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This dissertation is a study of Plutarch’s portrayal of military leadership in his 
Parallel Lives. I investigate Plutarch’s use of extended military narrative to provide 
examples of good generalship for his readers, his conception of the importance and 
dangers of a military education, his attitude toward the moral use of deception in 
warfare, and the importance of synkrisis to the reader’s final assessment of a general’s 
military ability. I conclude with a case study of the Pyrrhus-Marius, in which I examine 
how Plutarch uses military narrative throughout the pair to compare the generalship of 
the two men. 
I demonstrate that Plutarch’s conception of generalship in the Parallel Lives is 
nuanced, consistent, and often significant to the interpretation of a pair. Plutarch 
constructs his military narratives in such a way as to identify specific acts of generalship 
through which the military leaders among his readership could evaluate and improve 
their own generalship. Plutarch’s treatment of the morality of generalship is consistent 
with his views on education and character; while he accepts the necessity and 
appreciates the effectiveness of military deception, he also recognizes its limitations and 
holds up for criticism those generals who do not use it appropriately.  
I also examine the importance of the formal synkrisis at the end of each pair of 
Lives to the structural integrity of the Plutarchan book and the evaluation of military 
leadership in each pair. These concluding synkriseis demonstrate that Plutarch had a 
consistent set of criteria for evaluating the generalship of his subjects, and encourage the 
reader to make similar judgments on military ability themselves. This process of 
evaluation and comparison of military leadership is particularly important to my reading 
of the Pyrrhus-Marius, as comparing the military careers of its subjects allows for a 
more complete reading of the pair than is otherwise possible. 
 





This dissertation is a study of Plutarch’s portrayal of military leadership in his Parallel 
Lives. I investigate Plutarch’s use of extended military narrative to provide examples of 
good generalship for his readers, his conception of the importance and dangers of a 
military education, his attitude toward the moral use of deception in warfare, and the 
importance of Plutarch’s formal comparisons to the reader’s final assessment of a 
general’s military ability. I conclude with a case study of the Pyrrhus-Marius, in which I 
examine how Plutarch uses military narrative throughout the pair to compare the 
generalship of the two men. 
I demonstrate that Plutarch’s conception of generalship in the Parallel Lives is nuanced, 
consistent, and often significant to the interpretation of a pair. Plutarch constructs his 
military narratives in such a way as to identify specific acts of generalship through 
which the military leaders among his readership could evaluate and improve their own 
generalship. Plutarch’s treatment of the morality of generalship is consistent with his 
views on education and character; while he accepts the necessity and appreciates the 
effectiveness of military deception, he also recognizes its limitations and holds up for 
criticism those generals who do not use it appropriately.  
I also examine the importance of the formal comparisons at the end of each pair of Lives 
to the structural integrity of the Plutarchan book and the evaluation of military 
leadership in each pair. These comparisons demonstrate that Plutarch had a consistent set 
of criteria for evaluating the generalship of his subjects, and encourage the reader to 
make similar judgments on military ability themselves. This process of evaluation and 
comparison of military leadership is particularly important to my reading of the Pyrrhus-
Marius, as comparing the military careers of its subjects allows for a more complete 
reading of the pair than is otherwise possible.





Today, Plutarch is not often read for his insight on ancient military leadership. 
While it is possible to find essays among the Moralia that address the campaigns of 
Alexander the Great or the military achievements of Athens, there are certainly no 
manuals of military science such as those written by Onasander or Polyaenus. Likewise, 
his Parallel Lives, traditionally read as historical sources as much as biographical pieces, 
lack the personal military commentary that can be found, for example, in the works of 
Xenophon. Indeed, Plutarch’s sole first-hand military knowledge appears to have come 
from occasional visits to battlefields such as Bedriacum (Otho 14.2) and Chaeroneia 
(Sulla 21.4). It is certainly tempting to take Plutarch’s assertion in the proem of the 
Alexander that he writes “not histories, but lives” (Alex. 1.2) as sufficient reason to 
ignore anything he says on the subject of military leadership. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to read any of the Parallel Lives without encountering 
a significant amount of detail about the military achievements and careers of his 
subjects. Plutarch may not have been personally involved in military operations as 
writers like Thucydides, Xenophon, or Caesar were, but his narratives of Nicias’ Sicilian 
Expedition, Agesilaus’ Persian campaigns, and Caesar’s Gallic Wars nevertheless make 
up a substantial part of their respective Lives. Nor can these extensive military narratives 
be considered merely coincidental to Plutarch’s more overt interest in the character or 
virtue of his subjects: in all but two of the eighteen extant synkriseis to the Parallel 
Lives, Plutarch specifically encourages the reader to judge the military successes of his 
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subjects against each other, affording military achievement the same status in the 
synkriseis as political accomplishment and moral virtue.1  
This thesis seeks to address the considerable amount of material to be found 
regarding military leadership within the Parallel Lives. Over the course of this thesis I 
examine the majority of the Parallel Lives to varying degrees, excepting only those few 
pairs whose constituent Lives lack any serious discussion of generalship.2 Through a 
close examination of military narrative, military education, and specific acts of 
generalship throughout Plutarch’s work, I will demonstrate the consistency and 
significance of Plutarch’s portrayal of effective military leadership within the Parallel 
Lives. One area of particular interest throughout my investigation is Plutarch’s frequent 
emphasis on imitable acts of generalship. In many Lives, such as the Lucullus, Aemilius 
Paulus, and Marius, Plutarch identifies discreet actions that his subjects take on the 
battlefield that lead to their success. He cites, for instance, Lucullus’ methodical and 
attritional campaign against Mithridates’ numerically superior army (Luc. 8-11), 
Aemilius’ observation and exploitation of gaps in the Macedonian phalanx (Aem. 20.4-
8), and Marius’ effective use of terrain against the Teutones (Mar. 20-21), as being 
specifically responsible for their successes against difficult odds. The level of analysis 
contained in these passages and others goes beyond that which is needed simply to 
progress the narrative in their respective Lives. Indeed, it is indicative not only of 
                                                 
1 The two pairs whose synkriseis do not compare their subjects’ military accomplishments, the Lycurgus-
Numa and Demosthenes-Cicero, understandably do not include much discussion of generalship in the 
individual Lives themselves. They are the exception that prove the ubiquity of military leaders across the 
rest of the Parallel Lives. 
2 See n.1, above. 
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Plutarch’s interest in the specific military deeds of his subjects, but also of his 
recognition that many of his readers would be similarly concerned with the generalship 
of these accomplished statesmen.  
Another trend I follow in this thesis is Plutarch’s use of synkrisis in his portrayal 
of effective military leadership. The formal synkriseis that conclude most pairs of Lives 
often contain significant comparisons of their subjects’ generalship across a range of 
criteria, from relatively simple measurements such as number and scale of battles to 
more complex evaluations of personal responsibility, the influence of fortune, or the 
impact of specific military innovations. These comparisons demonstrate the degree to 
which Plutarch analyzed his subjects’ actions on the battlefield, and allow us to identify 
precisely what Plutarch considered important in his assessment of generalship. Just as 
important as these formal synkriseis are the internal comparisons both within and 
between pairs of Lives. Several pairs which feature some of the most militaristic of 
Plutarch’s subjects, such as the Alexander-Caesar and the Pyrrhus-Marius, lack the 
concluding synkriseis that so help to reinforce Plutarch’s portrayal of generalship from 
the pair itself. Nevertheless, the parallels between the military narratives within these 
pairs and others provide key insights into Plutarch’s judgments concerning what 
constitutes effective generalship. These judgments, both implicit and explicit, constitute 
an important aspect of the Parallel Lives, as they provide the opportunity for interested 
readers to further their own understanding of military leadership. This concept of self-
improvement is central to Plutarch’s conception of his work, and throughout this thesis I 
demonstrate that the Parallel Lives provide as much opportunity for aspiring generals to 
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better themselves as it does for any other statesmen. 
 
Previous Scholarship on Generalship in the Parallel Lives 
Plutarchan scholarship has tended to avoid investigating the military aspects of 
Plutarch's works to any great degree, and this comes as no surprise. Plutarch lacked the 
military background of predecessors like Xenophon or Polybius, and his stated purpose 
in the Lives is to help improve the moral character and virtues of his readers, not to 
provide a handbook for aspiring generals.3 The traditional tendency to avoid military 
themes among Plutarchan scholars is not, of course, without some justification, and 
several have identified legitimate shortcomings in Plutarch’s treatment of military 
matters. In the preface of his commentary on the Alexander, Hamilton (1969) correctly 
comments on the paucity of military narrative in the Life, which is particularly 
surprising for one who is so defined by his military successes. In addition to the 
weakness of some of his military narratives, Plutarch has earned criticism for his 
understanding of broad military trends. Pelling (1986a) argues that Plutarch seems to be 
mostly unaware of the real significance of Marian military reforms, largely due to his 
ignorance of Roman political institutions that do not have clear Greek analogies. 
Keaveney (2005) identifies another flaw in Plutarch’s understanding of military matters 
in the late Roman Republic made clear in the Sulla, in which Plutarch describes Sulla 
treating his soldiers in a way much more appropriate to the Triumvirs of the late 30s BC 
                                                 
3 Aem. 1.1-3; Per. 1.3-2.4; Dem. 1.3-6. 
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than to a consular commander of the early 80s.4 De Blois (1992) similarly acknowledges 
that while Plutarch may have been aware of the organizational and tactical changes that 
the Roman army underwent throughout the Republic, he makes very little mention of it. 
Plutarch likewise has little discussion of the development of Greek hoplite warfare in the 
5th and 4th centuries BC or of the changes Philip II made to the phalanx before the 
campaigns of Alexander. I do not disagree with these observations, but I do not believe 
that the lack of specific discussion of larger military trends in the Parallel Lives detracts 
from his ability to discuss the generalship of his subjects with accuracy. Indeed, passages 
such as Philipoemen’s efforts to upgrade the phalanx formation of the Achaean army 
(Phil. 9.1-14), Marius' alteration of the pilum (Mar. 25.2), and the difficulties Aemeilius 
faced when attempting to engage a Greek phalanx with his legionaries (Aem. 16-20) are 
not uncommon in the Parallel Lives. Such examples demonstrate that while broad 
historical development may not have been Plutarch’s main focus, Plutarch was certainly 
aware of at least some of the tactical innovations and difficulties that influenced the 
military careers of his subjects. 
Plutarch, then, rarely launches into extended discussions or digressions on the 
topic of generalship per se, and does not often dedicate much space in his Parallel Lives 
to analyzing broad military trends in Greek or Roman history. Nevertheless, several 
scholars in recent years have observed that Plutarch had more than a passing interest in 
the subject. In his seminal book on the Parallel Lives, Wardman (1974) recognizes that 
                                                 
4 Keaveney (2007), 93 n.5, identifies two further – if relatively minor – historical inconsistencies with 
Plutarch’s treatment of Marius’ reforms and Sulla’s discipline of his soldiers during the Social War.  
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generalship played an important role in the lives of many of Plutarch’s subjects, and 
identifies several parallels between military and political leadership; however, Wardman 
sees both military virtue and the victories created by good generalship as subordinate to 
political virtue and the larger goals of the ‘politicus’ in the Parallel Lives.5 This view, 
while justifiable within his discussion of the ‘politicus’, does not do justice to the actual 
significance of military virtue in the Lives, and ignores Lives like the Sertorius, 
Eumenes, or Pyrrhus in which the subject’s military career is foremost among Plutarch’s 
concerns. Duff (1999) shows considerably more appreciation for Plutarch’s interest in 
the military accomplishments of his subjects. Unlike Wardman, Duff does not see 
military achievement in the Parallel Lives as subordinate to a statesman’s political 
career, and indeed recognizes that Plutarch frequently shows an admiration for military 
success and achievement beyond that which reflects on a subject’s character.6 While 
Duff does not significantly expand further on the importance of military achievement in 
its own right, it is nevertheless an important recognition of an often-overlooked aspect of 
the Parallel Lives, and it was this initial work which led me to investigate further just 
how much Plutarch reflects upon generalship and what the ancient reader could infer 
about effective military practice from his writing.7 
 In more recent years scholars have begun to look more clearly at military 
generalship in the Parallel Lives, perhaps in some part due to greater recognition of the 
                                                 
5 Wardman (1974), 93-100. 
6 Duff (1999), 97-98. 
7 Duff (1999), 121-3, 184-204 does consider the conflict within several pairs between Plutarch’s high 
valuation of military success and the questionable means that some generals employed to achieve it, which 
is a theme I will address in Chapter 2. He likewise (1999, 263-4) discusses the importance of military 
achievement to Plutarch’s concluding synkriseis, which I expand upon in Chapter 3.  
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subject in Duff (1999). Teodorsson (2005) examines the importance of fortune to 
Timoleon’s military success and the degree to which that contributes to Plutarch’s praise 
of the general’s achievements. Tröster (2008), on the other hand, looks at the eventual 
failure of Lucullus’ military leadership due to his inability to control his soldiers. Several 
scholars have also examined the close interplay in some Lives between generalship and 
moral virtue. Verdegem (2005) compares the military achievements of Alcibiades with 
the consequences of his consistently questionable moral choices. Ingenkamp (2008) 
explores the impact of Pelopidas’ and Marcellus’ anger and rashness on their military 
careers (and particularly their untimely deaths). Beneker (2010) uses Sertorius’ warlike 
nature and military ability as a foundation to explore his relations with his δόξα and the 
consequent similarities between his Life and those of other Roman generals of the late 
republic. Xenophontos (2012) focuses solely on military ethics within the Fabius 
Maximus, and shows how Plutarch constructs the military narrative in that Life so as to 
demonstrate and reinforce correct moral action. This type of scholarship has been 
becoming more frequent, and represents a positive trend in the growing recognition of 
the importance of military leadership and narrative to the Parallel Lives. In particular, 
these recent scholars have been treating military, political, and moral achievements as 
interconnected and equally valuable to a complete understanding of individual Lives and 
pairs. Military activity in the Lives is no longer necessarily treated as peripheral, as it 
was in Wardman’s time, but as an integral component of the work. Nevertheless, apart 
from Marincola’s (2010) investigation of military narrative in the “Persian War Lives”, 
this research has tended to be limited in scope to a single Life or pair, and still focuses 
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primarily on the relationship between generalship and moral virtue rather than 
examining generalship in its own right. This is completely understandable given the 
current state of Plutarchan scholarship and the clear importance of character and virtue 
to the Parallel Lives, but at the same time leaves considerable room for new scholarship 
on the subject of military leadership. I build on this recent work, and focus particularly 
on how completely Plutarch integrates military narrative and analysis into the Parallel 
Lives as a whole. 
  
Methodology and Organization 
 The Parallel Lives represent a significant body of work, and in order to examine 
Plutarch’s portrayal of military leadership more effectively across all of the relevant 
Lives I have had to impose certain boundaries on my treatment of his works. First, I treat 
Plutarch’s Parallel Lives as literary works, and avoid analyzing his military narratives 
for their historical accuracy. This is something best suited for commentaries on 
individual Lives or pairs, which have the depth and detail to do such a topic justice.8 
That being said, I do engage with the sources of Plutarch’s military narratives at times, 
particularly in Chapter 1, in an attempt to identify how Plutarch adapted his source 
material to highlight particular military actions or themes.9 Overall, though, I take the 
                                                 
8 Indeed, historical commentaries have proven to be an invaluable resource for the origin and accuracy of 
Plutarch’s military narrative in many Lives. Hamilton (1969) meticulously identifies what is missing from 
Plutarch’s narratives of Alexander’s campaigns, while Pelling (1988b), Albini (1996), Georgiadou (1997), 
Pelling (1997), Shipley (1997), and Pelling (2012) each deal with Plutarch’s military narrative in useful 
detail. I found Shipley and Pelling (2012) particularly influential: Shipley for his analysis of the frequent 
acts of military deception in the Agesilaus, and Pelling for his meticulous detail regarding the sources and 
historical details of Caesar’s many campaigns. 
9 For Plutarch’s adaptation of his source material, cf. Pelling (1980), Larmour (1988), Larmour (1992). 
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details of Plutarch’s military narratives as they are written, and do not attempt to explain 
away even obvious factual errors or omissions; my work is not an apology of Plutarch’s 
worth as a military historian, but an appreciation of his significant interest in the art of 
the successful general.   
 Secondly, as the title suggests, this thesis focuses on military leadership in the 
Parallel Lives rather than all of Plutarch’s work as a whole. I do not avoid the Moralia 
altogether, and indeed delve into them quite heavily when examining Plutarch’s views 
on education and deception. Despite the wide variety of rhetorical pieces, philosophical 
dialogues, and miscellaneous essays that make up the Moralia, I believe that it is 
counterproductive to consider only half of Plutarch’s literary output when exploring 
such important themes in the Parallel Lives. Amongst everything else that Duff (1999) 
has added to the study of Plutarch, his work has shown the considerable benefits to be 
gained from examining the entirety of Plutarch’s corpus. Nevertheless, while I do 
address works from the Moralia within this thesis, I only consider Plutarch’s treatment 
of military leadership within the Parallel Lives themselves. 
 I have organized this thesis into four chapters, which together consider the 
variety of ways in which Plutarch incorporates themes of military leadership into the 
Parallel Lives. Chapter 1 examines Plutarch’s use of extended military narrative to 
provide concrete examples of generalship that his audience would be able to imitate or 
avoid. It begins by considering the contemporary readership of the Parallel Lives, and 
the possibility that at least a small portion of Plutarch’s Roman readers would have been 
in the position to put lessons of generalship into practice. It then addresses the 
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importance of imitation to Plutarch’s conception of how his audience would engage with 
individual pairs, and the idea that his readers would examine the Parallel Lives in order 
to identify great deeds that are worthy of imitation. The concept of imitation provides 
the framework for an examination of Plutarch’s extended military narratives across 
several Lives, where it is seen that Plutarch consistently constructs his narrative in such 
a way as to highlight particular acts of military leadership that he considers to be worthy 
of imitation. It is from these narratives that Plutarch’s ideal of a rational and 
conscientious military leader begins to emerge. 
Chapter 2 builds on the significance of military narrative established in the first 
chapter to examine two related themes that connect military leadership to moral virtue. It 
begins by considering the importance that Plutarch places on his subjects receiving a 
balanced education, and the moral implications for those statesmen whose education is 
primarily or exclusively military. The chapter then examines the portrayal of military 
deception in the Parallel Lives, focusing particularly on two brief case studies: one on 
the Spartan Lives Lysander and Agesilaus, and another on the Sertorius-Eumenes. These 
two studies demonstrate that Plutarch clearly appreciated the effectiveness of military 
deception, but that he was also willing to identify and implicitly criticize those generals 
who did not use it appropriately. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the formal synkriseis that conclude the majority of pairs in 
the Parallel Lives. It examines the criteria that Plutarch uses to compare his subjects’ 
military careers in the synkriseis, and considers the consistency between such 
comparisons and the portrayal of the same military careers in the Lives themselves. This 
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analysis demonstrates that Plutarch’s comparison of military achievement in the 
synkriseis is considerably more nuanced than it first appears. The chapter further 
examines the synkriseis in the context of their traditional purpose of directly comparing 
and judging between the actions of two men. While Plutarch rarely makes an explicit 
judgment between the military ability and achievements of his subjects, his frequent use 
of synkriseis suggests that he fully expected his readers to come to their own conclusions 
about which statesman in each pair should be considered the superior general.  
The importance of synkrisis to the discussion of military leadership in the 
Parallel Lives becomes clear in Chapter 4, an extended case study of the Pyrrhus-
Marius. Pyrrhus and Marius are both known for their extensive military careers, and the 
pair itself is one of the few that lacks a concluding synkrisis; these two characteristics 
make it particularly worthwhile to examine the Pyrrhus-Marius in terms of the themes 
discussed throughout the rest of the thesis, with the goal of concluding which man was 
the better general. Comparing the military narratives within the two Lives not only 
makes it possible to evaluate the generalship of each man, but also magnifies several 
important themes within the pair that are not otherwise apparent. The military leadership 
of the two men, upon close inspection, proves to be one of the most important features in 
the entire pair. 
Plutarch’s diverse treatment of military leadership throughout the Parallel Lives 
demonstrates an interest in the subject that is rarely acknowledged. He is not merely 
concerned with the intersection between generalship and character, although that is 
certainly a common theme in many Lives, but with the actual mechanics of good 
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generalship and the success that effective military leadership brings for both individuals 
and states. One of Plutarch’s stated aims in the Parallel Lives is the betterment of his 
readers, and his consistent focus on the actions of successful generals on the battlefield 
encourages the military-minded among his audience to reflect on how they might 
improve their own leadership abilities. Plutarch’s portrayal of military leadership in the 
Parallel Lives, then, is not an afterthought, and should not be treated as such. It is 
deliberate, well-crafted, and an integral part of the work as a whole; its study allows for 



















Military Narrative in Plutarch’s Lives 
 
 Plutarch's military narrative in the Parallel Lives often pales in comparison to 
that found in other sources. His descriptions of important battles such as Cannae (Fab. 
14-16) or Gaugamela (Alex. 31-33), while often of admirable length for the size of the 
Life they are found in, lack significant detail compared to other extant accounts.10 Such 
details as the orders of battle and troop movements that other authors traditionally 
include rarely find much space in Plutarch's descriptions of battles and campaigns. 
While these limitations sometimes earn special mention in commentaries of particular 
Lives, such as by Hamilton, they are rarely held against Plutarch as an author.11 After all, 
as is often cited, Plutarch wrote “not histories, but lives” (Alex. 1.2), and so would not be 
expected to dedicate much time to the details of war. And yet, with a few notable 
exceptions, Plutarch dedicates a substantial amount of space in many Lives to the battles 
and campaigns fought by his subjects.  
 In some Lives Plutarch chooses to highlight one or two particular campaigns 
with a particularly lengthy narrative. The Caesar contains extended narratives of both 
the Gallic Wars (Caes. 15-27) and the Civil War (Caes. 36-47), which is of course not 
surprising given the importance of those campaigns to his life and career.  Lucullus' 
                                                 
10 Both Polybius and Livy dedicate eight chapters to the battle of Cannae (Pol. 3.110-18; Livy 22.44-52). 
Arrian spends seven chapters on Gaugamela (3.8-15), while Diodorus Siculus spends five (17.56-61).  
Chapters are obviously not a precise unit of measurement and can vary widely in length, but in my opinion 
still provide an effective rough comparison of length. 
11 Hamilton (1969), xl. 
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campaigns against Mithridates and Tigranes (Luc. 7.1-19.5; 24.1-35.7), Marius' war with 
the Cimbri and Teutones (Mar. 13-27), and Antony's Parthian expedition (Ant. 37-52) 
are a few other examples that are equal in length and detail to what is found in the 
Caesar. In other Lives, such as the Fabius Maximus, the Nicias, and the Sertorius, 
however, military narrative is even more prominent, and effectively forms the 
centerpiece of the entire work in each case.12 All of the statesmen mentioned above are 
well-known generals, and it is understandable that Plutarch dedicates much of their 
Lives to their respective military careers. The presence or absence of military narrative 
in a particular Life is not always so predictable, however. The Alexander stands out 
clearly as the Life of a general with surprisingly little military narrative. In the 
Alexander, descriptions of major military operations make up fewer than 8 of 77 
chapters, and narrative of actual fighting takes up even less space.13 This contrasts 
sharply with the Caesar, which dedicates the majority of thirteen chapters to Caesar's 
campaigns in Gaul (Caes. 15-27), twelve to his war with Pompey (Caes. 36-47), and 
several more to his wars in Pontus (Caes. 50), Africa (Caes. 52-53), and Spain (Caes. 
56). Other Lives, on the other hand, contain considerably more military narrative than 
one might expect; both the Aristides and the Crassus show that Plutarch could highlight 
the generalship of men who were primarily politicians. The Persian Wars feature heavily 
in the Aristides, and Plutarch dedicates 13 of 27 chapters to the battles of Marathon, 
                                                 
12 The entire second half of the Nicias details his participation in the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition (Nic. 15-
30); the war with Hannibal dominates nearly the entirety of the Fabius Maximus (Fab. 2-27); and 
Sertorius' campaigns in Spain against Metellus and Pompey form the majority of his Life (Sert. 12-26).  
13 Plutarch's descriptions of the major battles of Alexander's campaign are consistently short: Granicus: 
16.1-14; Issus: 20.8; Tyre: 24.5-25.3; Gaugamela: 31-3; Bactria and Sogdiana: 45.5-6, 58; Hydaspes 60.1-
8.  
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Salamis, and Plataea.14 The Crassus as well includes a surprising amount of military 
narrative considering its subject. Plutarch dedicates four chapters to the revolt of 
Spartacus (Cras. 8-11) and a full seventeen (Cras. 17-33) to Crassus' failed expedition 
against Parthia. Plutarch's description of the disastrous battle of Carrhae (Cras. 23-27) is 
far more detailed than his narrative of any of Alexander's battles.15 There are, in fact, 
very few Lives that lack any military narrative; only the Lycurgus-Numa, Demosthenes-
Cicero, and the Gracchi do not contain at least some description of their subjects' actions 
in command of soldiers.16  
It is this military narrative, which Plutarch includes in nearly every Life, that will 
be the focus of this chapter. Over the course of the chapter, I will argue that these 
narratives are not only in accord with but also complement Plutarch's stated goal of 
improving his readers' character.17 First, I will examine the recent scholarship on 
Plutarch's use of military narrative in the Parallel Lives, and consider the relationship 
between military narrative and the depiction of character. I will argue that actual military 
narrative, as distinguished from the anecdotes about early military service that are 
frequent in the Lives, is particularly effective at demonstrating the character of the 
generals involved. After this I will discuss the readership of the Parallel Lives, 
                                                 
14 Plutarch's treatment of Marathon (Aris. 5.1-7) and Salamis (Aris. 8.1-9.4) is understandably short, but 
the narrative of Plataea is ten chapters long (Aris. 11.1-20.7). 
15 The focus on Crassus' Parthian campaign is much less surprising when it is set next to the Sicilian 
Expedition in the Nicias, and Plutarch states explicitly in the first sentence of the pair that he saw the two 
disasters as suitable parallels (Nic. 1.1). 
16 Plutarch does say that Cicero was saluted as imperator by his soldiers after defeating a band of robbers 
while in Cilicia (Cic. 36.6), but gives no further detail. As mentioned above, Plutarch mentions the early 
military service of the two Gracchi brothers (Gracchi 4.5-6, 23(2).1-3), but provides no subsequent 
narrative of their actions.  
17  Duff (1999), 49-51. See below, pp. 27-32. 
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specifically considering the relevance of its dedicatee Sosius Senecio. Plutarch intended 
the Lives to have a positive educational effect on its readers, and I will demonstrate that 
there were indeed contemporary readers of the Parallel Lives who could have benefited 
from reading about the actions of successful generals. In the next section I consider how 
this process may have actually occurred. In the proems of several Lives, most notably 
the Pericles, Aemilius Paulus, and Demetrius, Plutarch explains that he wrote the Lives 
in part so that his readers would have the opportunity to imitate the virtues of past 
statesmen.18 I argue that Plutarch's descriptions of battles and campaigns often provide 
the possibility for the same sort of imitation: even though contemporary generals would 
not have been likely to encounter the same exact situations as Caesar or Fabius or 
Philopoemen, Plutarch frequently isolates key actions and decisions that were indeed 
imitable by those of his readers who commanded armies. Finally, after examining select 
passages of military narrative from various Lives, I will consider what precisely a reader 
could learn about successful generalship from the Parallel Lives.  
 
Scholarship on Plutarch's Military Narrative 
 The scholarship which has focused on military narrative within the Lives has 
done so within the context of Plutarch's interest in portraying moral virtue. Sophia 
Xenophontos' recent work on practical ethics in Plutarch’s work is one such example. In 
an earlier article, she argues that Fabius' frequent disagreements with the other Roman 
                                                 
18 Per. 1.4-2.4; Aem. 1.1-4; Demetr. 1.3-6. For a more detailed analysis of these passages in terms of 
military imitation, see below, pp. 27-32. 
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generals throughout the Fabius-Maximus serve to display Plutarch's views of proper, 
ethical generalship. The contrasts between the generalship of Fabius and that of his 
colleagues in the face of Hannibal's invasion demonstrate both the dangers of rashness 
and ambition in a general, and the consequent importance of prudence and foresight.19 
She has more recently argued that Plutarch uses military narrative as a setting for both 
his subjects and his audience to engage in reflection of their own character and actions.20 
I completely agree with the utility of military narrative in the Parallel Lives that 
Xenophontos advocates here, but believe that this point can and should be taken further: 
as I argue below, Plutarch’s military narrative provides interested readers with an 
opportunity to reflect on their own generalship as well as their character. Other scholars 
have likewise used Plutarch's portrayal of military leadership in the Lives as a lens 
through which to examine specific moral questions.21 Such work shows a growing 
awareness of the prevalence of military narrative in the Parallel Lives, but at the same 
time also demonstrates a continued reluctance to see Plutarch's portrayal of generalship 
as anything other than another window into the moral character of his subjects.  
 Timothy Duff has acknowledged the importance that Plutarch places on the 
military successes of his heroes, and has even suggested that Plutarch had a particular 
interest in military affairs. He makes a distinction between military narrative which 
characterizes a particular subject, and that which does not. The non-characterizing 
                                                 
19 Xenophontos (2012).  
20 Xenophontos (2016), 151-172. 
21 Tröster (2008) discusses Lucullus' difficulties in dealing with the plêthos, which are particularly clear in 
his treatment of soldiers while on campaign; Ingenkamp (2008) considers Plutarch's conflicting judgments 
concerning the excessive rashness that he thought characterized the generalship of Pelopidas and 
Marcellus. 
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passages, Duff argues, demonstrate both Plutarch's interest in military affairs and the 
high regard in which he held success, even success which came at the price of 
questionable morality; this conflict between success and morality, in turn, makes several 
pairs of Parallel Lives particularly problematic.22 Duff identifies passages from the Cato 
Major, Pelopidas, and the Gracchi as particularly clear examples of characterizing 
military narrative, and indeed they are. Cato appears brave, incorruptible, and boastful 
during his campaigns in Spain and Greece (Cato Major 10-14), Pelopidas and 
Epaminondas demonstrate great loyalty during the battle of Mantinea (Pel. 4.5-8), and 
Plutarch explicitly identifies the bravery and discipline that the Gracchi brothers show 
during their early military careers (Gracchi 4.5-6, 23(2).1-3).23 There are many more 
similar passages throughout the Lives. Marius appears much like the Gracchi in his early 
military career, when he excelled the other young men in bravery and readily accepted 
the changes that his commander Scipio introduced into the army (Mar. 3.2). In the 
Camillus, Plutarch describes the Roman engaging and routing the bravest of the enemy 
at the head of the army while dragging along a missile in his wounded thigh (Cam. 2.1). 
The difficulty only comes when attempting to identify military narrative that does not, in 
fact, characterize the subject. Duff singles out Plutarch's description of Caesar's Gallic 
campaigns (Caes. 15-27) as a contrast to the passages cited above, and sees it as an 
example of Plutarch's admiration for military achievement. I agree that this passage from 
                                                 
22 Duff (1999), 98. Duff identifies the Coriolanus-Alcibiades, Lysander-Sulla, Phocion-Cato Minor and 
Pyrrhus-Marius as pairs which embody this conflict. See Duff (1997); (1999), 101-240 for more on these 
Lives.  
23 Cf. Georgiadou (1997), 36-7 for the close connection between Pelopidas and Epaminondas throughout 
the Pelopidas.  
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the Caesar is indeed considerably different than those found in the Pelopidas or the 
Gracchi, but not because of any lack of characterization.24 While the opening chapters of 
the section focus on Caesar's achievements (Caes. 15.1-5) and the virtues demonstrated 
by the soldiers under his command (Caes. 16.1-9), Caesar's character is conspicuous 
throughout the rest of the narrative. His impressive resilience and continual efforts to 
train his body while on campaign, despite his apparent frailty and epileptic fits (Caes. 
17.2-3), clearly demonstrate his self-control and dedication. He was constantly busy, 
confident on horseback, wrote frequent letters, and lacked pretension (Caes. 17.4-11). 
Caesar's actions in the campaigns and battles that follow characterize him as well: he is 
decisive (Caes. 18.2, 19.9, 24.4, 26.7), bold (Caes. 19.7, 20.8-9, 23.2), clever (Caes. 
22.7, 24.6), and eager for glory (Caes. 22.6). Herein lies the main difficulty with trying 
to identify military passages that do not inform on the subject's character. As Duff and 
others have recognized, the ancient notion of character was inextricably linked with 
action: one's character determined one's actions, so it was through a man's actions that 
his character could be best observed.25 This relationship between action and character 
lies at the heart of Plutarch's Parallel Lives. Plutarch wrote about statesmen, not 
philosophers, and so even the Lives of dedicated politicians such as Demosthenes and 
Cicero demonstrate their subjects' characters by highlighting the important actions of 
their careers.26 It is not only actions that illustrate character, of course; at the beginning 
                                                 
24 I would suggest, however, that the passage Duff cites from the Cato Major is much more closely related 
to that from the Caesar than those from the Pelopidas or Gracchi.  
25 Duff (1999), 13-14. Cf. Gill (1983; 1990; 1996).  
26 Duff (1999), 15-16. 
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of the Alexander Plutarch famously says that phrases and jests may reveal even more 
about a man's character than illustrious deeds (Alex. 1.2), and he does not neglect the 
meaningful sayings of his subjects in the Parallel Lives. However, while aphorisms are 
particularly prevalent in a few Lives, actions inevitably form the background of both 
characterization and narrative in Plutarch's biographies.27 Because of the relationship 
between action and character, then, military narrative, with its focus on the actions of a 
particular general, invariably forms part of that general's characterization. 
 Nevertheless, there is a considerable difference between the Gallic War narrative 
in the Caesar and the rather perfunctory pieces of military narrative which Duff cites 
from the Pelopidas and the Gracchi. The passage from the Caesar covers several 
campaigns over a span of many years and has a clear chronological progression; it is by 
any definition a coherent narrative. The passages from the Pelopidas, Gracchi, and 
others cited above, on the other hand, are simply anecdotes. It is telling that these 
examples all fall in the beginnings of their respective Lives, in what Duff has termed 
'proemial openings'.28 Such openings appear in the majority of Lives, and serve to 
introduce both the subject's character and important themes that will appear throughout 
the rest of the Life. These openings often include stories from early in the subject's 
military or political career, but, crucially, do not form part of the standard chronological 
narratives of their respective Lives.29 References to early military actions in these 
                                                 
27 Plutarch is particularly fond of Laconisms, as can be seen at Lyc. 19-20; Lys. 22.1-5; Cato Major 7-9; 
and, of course, the Apopthegmata Laconica. 
28 Duff (2008a), 190. 
29 Duff (2008a), 190-1. The proemial openings are often, though not always, grammatically separated from 
the primary narrative. 
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proemial openings do primarily focus on characterization, as Duff has observed: 
Plutarch’s brief illustrations of the loyalty of Pelopias (Pel. 4.5-8) and the bravery of 
Marius (Mar. 3.2) and Camillus (Cam. 2.1), as discussed above, support this. However, 
because these anecdotes are so limited in scope and are isolated from the actual narrative 
of a particular Life, they should not be classified as military narrative. From this point 
on, military narrative will refer only to passages in the primary chronological narrative 
of a Life that cover a complete battle and campaign. These will be the focus of the rest 
of the chapter.  
  
Readership of the Parallel Lives 
 So far I have suggested that Plutarch's military narratives in the Parallel Lives 
provide examples of effective generalship that his readers could imitate. This necessarily 
brings up the difficult question of who actually read the Parallel Lives, and whether any 
readers would realistically have benefited from practical advice on generalship. In the 
Political Precepts, Plutarch specifically dissuades his readers from glorifying the Greek 
military successes of Marathon, Plataea, and the Eurymedon: contemporary Greeks no 
longer had the opportunity (or need) for independent military action under Roman rule, 
and stirring up the common people with memories of past victories is not only laughable 
but potentially dangerous (813C-814C).30 If Plutarch expected all of the readers of the 
                                                 
30 Marincola (2010), 121 sees a potential paradox in Plutarch's warning here, considering not only that the 
Persian Wars form the central narrative of the Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon, but also that Plutarch 
makes more than a hundred references to the Persian Wars in the Moralia. However, this passage is not 
truly in conflict with the rest of his writings. Plutarch only says that it is τοὺς πολλούς (814C) that begin to 
act wantonly at the thought of past military glories; he certainly would not have expected τοὺς πολλούς to 
be reading his works, and thus no doubt expected his readers to understand the educational purpose behind 
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Parallel Lives to be Greeks, politically active or not, then he could not have expected his 
military narratives to have had any educational effect on his readers. Of course, we know 
that at least one reader of the Lives was Roman: the dedicatee of the series, Sosius 
Senecio. Although the opening pair of the Parallel Lives, which would have likely 
contained an explicit dedication, is not extant, several references to Senecio in other 
Lives have made his position as sole dedicatee of the series widely accepted.31 Sosius 
Senecio was not only twice consul and a prominent general under Trajan, but also a 
well-educated and philosophically-minded man, sympathetic to Greek culture, who 
additionally received the dedications to Plutarch's Table Talk and Progress in Virtue.32 
Senecio appears to be a perfect representation of the type of reader most able to benefit 
from reading the Lives: an influential Roman in the imperial administration who was 
interested in philosophy and who had the opportunity to put both political and military 
lessons from the Parallel Lives to practical use. Nevertheless, opinion is still divided on 
how representative of the Parallel Lives' readership he actually was. Duff acknowledges 
the possibility that Romans besides Sosius Senecio may have read the Lives, and that 
some Greek readers may also have achieved similarly high positions in the imperial 
administration; however, he also asserts that “the majority of Plutarch's readers”, even if 
they were indeed politically active, faced the political limitations that Plutarch sets out 
                                                 
his discussions of the Persian Wars. 
31 Plutarch references Senecio by name at Thes. 1.1; Dem. 1.1; 31.7; Dion 1.1. At Aem. 1.6 and Ag./Cleom. 
2.9 Plutarch addresses an unnamed reader in the second person singular, who appears likely to have been 
Senecio as well. On the basis of this, Ziegler (1949), 52-3 suggested that Senecio was the dedicatee of the 
entire series of Parallel Lives, and this has become the communis opinio; cf. Jones (1970), 102; (1971), 
55. 
32 Quaest. conv. 612C-E; prof. in virt. 75B; see Jones (1971), 55-6.  
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for Greek magistrates in the Political Precepts.33 This is certainly reasonable, especially 
given that many aspects of the Lives appear to be written with a distinctly Greek 
audience in mind, as discussed below. 
 Duff does provide a stronger case for a primarily Greek readership of the Lives, 
although not in connection with Senecio's role as dedicatee. He observes that Plutarch 
frequently judges his Roman subjects according to Greek virtues and values, especially 
in regards to the existence of a Hellenic education: that Coriolanus and Marius reject 
proper education, for example, counts as a major stroke against each of their characters 
in their respective Lives.34 Duff also argues that the frequent glosses and explanations of 
relatively simple Latin words and phrases throughout the Parallel Lives are evidence 
that Plutarch constructs both the author and the reader of the Parallel Lives as Greek.35 
In contrast, Philip Stadter, drawing upon work by Simon Swain, has recently suggested 
that such Latin glosses were a stylistic necessity when including foreign words in Greek 
literature of Plutarch's time, regardless of the reader's expected knowledge.36 He 
suggests that Plutarch saw the Parallel Lives as a means to bring practical Greek 
philosophy to Rome, so that he might in some way educate the most influential 
statesmen of his time as Plato had once done.37 Christopher Pelling, in turn, has 
                                                 
33 Duff (1999), 66-7. 
34 Duff (1999), 303-308. Cf. Swain (1990b); Cor. 1.2-3; Mar. 2.2-4.  
35 Duff (1999), 302. Some of these examples, such as Plutarch's explanation of Pompey's surname Magnus 
at both Crass. 7.1 and Pomp. 13.6-7, or his discussion of Roman naming practices at Mar. 1.1-3, are 
particularly telling for a Greek readership. Cf. Cerezo Magán (1992), 16-18; Wardman (1974), 39-40. 
36 Stadter (2014), 46; following Swain (1996), 40-2. 
37 Stadter (2014), 50-5. Again following Swain (1990), Stadter highlights the emphasis that Plutarch often 
put on the benefits of the Hellenic education (or the consequences of its absence) for the Roman subjects 
of the Lives. 
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advocated a middle ground, and, most importantly, does not attempt to narrow down the 
real-life audience of the Lives. He agrees with Duff that Plutarch has constructed a 
primarily Greek audience for the Lives, but he also recognizes the significance of 
Plutarch's dedication of the work to Senecio. Pelling suggests that the dedication to 
Senecio not only represents one end of the range of actual readers but also indicates that 
the Lives will be valuable in some way to everyone from local Greeks to influential 
Roman leaders; the real-life readership of the Lives almost certainly included influential 
Romans like Senecio, local Greek politicians like Menemachus, and Plutarch's students 
in Chaeronea.38  
 I believe that this is the most productive way to consider the readership of the 
Parallel Lives. The evidence for a constructed Greek readership is convincing; while 
Stadter has shown that some of Plutarch's explanations of Latin words and Roman 
customs do serve an additional narrative purpose in some Lives, the numerous glosses 
that Plutarch includes are clearly aimed toward a presumed Greek reader.39 Nevertheless, 
that Plutarch constructs a Greek narratee for the Lives by no means suggests that he did 
not expect Romans to read the work as well.40 The dedication to Sosius Senecio is 
important, and appears to be based on a genuine relationship between the two men. 
Senecio's frequent appearances in the Table Talk, which is also dedicated to him, are 
particularly illustrative of the friendship between the two: Plutarch relates several 
                                                 
38 Pelling (2004), 407-409. 
39 Stadter (2014), 46. He specifically considers both Plutarch's explanation of Roman political terms like 
populus, patricius, and senatus in Rom. 13, and his definition of a decies at Ant. 4.7-9.  
40 Jones (1971), 78. 
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dinners and discussions that the two of them shared (612E-615C; 622C-623C; 635E-
638A), including one which took place while Senecio was a guest at the wedding of 
Plutarch's son (666D). This is certainly not to say that there was no hint of a client-
patron relationship in Plutarch's dedications to Senecio, which present the Roman as a 
particularly educated and cultured individual; it is very likely, as Stadter suggests, that it 
was on Senecio's recommendation that Plutarch received his ornamenta consularia from 
Trajan.41 Nevertheless, it was not a one-sided dedication, and while Plutarch obviously 
addresses the Lives to Senecio because of the philosophical and moral benefits that 
reading them would bring, he could not have been unaware that the consul's career and 
aptitude lay in the military sphere.42 Likely to have been in command of a legion in 
Lower Germany during the reign of Domitian, Senecio was appointed governor of Gallia 
Belgica soon after Domitian's assassination. After his first ordinary consulship in 99, 
Senecio held high command under Trajan in the Dacian Wars, and it is likely his success 
in that campaign which earned him his second consulship in 107.43 Senecio, then, 
because of his combination of a philosophical education and political influence, closely 
embodied the statesmen of Classical Greece and Rome featured in the Lives by 
simultaneously exercising both political and military power.  
                                                 
41 Stadter (2014), 41-2. Cf. Jones (1971), 56. While Jones (1971), 49 cautions against presuming a similar 
client-patron relationship between Plutarch and L. Mestrius Florus, who secured the Chaeronean's Roman 
citizenship, there must have been some sort of mutual exchange between the two; Stadter's suggestion that 
Florus may have received the dedication of Plutarch's Lives of the Caesars, although pure speculation, is 
tempting. See Stadter (2014), 40-1. 
42 Plutarch never makes specific reference to Senecio's military experience, but he does refer to Trajan's 
expedition across the Danube in On the Principle of Cold (949E), and would certainly have known that 
Senecio was a part of that campaign. It might well have been Senecio who provided Plutarch with the 
story of boats being crushed by the river when it froze over. 
43 Jones (1971), 55-6. 
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 Sosius Senecio was not the only one of Plutarch's friends to have held significant 
military command in the imperial administration. Perhaps the eldest of these was L. 
Mestrius Florus, to whom Plutarch owed his Roman citizenship. Florus served under 
Otho at Bedriacum in 69, apparently by duress, and later provided Plutarch with a tour 
of the battlefield (Otho 14.2).44 There are more such friends to be found among the 
following generations. Quietus Avidius, a joint recipient of On Brotherly Love and the 
sole dedicatee of On Delays of Divine Vengeance, was a legionary legate late in 
Vespasian's reign or early in Domitian's, was suffect consul in 93, and held a consular 
command in Britain under Trajan.45 If the Saturninus to whom Plutarch dedicates 
Against Colotes is L. Herrenius Saturninus, who intervened in Delphi as proconsul of 
Achaea in 98/9, he is another of Plutarch's friends with military influence; this 
Saturninus was a legate of Upper Moesia during the second Dacian War.46 Of course, 
none of these men have any explicit connection to the Parallel Lives, and none of them 
appear to have shared the same close relationship that Plutarch and Senecio did. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Plutarch did not only surround himself 
with local Greek magistrates or students of philosophy; Senecio was not the only 
influential Roman with whom Plutarch was on good terms. More significantly, Plutarch's 
friends in the imperial administration demonstrate Plutarch's awareness – if it was not 
already clear from the Lives themselves – that an interest in philosophy could 
successfully coexist with a military career. 
                                                 
44 Jones (1971), 49. 
45 Jones (1971), 51-3. De frat. am. 478A-B; de sera num. vind. 548A. 
46 Jones (1971), 57. Adv. Col. 1107E. 
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 The virtues that Plutarch's subjects demonstrate in the Parallel Lives are, of 
course, relevant to all readers, regardless of their political or military influence. While it 
is difficult to deny that Plutarch did not expect at least some of his readers to have the 
opportunity to put into action some of the more practical lessons in statesmanship 
demonstrated by the famous leaders of the past, it is important not to take Plutarch’s 
Roman connections too far when considering his composition of the Lives. While 
Senecio and Plutarch’s other similarly influential acquaintances may well represent 
‘ideal’ readers – those most able to put into practice lessons learned from the Lives on 
the widest scale – it is very unlikely that Plutarch would have composed the Parallel 
Lives with such readers in mind. Plutarch must surely have written the Parallel Lives 
with the well-educated but local Greeks that made up his immediate social circle in mind 
as the series’ primary readers. Nevertheless, while the moral and political lessons so 
prevalent in the Lives would have applied to a wider readership, there was at the same 
time an audience for military lessons as well, for whom the generalship of Philopoemen, 
Marius, or Caesar might elicit particular interest. 
 
Imitation of Generalship in the Parallel Lives 
 The importance of imitation to Plutarch's stated purpose of the Lives is widely 
accepted. While the first book of the Parallel Lives, the Epaminondas-Scipio, and the 
presumed introduction that would have begun it, have been lost, there exist in the 
beginning of other Lives authorial statements from Plutarch indirectly explaining his 
methodology. His purpose appears to be clear. Through the Parallel Lives, Plutarch seeks 
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to demonstrate the character of his subjects by describing their actions and sayings – 
both great and small (Alex. 1.1-3; Nic. 1.5); he expects that by examining the lives of 
great men, his readers will be driven to imitate their virtues, avoid their vices, and in so 
doing improve their own characters (Aem. 1.1-3; Per. 1.3-2.4; Dem. 1.3-6). The 
importance of imitation to the reading of the Parallel Lives can be seen particularly in 
the proem to the Aemilius Paulus. Plutarch begins the Life by briefly discussing his 
reason for writing the Parallel Lives: 
Ἐμοὶ [μὲν] τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι' ἑτέρους, ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ 
φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι' ἐμαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως 
κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀλλ' ἢ 
συνδιαιτήσει καὶ συμβιώσει τὸ γινόμενον ἔοικεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἐπιξενούμενον ἕκαστον 
αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ παραλαμβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶμεν 
“ὅσσος ἔην οἷός τε”, τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων 
λαμβάνοντες (Aem. 1.1-2). 
 
It fell to me to undertake the writing of the Lives for others, but now to continue it and 
be fond of it for myself as well, endeavouring in some way as in the mirror of history to 
arrange a Life and make it like the virtues of those men. It is like nothing other than 
what happens when one lives together and spends time together, whenever, as if 
welcoming and entertaining each one of these men from history, we examine “how great 
and of what kind he was”, taking from his deeds the most authoritative and most 
beautiful to know. 
 
The overall message of this passage is that readers of the Parallel Lives, including 
Plutarch himself, should read the Lives in a similar way to how they read history, by 
examining the lives and actions of those they read about and picking out the qualities 
that made them great.47 Plutarch’s reference to the mirror of history similarly suggests 
                                                 
47 Plutarch makes a similar argument in How to recognize that one is making progress in virtue, where he 
suggests that history, poetry, and philosophy should be read as much for the practical benefit they bring 
the reader as much for enjoyment (Prof. in Virt. 79C-E). 
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the importance of self-reflection while reading his works.48 Just as important, in my 
opinion, is the idea of identifying and ‘taking’ the best deeds of the men one reads about. 
This suggests that while the Parallel Lives allow readers to examine the lives and 
careers of great men in their entirety, Plutarch also expected his readers to select specific 
actions of the subjects of individual Lives, and to use those particular actions to better 
themselves. I would suggest, as we shall see below, that this process of selecting 
individual actions from the Lives to examine and imitate is particularly important to the 
understanding of military narrative within the Parallel Lives.  
 While the idea of imitation forms the central focus of Plutarch's proem to the 
Aemilius Paulus, it is not immediately clear how Plutarch actually conceived of this 
process of imitation. Duff has made the argument that the subjects of the Lives were so 
far removed from Plutarch's own time that the readers of the Lives would have had no 
opportunity to imitate the exact circumstances of the men they read about.49 He points to 
the Political Precepts as evidence that Plutarch was well aware of the stark lack of 
political and military independence enjoyed by contemporary Greek magistrates, and 
argues that Plutarch could not then have expected his readers to imitate the lives of past 
statesmen as he proposes in the proems.50 This objection, however, needlessly creates a 
problem where there was not one before. When Plutarch considers how reading the Lives 
might lead to imitation in the beginning of the Pericles (Per. 1.4-2.4), he is not 
                                                 
48 For the use of mirror imagery in general, see McCarty (1989); for more on Plutarch’s use of the mirror 
in this particular case, see Duff (1999), 32-34; Zadorojnyi (2010). 
49 Duff (1999), 66-8.  
50 Pol. Pre. 805A, 813D-814C, 824C-D.  
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suggesting that his readers should imitate the exact actions of Pericles by, for instance, 
building another Parthenon. However, many of Plutarch’s politically-involved readers 
would have likely had the means and opportunity to imitate Pericles to an extent by 
implementing at least some form of building projects to beautify their local city, and 
Plutarch clearly stresses the benefits of such actions within the Life (esp. Per. 12-13). 
Moreover, it is by imitating these actions that Plutarch’s readers should (and by nature 
will) imitate the virtues embodied by those actions, which will in turn lead them to 
choose to act in such a way more frequently.51 That Plutarch did indeed see this process 
as an imitation of virtue – rather than exact action – is most clear from the Philopoemen: 
Plutarch says that Philopoemen imitated (ἐμιμεῖτο) Epaminondas' energy, wisdom, and 
incorruptibility, but (because of his own failings) not his gentleness, gravity, or kindness 
in political disputes (Phil. 3.1).52 Philopoemen saw the precise actions of Epaminondas 
as a model of general action and good character that he might imitate, and so 
consciously strove to act in the same way in his life that he saw that the Theban leader 
did in his. The political situation in Greece during Philopoemen's time was considerably 
different than Epaminondas' situation more than a century before, but the virtues 
demonstrated by Epaminondas were just as applicable to the third century BC as the 
fourth. This must certainly be the same process which Plutarch expects his readers to 
experience upon reading the Parallel Lives; the precise actions of past statesmen may be 
                                                 
51 This is in line with Duff's comments on προαίρεσις in his explanation of the Pericles' proem (1999, 39). 
Cf. Wardman (1974), 107-15.  
52 Duff cites this passage and others (Dem. 5.1-5; Them. 3.4-5; Pel. 7.2) as emblematic of Plutarch's 
concept of imitation (1999; 51), and so surely understands the concept, but at times seems to get too 
caught up with the idea of imitating deeds rather than virtue (1999; 34-45, 66-8). Cf.  Valgiglio (1992), 
4011-13, and Frazier (1995), 148-9 for more such examples of heroic emulation. 
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unique to their own time, but the way in which they acted demonstrates timeless virtue 
worthy of imitation. 
The preface to the Demetrius-Antony further helps to clarify Plutarch’s 
conception of imitation in the Parallel Lives. Before he introduces the pair itself, 
Plutarch discusses the importance of negative examples when learning particular arts or 
virtue, citing how healers incidentally study disease and musicians must consider 
discordant sounds in order to create harmony (Dem. 1.3-4). He further describes how 
ancient Spartans would show drunken helots to their youth so they could see the dangers 
of drinking unmixed wine (Dem. 1.5), and how the Theban flute-player Ismenias would 
have his students listen to bad players so they knew how not to play (Dem. 1.6). These 
examples all serve as an introduction to Plutarch’s idea to include one or two pairs that 
feature men who are conspicuous for their vices, such as Demetrius and Antony (Dem. 
1.6). Many scholars have since attempted to identify other such ‘negative’ pairs, or even 
to introduce a third category in between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ pairs.53 Duff has 
argued, on the other hand, that it is incorrect to attempt to classify Lives as either 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’: even Demetrius and Antony, he says, demonstrate virtue at 
times in their respective Lives, while many subjects of so-called ‘positive’ Lives at times 
behave in ways that are not particularly praiseworthy.54 This, I believe, is the correct 
view: Plutarch’s subjects are rarely so simplistic that they can be easily classified as 
                                                 
53 Russel (1973), 108, and Aalders (1982), 9, suggest the Alcibiades-Coriolanus as another potential 
negative pair, while Nikolaidis (1988), 331-2, and Piccirilli (1989), 14-16, see the Nicias-Crassus as a 
largely negative pair. Piccirilli (1990), xxix-xxxiv, puts forward the concept of a category between positive 
and negative Lives for pairs which simply give an unfavourable portrayal of their subjects.  
54 Duff (1999), 53-65. See Pelling (1988b), 10-18, for positive examples within the Demetrius-Antony in 
particular. 
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simply good or bad. Instead, all pairs provide examples of both good and bad actions 
and character in varying degrees. What is significant here for the discussion of imitation 
is how Plutarch describes these negative cases working. The examples show that he had 
in mind people who are trying to learn an individual skill (such as flute-playing) or a 
particular virtue (such as moderation in drink), and in both cases seeing an art practiced 
poorly or the lack of a virtue would induce the learner to do things the correct way. The 
converse of this, although Plutarch does not explicitly state it, is that seeing a skill 
performed well or a virtue adhered to would similarly help the learner practice or act 
correctly. 55 This, as I argue below, is precisely the context in which Plutarch provides 
examples of good generalship to imitate and bad generalship to avoid. In light of the 
above discussion of the imitation of virtue, however, it is important to keep in mind that 
the examples of good generalship that Plutarch provides still promote the imitation of 
particular fundamentals rather than specific actions. The precise historical acts of 
military leadership that Plutarch describes are not imitable, because the circumstances of 
a particular battle or campaign could never be exactly the same. Nevertheless, they 
provide guidance for more broad methods of leadership that could serve to improve a 
general’s overall skill. 
It is particularly important to place the concept of military imitation in the 
context of its time: the use of exempla for teaching generalship was hardly an alien 
concept for Plutarch’s audience. Frontinus, a rough contemporary of Plutarch’s and a 
                                                 
55 Ingenkamp (2008), 264-5, in his discussion of Pelopidas and Marcellus, similarly recognizes the 
importance that Plutarch places on observing practitioners of a τέχνη (such as generalship) rather than 
simply learning the rules of the τέχνη.  
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prominent general under Trajan, wrote the Strategemata, a manual on military tactics 
and stratagems that is essentially a collection of exempla from Greek and Roman 
generals. In the proem of the Strategemata Frontinus sets out his purpose quite clearly, 
saying that he feels obligated to examine the correct actions of generals so as to provide 
his readers with examples of deliberation and foresight; this, he says, will enable them to 
increase their own ability to act similarly (Front. Strat. I). His work suggests that 
Frontinus saw military leadership as a rather straightforward skill that could be learned 
by the study of past practitioners, wherein the same techniques used by generals in 
antiquity could still be effective in the early Roman Principate.56 Frontinus, then, 
expected his audience to approach his work in the same essential way as Plutarch 
intended his readers to, just with a different primary focus. Not all such military manuals 
of the time were composed of imitable exempla. Onasander’s work, the Strategikos, is of 
a slightly earlier date than Frontinus’, and is more specifically didactic: he does not 
provide exempla of past actions, but rather directly instructs the reader on the correct 
actions of a good general. Even though Onasander does not directly cite the specific 
actions of past generals within his work, he nevertheless makes a point to tell his readers 
that all of the principles that he espouses in his work are derived from authentic deeds 
and battles (Onas. P.7-8). That being said, Onasander’s treatment of generalship still has 
some connection to Plutarch’s. Like his fellow Greek, Onasander was concerned with 
moral virtue, and the first section of the Strategikos sets forth his belief that a general 
should be temperate, self-disciplined, and frugal, among many other qualities (Onas. 
                                                 
56 Campbell (1987), 14-15. 




 Plutarch’s readers, then, would likely have been familiar with reading texts with 
an eye towards useful exempla. To see most clearly how the imitation of military action 
works in the Parallel Lives, it is best to return to Plutarch's narrative of the Gallic Wars 
in the Caesar. Throughout the narrative, Plutarch not only makes an effort to identify the 
conspicuous action that led to Caesar's victory on each individual occasion, but also 
attempts to provide Caesar's rationale behind the decisions he made. By highlighting his 
decision-making process, I argue, Plutarch is providing his readers with the knowledge 
necessary to imitate these military successes on their own. This tendency is clear from 
the very first campaign that Plutarch describes: Caesar's defense against the invading 
Helvetii. After a hard battle in which he recovered from an ambush to drive his attackers 
all the way back to their fortified camp, Caesar resettled all those barbarians who had 
survived the battle in the lands and cities which they had abandoned; “he did this”, 
claims Plutarch, “fearing that if the land became empty the Germans would cross over 
and occupy it” (Caes. 18.6).57 This is the picture of Caesar with which Plutarch ends his 
description of the first campaign: not of the brave man who led a counter-charge on foot 
rather than on horseback (Caes. 18.3), but of the reasoning man who carefully 
considered future events.58 Indeed, Plutarch calls this action “better than the noble work 
of victory” (Caes. 18.5): the thoughtful precautions that Caesar takes after the battle are 
                                                 
57 ἔπραξε δὲ τοῦτο δεδιὼς μὴ τὴν χώραν ἔρημον γενομένην οἱ Γερμανοὶ διαβάντες κατάσχωσι (Caes. 
18.6). 
58 Plutarch's interest in how a general made use of victory was a common theme in the Lives. See 
Wardman (1974), 93-100.  
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even better than the battle itself.59 The significance and timeliness of Caesar's foresight 
becomes immediately apparent, as he next finds himself directly at war with the German 
Ariovistus. According to Plutarch, both the suddenness of Caesar's advance and the 
prophecies of the German holy women had disheartened the barbarian army (Caes. 19.7-
8); when Caesar observed this, he “decided that it was a good plan to engage them while 
they were out of heart”, whereupon he harassed their encampment, incited them into an 
undisciplined attack, and completely routed them (Caes. 19.9-11).60 It is Caesar's tactical 
decision here that Plutarch highlights, rather than his strategic decision seen after the 
Helvetii campaign. Nevertheless, Plutarch clearly emphasizes Caesar's process of 
rationalization and the decisive action that stems from it: after learning (πυνθανομένῳ) 
of the prophecies and seeing (ὁρῶντι) that the Germans kept quiet, he then thought 
(ἔδοξεν) of the correct response (Caes. 19.9). Caesar's actions against the Helvetii and 
Ariovistus are, of course, specific to his unique circumstances; nevertheless, his actions 
are indeed imitable. It is true, for instance, that not many generals would find themselves 
in the position to resettle an entire barbarian population as Caesar does with the Helvetii 
(18.6); however, the lesson that a general should consider future enemies as much as 
present is clear, especially as the Germans against whom he was preparing become his 
new enemy in the very next sentence (Caes. 19.1). Caesar's actions against Ariovistus 
are even more directly relevant to a mindful commander: effective intelligence 
                                                 
59 καλῷ δὲ τῷ τῆς νίκης ἔργῳ κρεῖττον (Caes. 18.5). Plutarch did not likely praise this resettlement on 
humanitarian grounds: Caesar was forcing the Helvetii back to abandoned land (χώραν ἀπέλιπον) and 
cities that were utterly destroyed (πόλεις ἃς διέφθειραν), and so they likely faced significant hardship 
trying to rebuild their lives. Cf. Pelling (2011), 226. 
60 καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξεν ἀπροθύμοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς συμβαλεῖν (Caes. 19.9). 
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concerning an opposing army can allow an observant and thoughtful general to take 
advantage of an enemy's weakness.  
 It is important to note that Plutarch’s emphasis on these particular aspects of 
Caesar’s generalship during his Gallic campaigns, while clearly based on his sources, 
appears to be his own. Plutarch’s narrative of Caesar’s Helvetii campaign, including 
Caesar’s motivation for resettling them after the battle (Caes. 18.6), is most likely 
directly derived from Asinius Pollio, but also closely resembles Caesar’s Commentarii 
(BG. 1.2-29).61 Although the length of Pollio’s treatment of the Helvetti campaign may 
not be known, if it is similar in length to Caesar’s account then Plutarch pared it down 
significantly to fit into the single chapter that Plutarch dedicates to the campaign. It is 
noteworthy, then, that for all of the detail Plutarch chose to cut out, he retained this 
instance of Caesar’s practical forethought after the battle. For Plutarch, Caesar’s 
decision to resettle the Helvetii appears to be the defining moment of the campaign, and 
the one most worth remembering. Cassius Dio’s account of the same campaign (Dio 
38.32-33) provides a clear contrast. Although his narrative of Caesar’s battle with the 
Helvetii is similar to Plutarch’s in both content and brevity, Dio makes no mention of 
Caesar’s fears of a German incursion in his resettlement of the Helvetii after the battle.62 
Plutarch’s portrayal of Caesar’s generalship against Ariovistus shows a similar focus not 
found in other accounts. As in the case of the Helvetii campaign, Plutarch’s narrative of 
                                                 
61 Caesar gives the same rationale that Plutarch attributes to him for his resettlement of the Helvetii: his 
fear that German tribes might occupy their abandoned territory. For Plutarch’s use of Pollio as a source 
rather than Caesar’s Comentarii directly, see Pelling (2011), 44-48; 219. 
62 For Dio, like Plutarch, Caesar’s personal charge against the Helvetii and the fierce fighting in front of 
the wagon train (Caes 18.4; Dio 38.33.3-5) are the key moments of the battle itself. See Dio 38.33.5-6 for 
the aftermath of the battle.  
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Caesar’s conflict with Ariovistus considerably simplifies Caesar’s own account (BG 
1.30-54) into a single chapter. In this case, however, Plutarch’s analysis of Caesar’s 
actions appears to be his own interpretation. Although Caesar says that he learned from 
German prisoners that the German holy women had forbidden battle because of poor 
omens, he does not make any direct connection between this knowledge and his attack 
on the following day (BG 1.50-51). In Plutarch’s version, however, Caesar makes an 
explicit decision to attack based on his knowledge of the omens and the German 
passivity (Caes. 19.9). While it is possible that Plutarch found this detail in Pollio or 
another lost source, it is much more likely that it is his own invention: Plutarch is known 
to have created minor details to fill in occasional gaps and streamline his narrative, and 
this obvious inference does just that.63 However, just because Plutarch may have 
invented the details of Caesar’s decision to attack Ariovistus to help fill a gap in the 
narrative does not make the detail any less influential on Plutarch’s interpretation of 
Caesar’s generalship. The emphasis that Plutarch places on the process of Caesar’s 
decision-making, especially the link between learning, observing, and thinking discussed 
above, is consistent with the rest of Plutarch’s characterization of Caesar’s leadership in 
the Life. Indeed, as I shall demonstrate, it is a common focus of Plutarch’s military 
narratives throughout the Parallel Lives. 
 Plutarch highlights other instances of Caesar's deliberation in the rest of the 
narrative, all of which provide further insight into his generalship. At one point, Caesar 
rejects the embassy of a tribe who had already attacked him under a flag of truce, 
                                                 
63 Pelling (2002), 94-96. 
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“believing good faith towards such faithless breakers of truces to be naive” (Caes. 
22.3).64 Plutarch’s focus here is not so much the ambush that Caesar suffered or his 
temporary naivety towards his enemy that may have caused it, but on Caesar’s 
introspection and recognition of this fault. After this warning to be on guard against 
deception, Plutarch demonstrates the benefits of employing deception oneself, 
describing how Caesar pretended to be afraid of his enemy's larger army by continuously 
avoiding battle: “he maneuvered so as to be despised, until, marching out against those 
who were attacking separately through rashness, he routed them and destroyed many of 
them” (Caes. 24.7).65 Once again, Plutarch highlights the purpose and thought-process 
behind Caesar’s actions: he intentionally marshalled his troops in such a way as to incite 
his enemy into acting ὑπὸ θράσους, in which state they were no longer a cohesive army 
and thus easier to destroy.  
In his analysis of the Gallic Wars in Plutarch’s Caesar, Pelling (1984b) clearly 
identifies Plutarch’s interest in Caesar’s “great ability and achievement” during his 
military campaigns, such as his ability to inspire loyalty, his endurance of hardship and 
danger, and his skill in horsemanship, but concludes by suggesting that “there is little 
interest in the more personal virtues; Plutarch is not at all concerned to stress traits 
which his reader might imitate.”66 I absolutely agree that Plutarch’s interest is on 
Caesar’s qualities as a military leader, as we have seen, and not his other character 
                                                 
64 τὴν πρὸς οὕτως ἀπίστους καὶ παρασπόνδους πίστιν εὐήθειαν ἡγούμενος (Caes. 22.3). 
65 καταφρονηθῆναι στρατηγῶν, μέχρι οὗ σποράδην ὑπὸ θράσους προσβάλλοντας ἐπεξελθὼν ἐτρέψατο, 
καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν διέφθειρε (Caes. 24.7). 
66 Pelling (1984b), 91. Italics are his own. 
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virtues on which Plutarch focuses in other sections of the Life. However, I have argued 
in this section that Plutarch is indeed concerned with stressing traits and actions that his 
reader might imitate: not only his charisma and horsemanship, but his decisive action, 
introspection, and strategic planning as well. Pelling here seems to believe that it is only 
aspects of moral virtue that Plutarch encourages his readers to imitate, and this appears 
to be a common belief.67 However, as is clear from the above discussion of the 
prologues of the Aemilius Paulus and Demetrius, Plutarch considers the actions of his 
subjects to be just as important as their moral virtues; indeed, it is through imitating 
praiseworthy deeds that one begins to demonstrate particular virtues as well.  
Throughout the narrative of the Gallic Wars, Plutarch distills Caesar's military 
victories into concise, imitable actions for his readers. He identifies specific 
circumstances in which any general might find himself (such as facing a demoralized 
enemy, being ambushed, or being considerably outnumbered), and describes Caesar's 
considered and successful response to each situation. Although each of these examples 
focuses on a different aspect of Caesar’s generalship, the common trend across all of 
these stories is Caesar’s rationality: Plutarch identifies Caesar’s foresight after his battle 
with the Helvetii; his calculated attack against Ariovistus; his introspection and caution 
after falling prey to an ambush; and his tactical manipulation of the enemy. Individually, 
each of these lessons could be useful to an interested reader by illustrating an action that 
might be imitable under similar circumstances; it is not just Gallic tribes that are 
                                                 
67 Duff (1999), 30-45, 66-69 also focuses primarily on the imitation of moral virtue rather than practical 
action. 
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susceptible to being deceived, for example. Taken as a whole, however, Plutarch’s 
narrative of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul emphasizes the thought process behind his 
military leadership and characterizes him as a thinking general. The type of military 
analysis that Plutarch makes in the Caesar is thus much the same as his portrayal of 
virtue throughout the Lives. Plutarch provides the same opportunity for his readers to 
imitate specific aspects of Caesar's generalship as he does for his readers to imitate 
Fabius' patience or Aristides' incorruptibility.  
The Caesar is not the only Life in which Plutarch uses extended pieces of 
military narrative to provide imitable examples of effective generalship: the Lucullus is a 
similarly strong example. Combined, Plutarch’s narratives of Lucullus’ campaigns 
against Mithridates (Luc. 7.1-19.5) and Tigranes (Luc. 24.1-35.7) account for roughly 
half of the entire Life. While these narratives may not allow the reader to follow the ebb 
and flow of particular battles, they, like those found in the Caesar, illustrate specific 
examples of Lucullus’ superior leadership. Moreover, it is clear that Plutarch crafted his 
military narratives in the Life to highlight the qualities of Lucullus’ generalship that 
Plutarch found most admirable. The singularity of purpose within the military narrative 
of the Lucullus is best seen by first examining the praise Plutarch relates about Lucullus’ 
generalship after the Roman’s first defeat of Tigranes: 
Ῥωμαίων δ' οἱ δεινότατοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ πλεῖστα πολέμοις ὡμιληκότες ἐπῄνουν μάλιστα 
τοῦ Λευκόλλου τὸ δύο βασιλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους καὶ μεγίστους δυσὶ τοῖς 
ἐναντιωτάτοις, τάχει καὶ βραδυτῆτι, καταστρατηγῆσαι· Μιθριδάτην μὲν γὰρ ἀκμάζοντα 
χρόνῳ καὶ τριβῇ κατανάλωσε, Τιγράνην δὲ τῷ σπεῦσαι συνέτριψεν, ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν 
πώποτε ἡγεμόνων τῇ μελλήσει μὲν ἔργῳ, τῇ τόλμῃ δ' ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας χρησάμενος (Luc. 
28.9). 
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The Roman generals who were most skilful and most acquainted with war greatly 
commended Lucullus for out-generaling two great and distinguished kings by opposite 
means: swiftness and slowness. For he used up Mithridates, who was in his prime, with 
time and delay, but he crushed Tigranes through haste, being among the few generals 
ever to use delay for action and boldness on behalf of safety. 
 
Plutarch puts this approval for Lucullus’ achievement in the mouths of other Romans, 
but he surely enjoyed the irony explained within the final clause himself.68 Indeed, it is 
clear that Plutarch had this image of Lucullus’ rare breed of generalship in mind while 
he was writing the narrative of Lucullus’ campaigns, for by the time the reader has 
reached this passage in the Life, he has already seen multiple examples of Lucullus’ 
effective use of delay and boldness on the battlefield.69  
It is Lucullus’ patience that Plutarch highlights first, by comparing him with his 
ambitious co-consul Marcus Cotta. At the start of the campaign, Plutarch describes 
Mithridates’ army as devoid of its previous ostentation and impracticality, instead 
consisting of, among other forces, one hundred and twenty thousand heavy infantry 
trained and equipped in the Roman style (Luc. 7.4-6). Cotta, eager to defeat Mithridates 
and earn a triumph of his own, rushed to attack this enormous army, was summarily 
defeated, and became trapped in Chalcedon. Lucullus, on the other hand, showed great 
patience and restraint. Recognizing that Mithridates’ numerically superior army would 
be difficult to keep supplied, he interrogated several captives and determined that 
Mithridates had less than four days of food left, at which point he set out to collect all 
                                                 
68 Plutarch also expects his readers to agree with the pronouncement of these generals, as he often does 
when he provides the viewpoints of anonymous experts in a field: cf. Flam. 11. 3-7; Phoc. 37.1-2; Cato 
Min. 26.5; Mar. 34.6-7. See Pelling (1988b), 40; Duff (1999), 55, 120. 
69 See Keaveney (1992), 75-128 for a detailed narrative of Lucullus’ campaigns against Mithridates and 
Tigranes. 
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local provisions to deny them to his enemy and then waited for him to act (Luc. 8.1-8). 
Plutarch makes the senselessness of Cotta’s rashness perfectly clear, particularly by 
describing Mithridates’ impressive army immediately before, but the lesson in this 
passage is more nuanced than that. By specifically identifying the rationale behind 
Lucullus’ delay and his reasoned analysis of his enemy’s situation, Plutarch provides a 
clear counter-example to Cotta’s poor generalship. Lucullus has not actually achieved 
anything by this point, but his army remained intact while Cotta’s did not because he 
took the time to consider his enemy. Lucullus’ strategy is immediately justified, as 
Mithridates soon moved from his position to besiege another city, and Lucullus 
shadowed his army and encamped in a position that would once again deny the Pontic 
king easy access to vital supplies (Luc. 9.1-2).70 Plutarch portrays Mithridates as largely 
ignorant of the danger of famine that Lucullus had created for his grand army by 
carrying on war “not for theatrics nor display, but, as the saying goes, [Lucullus] was 
‘kicking in the gut’, and was busying himself stealing all of his provisions.”71 Such 
scorched-earth tactics forced Mithridates to send away all of his extraneous forces when 
Lucullus was distracted in order to ease the burden on his supplies. However, Lucullus 
managed to overtake the fleeing force and inflict such a devastating blow on them that 
Mithridates decided to abandon the siege of Cyzicus altogether, whereupon Lucullus 
                                                 
70 Plutarch makes no acknowledgement that Mithridates, by moving his army, gave up the siege of 
Chalcedon and thus presumably allowed Lucullus to relieve Cotta without bloodshed. Indeed, Plutarch 
does not mention Marcus Cotta again in the entire Life, which, I suggest, emphasizes his role as a foil to 
highlight Lucullus’ patience. So-called internal synkriseis are relatively common in the Parallel Lives: see 
in particular Beck (2002); Xenophontos (2012). 
71 ἅτε δὴ μὴ θεατρικῶς μηδ' ἐπιδεικτικῶς Λευκόλλου πολεμοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον εἰς τὴν 
γαστέρα ἐναλλομένου καὶ ὅπως ὑφαιρήσει τὴν τροφὴν ἅπαντα πραγματευομένου (Luc. 11.2). 
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once again chased him and, catching him at the Granicus, finally defeated Mithridates’ 
army in detail (Luc. 11.1-8). Throughout these chapters, Plutarch emphasizes both 
Lucullus’ constant efforts to deny supplies to Mithridates’ army and his readiness to 
pursue the army and take advantage of any opportunities that presented themselves. 
Lucullus’ caution, as Plutarch portrays it, was by no means idle, as he was continuously 
engaged in furthering his own position while undermining that of his enemy. Lucullus’ 
ultimate success over a numerically superior army shows this to be an effective model of 
cautious and considered generalship to follow. 
Mithridates soon recovered from his initial losses, forcing Lucullus to resume his 
campaign against him, but Plutarch does not focus on his generalship nearly so much in 
the ensuing chapters. Indeed, Mithridates eventually took to flight again not due to 
Lucullus’ actions but because of two disastrous skirmishes with Lucullus’ subordinates 
that drained both his men and resources (Luc. 17.1-5). However, Lucullus returns to the 
fore when the narrative switches to his campaign against Tigranes. Initially, Lucullus’ 
actions appear to contradict his earlier calculated caution against Mithridates: “he 
seemed to be making a reckless attack, one having neither safety nor calculation, against 
a warlike nation, many myriads of horsemen, and an immense country” (Luc. 24.1).72 
Lucullus proceeded to march deep into Mesopotamia, crossing both the Euphrates and 
the Tigris with less than fifteen thousand soldiers (Luc. 24.1-7). This certainly does seem 
to be a reckless act, and completely out of character for a general who patiently 
                                                 
72 ὁρμῇ τινι δοκῶν παραβόλῳ καὶ σωτήριον οὐκ ἐχούσῃ λογισμὸν ἐμβαλεῖν αὑτὸν εἰς ἔθνη μάχιμα καὶ 
μυριάδας ἱππέων πολλὰς καὶ ἀχανῆ χώραν (Luc. 24.1). 
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shadowed Mithridates for so long. Lucullus appears to regain his senses when 
confronted with part of Tigranes’ army sent led by Mithrobarzanes, as he sent a small 
force of his own to distract the enemy while he personally began to arrange the 
encampment of his main army; however, this delaying force managed to kill the enemy 
general, after which the remains of his army fled (Luc. 25.3-5). This success caused 
Tigranes to abandon his city Tigranocerta so as to rebuild his army, and Lucullus, like he 
had done against Mithridates, exploited the opportunity by dispatching two of his 
subordinates to harass Tigranes’ column and prevent other forces from joining up with 
him (Luc. 25.6-7). Lucullus clearly appears to have regained his rationality at this point, 
as he invests Tigranes’ favored city “thinking that Tigranes would not bear it, but against 
his judgment and in anger come down and fight” (Luc. 26.2).73 This is the same 
thoughtful Lucullus who fought against Mithridates, once again establishing himself in a 
strong position with the clear intention of forcing his enemy into making a mistake. As 
before, Lucullus’ plan was successful, and Tigranes moved to attack him (Luc. 26.4-7). 
Once Tigranes was in sight Lucullus undertook his most daring move yet, leaving a third 
of his army to maintain the siege of Tigranocerta and attacking Tigranes’ army of over 
two hundred thousand with only ten thousand heavy infantry of his own (Luc. 26.6-
27.2). Tigranes was so surprised that Lucullus was actually attacking his army that he 
did not draw up his battle array until the Roman was almost upon him, and consequently 
left his heavily-armored cavalry in an exposed position at the foot of a hill. Seizing upon 
                                                 
73 οὐκ ἀνέξεσθαι τὸν Τιγράνην οἰόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην ὑπ' ὀργῆς καταβήσεσθαι διαμαχούμενον 
(Luc. 26.2). 
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this opportunity, Lucullus sent his own small force of cavalry to attack the flank, and 
personally led his infantry in a charge against the enemy cavalry from the front; unable 
to fight effectively due to the length of their spears, Tigranes’ seventeen thousand mailed 
cavalry turned and fled into their own infantry, which started a general rout that soon 
turned catastrophic (Luc. 28.1-28.7). This is certainly the high point of Lucullus’ military 
career and of the Life itself. As Graham Wylie argues, Lucullus’ bold attack as Plutarch 
portrays it was a great tactical move, as the Roman commander not only identified the 
weak point in Tigranes’ line, but also exploited the weakness of the enemy unit in front 
of him.74 This is consistent with Plutarch’s treatment of Lucullus’ actions throughout 
both of his campaigns against Mithridates and Tigranes: even when Lucullus is taking 
enormous risks, Plutarch still – for the most part – portrays him as a rational and 
calculating general. Admittedly, Plutarch sees no reasoning behind Lucullus’ initial 
attack on Tigranes’ territory with such a small force (Luc. 24.1). However, he does 
explain Lucullus’ thinking for putting Tigranocerta under siege, and he consistently 
shows Lucullus employing his limited resources effectively, especially his use of his 
subordinate generals to keep Tigranes off balance (Luc. 25.6). Even more than in the 
case of Caesar’s campaigns, it is unlikely that Plutarch ever imagined one of his readers 
as facing the exact same military situations as Lucullus, or as being able to defeat an 
army while outnumbered twenty-to-one as Lucullus does (Luc. 28.8). Nevertheless, like 
in the Caesar, Plutarch highlights particular acts of generalship throughout his military 
narrative in the Lucullus that could indeed be imitable by a certain part of his readership, 
                                                 
74 Wylie (1994), 116. 
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such as methodically denying supplies in order to starve a larger enemy (Luc. 9.1-2), 
forcing an enemy to leave an advantageous position (Luc. 8.7-8, 26.2), or exploiting the 
weaknesses in an enemy’s deployment or equipment (Luc. 28.2-4). Moreover, by 
explaining Lucullus’ reasoning behind such imitable actions, Plutarch portrays Lucullus 
as a rational general who puts deliberate thought into his actions, in clear contrast to 
others such as Cotta and Tigranes.75  
Plutarch, then, clearly constructs his military narrative in the Lucullus to portray 
his subject as a thoughtful general who made equally effective use of caution and 
boldness to achieve success. However, unlike in the Caesar, where his subject’s military 
superiority is unquestioned, Plutarch recognises Lucullus’ failures as a general as well. 
At the end of the Life, after Lucullus’ fortunes had considerably declined, Plutarch says 
that Lucullus’ consistent inability to maintain the affections of his soldiers shows him to 
have been “either naturally unsuited or unlucky in the first and greatest of all qualities of 
leadership” (Luc. 36.5).76 This failure of Lucullus to keep his soldiers content and under 
control is an underlying theme throughout the Life (Luc. 15.6-7, 24.1, 30.5, 32.2-3), and 
eventually leads to his army mutinying to the point that he could only just prevent them 
                                                 
75 Interestingly, Plutarch does appear to have a degree of respect of Mithridates’ generalship. Throughout 
his early campaign with Lucullus, Plutarch shows Mithridates reacting to and attempting to pre-empt 
Lucullus’ actions in a considered manner (Luc. 9.1, 9.3, 11.2, 11.5). It was only because Mithridates’ own 
generals deceived him about the dire supply situation of his army, Plutarch says, that he was forced into 
making poor decisions. Even later in the Life, after the defeat of Tigranes, Plutarch explains Mithridates’ 
absence from the climactic battle as a result of his rational expectation that Lucullus would act with the 
same caution against Tigranes as he acted against him (Luc. 29.1). Plutarch has no such praise for 
Tigranes’ generalship: see Pulci Doria Breglia (1973, 74), 37-67. 
76 ὕτω τις ἦν ἀφυὴς ἢ δυστυχὴς ὁ Λεύκολλος πρὸς τὸ πάντων ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον (Luc. 
36.5). 
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from completely abandoning him (Luc. 35.3-4).77 Plutarch attributes Lucullus’ failure to 
win the loyalty of his soldiers to his natural disregard for the common people and his 
belief that anything he did to please his men would simply decrease his authority (Luc. 
33.2). This, Plutarch says, combined with his haughtiness even towards other nobles, 
was his only bad quality (Luc. 33.3), which clearly suggests that he disagrees with 
Lucullus’ belief that working to please his soldiers would diminish his authority. This, 
then, is an instance of Plutarch providing an example of generalship for his readers to 
avoid rather than imitate: a general should not be as oblivious to the cares and concerns 
of his own soldiers as Lucullus was. Examples of poor generalship such as this are 
certainly not as common as examples of good generalship, but I would suggest that they 
are just as important to the overall interpretation of military leadership within the 
Parallel Lives. Specific examples of poor generalship within the Parallel Lives, such as 
Lucullus’ failure to control his soldiers, do indeed fit with Plutarch’s rationale at the 
beginning of the Demetrius-Antony, as discussed above, because they provide 
illustrations of actions or viewpoints that generals should avoid. For Plutarch, then, 
examples of poor military leadership could be just as useful as examples of good 
military leadership for the betterment of his readers’ generalship. 
In this section I have examined how Plutarch uses military narrative in the 
Parallel Lives to provide examples of both good and bad leadership for his readers to 
                                                 
77 Keaveney’s analysis of Lucullus’ situation suggests that Plutarch was overstating the insubordination of 
Lucullus’ soldiers at some points: when he describes Lucullus’ army as being unwilling to follow him east 
again after his defeat of Tigranes, Plutarch makes no mention of the proposed expedition being illegal 
under Roman law (1992, 180). Intentional or not, this omission does serve to highlight Lucullus’ poor 
relations with his soldiers: one imagines that his army might have been more willing to follow him if 
Lucullus had been a more inspirational leader. 
   
48 
 
imitate or avoid. It is true that even those of Plutarch’s readers who would have had the 
opportunity to lead large armies for Rome would be unlikely to have run into the exact 
same battlefield situations as people like Caesar or Lucullus did. Nevertheless, within 
the extended military narratives found within these and other Lives, Plutarch 
consistently identifies individual acts of generalship that are applicable to a variety of 
situations and thus potentially worthy of imitation by his readers. Moreover, by focusing 
on the reasoning that leads his subjects to make particular actions on the battlefield, 
Plutarch stresses the importance of a rational style of generalship. From these examples, 
and from more that we will see as this chapter continues, it is clear that Plutarch 
considered a general’s ability to make appropriate calculations on the battlefield to be 
one of the most important traits he could possess.    
 
Individual Battle Narratives 
 It is not just Plutarch's narrative of the Gallic Wars in the Caesar or the 
Mithridatic Wars in the Lucullus that provide imitable examples of military leadership. 
Although not all Lives contain such extended passages that cover entire military 
campaigns, many other sections of military narrative from both Greek and Roman Lives 
share similarities with Plutarch's treatment of the longer campaigns of Caesar and 
Lucullus. As we have seen, the key focus of these military passages is not on the 
successes themselves, but on the methods of success: Plutarch consistently concerns 
himself with demonstrating precisely how a general achieved victory in a particular 
battle or against a particular foe. In this way, military narrative in a Life serves the same 
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purpose as any other part of the biography: improving the reader through providing 
examples worthy of imitation. While in much of the Parallel Lives these examples are of 
good moral virtue, in the military narratives these examples are of good generalship.  
 When discussing Plutarch's military narrative, it is important to remember that 
Plutarch's primary interest unquestionably lies with the subject of each Life, and that the 
broader historical significance of his subjects' actions is at best secondary to their 
character.78 Even substantial sections of military narrative, then, sometimes contain 
relatively little in the way of troop movements, battle tactics, and the like; instead, 
Plutarch focuses heavily on the actions of his subjects before, during, and after a 
particular battle or campaign. Thus, in the Alexander, Plutarch places repeated emphasis 
on both Alexander's unfailing confidence before battle (Alex. 16.1-4; 31.6-32.3) and his 
recklessness during the fighting (Alex. 16.5-11; 16.14; 63.2-5), but makes little comment 
on the actual tactics and maneuverings of the battles themselves. Hamilton is not wrong 
to say the reader cannot clearly reconstruct any of Alexander's battles from Plutarch's 
narrative.79  
 This is not to say, however, that Plutarch was incapable of writing a coherent 
battle narrative, or indeed that he avoided doing so; in this regard the Caesar once again 
serves as a strong contrast to the Alexander. Plutarch dedicates five chapters in the 
Caesar to the battle of Pharsalus, his narrative of which is much more detailed than any 
of those he provides for Alexander's battles. Most crucially, while the focus of the 
                                                 
78 On the biographical relevance of Plutarch’s narratives, see especially Pelling (1980); (1990b); (2002), 
54-5. 
79 Hamilton (1969), xl. 
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section is clearly on Caesar, Plutarch makes a point to portray the actions of both Caesar 
and Pompey. He describes preparations made by both camps before the battle (Caes. 
42.1-43.7), the order of battle and initial battle plan (Caes. 44.1-8), the decisive 
moments of the battle (Caes. 45.1-6), and the aftermath of Caesar's victory (Caes. 46.1-
4). These details correspond to the basic elements of a standard battle description in 
ancient historiography, and while Plutarch's narrative lacks much of the detail of 
Caesar's own account of the battle (BC 3.82-99), it is certainly possible for the reader of 
the Caesar to follow the basic flow of the battle.80 Plutarch's account of the same battle 
in the Pompey is similarly detailed, and must certainly derive from the same source as 
the Caesar.81 There are a number of other comprehensive descriptions of battles within 
the Parallel Lives, including, as we shall now examine, Plutarch’s accounts of the battles 
of Plataea and Pydna. Significantly, it is clear from these examples that Plutarch’s battle 
narratives are integral parts of the Lives in which they are found.   
 As is the case with his narrative of the battle of Pharsalus in the Caesar and the 
Pompey, Plutarch’s account of Plataea is significantly less detailed than that found in 
Herodotus. Even though Plutarch dedicates nearly half of the Aristides to the battle of 
Plataea, that understandably pales in comparison with Herodotus’ own treatment of it, 
                                                 
80 Ash (2007), 435 lists four standard elements of ancient battle narratives: “(1) general's speeches; (2) 
fighting order of the armies; (3) battle; and (4) casualty figures”. While Plutarch does not provide much 
evidence of direct speech before the battle, his contrasting pictures of Pompey's and Caesar's preparations 
for battle serve much the same purpose. 
81 Pelling (2011), 358. Pelling conjectures that the Plutarch's two accounts of the battle are either taken 
directly from the same source (most likely Pollio) or from the same set of hypomnemata that Plutarch 
composed before writing the actual Lives. See Pelling (2002), 1-44 for the likely joint composition of the 
late republican Roman Lives.  
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both in scope and detail.82 Much of Plutarch's focus is on the internal conflict between 
the generals of the different Greek contingents and Aristides' mediating and unifying 
role, but the chronological progression of the battle itself is clear nevertheless.83 
Plutarch’s account is easily broken up into discrete sections: the choice of the battlefield 
(Aris. 11.5-7); the initial cavalry skirmish (Aris. 14.1-6); the confusion and conflict 
regarding the organization of the Greek battle line (Aris. 16.1-17.3); the battle itself 
(Aris. 17.3-19.3); and the final casualties (Aris. 19.4-5). While Plutarch’s narrative may 
be significantly compressed when compared to Herodotus’, it is still easy to follow 
despite his focus on the character and actions of Aristides. This emphasis on Aristides 
allows Plutarch to examine aspects of generalship not often seen in other Lives. Unlike 
most of the subjects of Plutarch’s Lives, who tended to be in overall command of their 
army at the height of their careers, Aristides was not in full command of the forces at 
Plataea: while he had been elected sole general over the Athenian contingent of 8,000 
hoplites, Aristides himself had to answer to the Spartan Pausanias, who was commander-
in-chief of the entire Hellenic army (Aris. 11.1). Aristides still does demonstrate 
independence of action, as we shall examine, but he necessarily makes many of his 
decisions in response to the directions from his commander. Plutarch’s narrative of 
Plataea in the Aristides, then, demonstrates to his readers the skills and temperament 
required to be an effective subordinate general, as well as the importance of such 
                                                 
82 Hdt. 9.19-75. 
83 Plutarch gives a much more prominent role to Aristides in his version of that battle than Herodotus does 
in his, and Plutarch has supplemented Herodotus' account with other sources. See Calabi Limentani 
(1964), ix-xxxvii; Marincola (2010), 129-32. 
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generals to the survival and success of a large, diverse army. 
 For Plutarch, one of Aristides’ best qualities as a general was his ability to make 
his Athenian contingent cooperate with the other Greek soldiers. On two occasions, both 
before and during the battle, Aristides directly intervenes to keep his soldiers from 
causing dissent over their place in the battle line. In the first instance, when the 
Athenians and Tegeans were competing for a place on the left wing of the Greek line, 
Aristides’ speech espousing the importance of cooperation and promising that the 
Athenians would fight bravely whatever their position impressed the allied leaders and 
earned the Athenians the honor of the left wing (Aris. 12.1-2). Later, when the other 
Athenian leaders took offense at Pausanias’ order that the Athenians and Spartans switch 
positions in the line to better counter the Persians, Aristides wholeheartedly supported 
his commander. Rather than supporting dissent at a critical time, Aristides reminded his 
own subordinates of their recent argument with the Tegeans and successfully convinced 
them of the honor that the Spartans were offering by finding them their own place in the 
line (Aris. 16.1-4). In Plutarch’s eyes, Aristides set a strong example by placing the 
needs of his commander and the army as a whole over his own personal loyalties, a level 
of dedication which is clearly worthy of imitation. Plutarch provides several further 
examples of Aristides’ strengths as a subordinate commander. In one, when Aristides 
learned of an internal plot to betray the Greek cause, he dealt with it discreetly and 
leniently so that it would not cause too much damage to the allied cause, even though 
this went against his natural sense of justice (Aris. 13.1-3).84 In another instance, 
                                                 
84 Plutarch says that Aristides was concerned about how many people might have been “implicated by a 
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Alexander of Macedon came to the Athenian camp in secret and told Aristides that 
Mardonius was planning to attack the next day. When Alexander asked Aristides to keep 
the information to himself, however, Aristides said that it would not be correct to keep 
the information from Pausanias, and dutifully brought the information to his commander 
to act on (Aris. 15.2-5). In these instances, Aristides put the interests of the Greek army 
above both his own sense of justice, as in the former case, as well as his own potential 
gain, as in the latter. While Plutarch does not speculate on what would have happened 
had Aristides not put the army’s welfare and success above all else, the ultimate Greek 
victory at Plataea – framed through the narrative to be closely connected to Aristides – 
makes it clear that he acted correctly. These examples of Aristides’ good generalship are 
more effective because of Plutarch’s coherent narrative of the Battle of Plataea, which 
provides context for both the reasoning and result of Aristides’ actions. During his 
narrative, as we have seen, Plutarch focuses on the confusion and internal conflict within 
the Greek army; this serves to reinforce the importance of Aristides’ ability to foster 
cooperation between the Greeks by showing how vital his contributions were to each 
stage of the battle. 
As with the narratives of Pharsalus and Plataea that we have already examined, it 
is certainly possible to form a clear picture of the battle of Pydna based on Plutarch’s 
account. Moreover, Plutarch’s portrayal of Aemilius Paulus’ generalship during the 
battle follows the familiar pattern of combining analysis of both his character and 
                                                 
test which was based on justice rather than expediency” (Aris. 13.2). The decision to forgo a just trial in 
this case must have been particularly difficult for Aristides, who, as Plutarch demonstrates at the 
beginning of the Life, consistently championed the cause of justice above all else (Aris. 4-6). 
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military decisions seen in the Caesar, Lucullus, and Aristides. Plutarch effectively sets 
the stage for the battle by explaining the preparations made by both Perseus (Aem. 16.4-
9) and Aemilius (Aem. 17.5-18.4), and vividly describing the Macedonian battle line 
(Aem. 18.5-9). Plutarch's account of the fighting itself, while relatively brief, 
nevertheless identifies the key stages of the battle: the initial invincibility of the 
Macedonian phalanx to Roman assault (Aem. 20.3-6); the gradual disruption of the 
phalanx as it moved over uneven ground (Aem. 20.7); and the Roman counter-attack that 
found the gaps in the Macedonian formation and managed to flank the ponderous 
phalanx (Aem. 20.8-10).85 Throughout his narrative of the Battle of Pydna, Plutarch 
focuses primarily on Aemilius’ reliability and talent for thinking quickly in the face of 
danger. When first confronted with the Macedonian battle line drawn up in full array, 
Aemilius prudently withdrew his tired troops to their camp in order to rest despite the 
protest of his eager junior commanders (Aem. 17.1-6). Plutarch reinforces Aemilius’ 
steadfast demeanor several times over the course of his narrative of the battle itself. 
First, when a skirmish between foragers looked as if it were turning into a general 
engagement, Plutarch describes Aemilius observing the action “like a helmsman, 
judging by the present commotion and the movement of the armies the greatness of the 
coming contest”, at which point he left his tent and started encouraging his legionaries to 
battle (Aem. 18.3).86 The image of a statesman as a κυβερνήτης is a favorite of Plutarch, 
who describes Pericles (Per. 15.4, 33.6), Philopoemen (Phil. 17.3), and Cato the 
                                                 
85 Again, cf. Ash (2007), 245 for the alignment of Plutarch’s account of Pydna with the standard ancient 
battle narrative. 
86 ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης τῷ παρόντι σάλῳ καὶ κινήματι τῶν στρατοπέδων τεκμαιρόμενος (Aem. 18.3). 
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Younger (Phoc. 3.3) in similar terms.87 It is significant, however, that Plutarch here 
applies this metaphor to a military situation rather than a political one; the indirect 
comparison of Aemilius’ generalship with the political leadership of some of history’s 
greatest statesmen emphasizes the importance of his actions and reinforces the 
connection between political and military leadership. Plutarch once again demonstrates 
Aemilius’ control over both his soldiers and his own emotions after the battle had been 
joined: when Aemilius observed the strength of the Macedonian phalanx and the 
inability of his troops to break their line of spears, according to Plutarch, “consternation 
and fear held him, as he had never seen a sight so fearful” (Aem. 19.2).88 Nevertheless, 
Aemilius hid his own fears and rode past his soldiers before the battle without armor and 
with a cheerful expression on his face (Aem. 19.3). Aemilius’ ability to overcome 
troubling emotions for the sake of his army allows them to engage the enemy in high 
spirits, which gives them an advantage in the battle to come. Plutarch’s clear narrative of 
the opening of the Battle of Pydna, highlighting as it does the ever-increasing threats of 
battlefield chaos and the Macedonian phalanx, makes it easy for readers to identify 
Aemilius’ self-control, one of his most admirable and imitable qualities as a commander. 
From the rest of Plutarch’s narrative, it is clear that Aemilius successfully mixes 
his self-control with an ability to read the battlefield. The initial Roman charge, made 
“according to no reasoning but with a wild spirit” (Aem. 20.4), was easily turned away 
by the pikes of the Macedonian phalanx, bringing back Aemilius’ initial fears at the 
                                                 
87 This is originally a Platonic image: cf. Plato, Rep. 488a-e. See Stadter (1987), 262, 267. 
88 ἔκπληξις αὐτὸν ἔσχε καὶ δέος, ὡς οὐδὲν ἰδόντα πώποτε θέαμα φοβερώτερον (Aem. 19.2). 
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enemy’s strength.89 Nevertheless, Aemilius soon saw a way to turn the battle around. 
After observing that the ground was uneven and causing the Macedonian phalanx to 
fracture in several places as it moved forward, Aemilius divided up his cohorts and 
ordered them into the emerging gaps in the phalanx so that they could bring their own 
weapons to bear and fight “not one battle against everyone, but many separate battles in 
turn” (Aem. 20.7-8).90 Aemilius’ soldiers quickly followed his orders to exploit the holes 
in the Macedonian phalanx, and by doing so they soon came to grips with and routed the 
Macedonians. Plutarch makes it clear that Aemilius’ leadership – specifically his 
steadfastness and his ability to read the battlefield – was directly responsible for the 
Roman victory at Pydna. These qualities, although visible in each individual passage, 
become much more developed because of Plutarch’s coherent narrative of the battle. 
Aemilius’ self-control, for example, is both more apparent and more admirable because 
the reader is able to see the apparent invincibility of the phalanx increase over several 
chapters. Likewise, Plutarch’s descriptions of the failed frontal assaults by the Romans 
at the beginning of the battle put Aemilius’ ability to read the situation on the battlefield 
into even sharper relief: his observation and considered action accomplish what brute 
force cannot. 
As has been seen in the Aristides and the Aemilius Paulus, Plutarch uses the 
context of a coherent battle narrative to identify and explore key aspects of his subjects’ 
style of generalship. Aristides’ tireless work to keep the Athenians from causing strife 
                                                 
89 κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ θυμῷ θηριώδει (Aem. 20.4).  
90 μὴ μίαν πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς καὶ μεμειγμένας κατὰ μέρος τὰς μάχας (Aem. 20.8).  
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within the Greek army, even when that came at the expense of his own sense of justice, 
only becomes apparent because of the clear structure of Plutarch’s narrative of the Battle 
of Plataea. Likewise, Plutarch’s narrative of the Battle of Pydna allows the reader to 
experience Aemilius’ dread at the apparent invincibility of the Macedonian phalanx as it 
stops several Roman advances, which in turn makes Aemilius’ steadfast generalship all 
the more significant. Much of the virtue exemplified by these men in such military 
narrative is certainly applicable to and imitable by all readers: Aristides’ selflessness and 
Aemilius’ ability to control his emotions, for example, are worthy of imitation by private 
citizens just as much as by local or imperial statesmen. However, I would argue that 
there are aspects of these narratives aimed primarily, if perhaps not exclusively, to an 
audience with a practical interest in military leadership. Plutarch’s focus on Aristides’ 
role as a subordinate general and his interactions with his superior Pausanius, for 
example, have considerably more significance for those readers who might find 
themselves commanding a section of a larger army. Just as Plutarch makes sure to 
identify the tactical decisions that Caesar and Lucullus made in different situations on 
the battlefield that led to their victories, he also highlights Aristides’ specific responses 
to both internal and external challenges while in command of the Athenian contingent. 
Similarly, just as he does in the Caesar, Plutarch identifies and explains Aemilius’ 
military decisions at the same time as he is expanding on the general’s character. 
Aemilius’ observation and analysis of both the terrain and the enemy’s army at Aem. 
20.7 in order to formulate a successful plan is a simple but clear lesson on how a general 
should react to a difficult situation. It is also particularly similar to the pattern of 
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observation and response that Plutarch highlights during Caesar’s Gallic Wars.91 The 
actions of Aristides and Aemilius that Plutarch highlights in their respective battle 
narratives are just as imitable by a portion of his readership as the more universal virtues 
that those leaders display. Moreover, Plutarch’s coherent and well-constructed narratives 
of their key battles serve to emphasize the aspects of their generalship that he found to 
be most worthy of imitation. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I have examined how Plutarch’s narratives of military 
campaigns and battles can be seen to fit with Plutarch’s stated purpose for writing the 
Parallel Lives. As we have seen, particularly in the proem to the Aemilius-Timoleon, 
Plutarch intended for his readers of the Parallel Lives to have the opportunity to 
examine the lives of great men and pick out actions and words that they could then use 
to better themselves. Plutarch was primarily interested in identifying imitable aspects of 
virtue, whether they were connected to military achievement or not. Nevertheless, as I 
have argued, Plutarch also expected his readers to imitate good actions, and those 
include examples of good military leadership. Certainly, only a fraction of contemporary 
readers of the Parallel Lives could have been expected to command soldiers in battle, 
and thus found examples of good generalship to be of practical use. However, there 
should be little doubt that there were indeed some people in his audience, exemplified by 
the Lives’ dedicatee Sosius Senecio, that would have read Plutarch’s military narrative 
                                                 
91 See above, p. 35. 
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with particular interest and with an eye for actions that they might be able to imitate. 
These readers, moreover, would have been accustomed to interpreting literary works in 
such a way. Plutarch’s practice of providing exempla of good generalship was 
completely in line with the tradition of authors such as Frontinus: military handbooks 
such as theirs were essentially collections of the actions and stratagems of successful 
generals. Ironically, despite the paucity of some of Plutarch’s military narratives when 
compared to more complete histories, he nevertheless provides more context for his 
military exempla than many dedicated treatises on generalship at the time. This is not to 
say, of course, that the generals amongst Plutarch’s readership would have necessarily 
found anything that was actually useful or practicable on the contemporary battlefield. 
Much the same can be said even for the readers of actual military handbooks, who may 
well have considered the material within to be largely irrelevant.92 Nevertheless, what is 
important to our discussion is not what use Plutarch’s audience made of his military 
exempla, but what imitable examples Plutarch included in the Parallel Lives for his 
readers to discover. This chapter has demonstrated that there is a significant amount of 
detail within Plutarch’s military narratives that is geared towards members of his 
audience looking for imitable examples of generalship. It is noteworthy that the main 
theme of generalship that Plutarch highlights in the longer campaign narratives of the 
Caesar and Lucullus – namely, the importance of rationality and consideration to a 
successful general – comes up time and again in the other Lives that we have examined. 
In the Aristides, it is the Athenian’s ability to reason with his own soldiers (Aris. 12.1-2; 
                                                 
92 See Campbell (1987), 27. 
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16.1-4) and exercise his judgment on vital matters (Aris. 13.1-3; 15.2-5) that Plutarch 
identifies as his most admirable and imitable traits as a general. Similarly, while 
Plutarch’s narrative of the Battle of Pydna in the Aemilius Paulus focuses on Aemilius’ 
self-control and ability to read the battlefield, it also emphasizes the importance of 
acting rationally during a battle. The clearest example of this is the way Plutarch 
portrays the Roman assault on the Macedonian phalanx. As mentioned earlier, the initial 
Roman attack made with οὐδένα λογισμὸν was soundly beaten back by the Macedonian 
phalanx; the Roman θυμός, no matter how fierce, proved to be completely ineffective on 
the battlefield against a competent enemy. 93 On the other hand, when Aemilius made a 
plan based on his observation of the phalanx’s difficulties – a clear example of λογισμόν 
even if Plutarch does not specifically name it as such – the Roman attack proved to be 
successful. The prevalence of this theme is particularly encouraging, because it suggests 
that Plutarch had put significant thought into what he considered to be an ideal type of 
general. This type of rational generalship is particularly apt for the Parallel Lives, given 
that those generals who Plutarch might have expected to read the Lives would have 
likely had the same educated background as the dedicatee Sosius Senecio. Plutarch’s 
frequent focus on this rational and thoughtful style of generalship is by no means 
surprising given his background in philosophy. It is common throughout his military 
narratives, and indeed, as we will see, occurs in other aspects of his treatment of 
generalship in the Parallel Lives.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the treatment of military leadership in the 
                                                 
93 Aem. 20.4; see above, p. 55.  
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Parallel Lives is not solely limited to the specific lessons of generalship that can be 
learned by readers with a practical interest in the topic. Military narrative is indeed 
important to the structure of many Lives and the characterization of many subjects, but 
there are many other aspects of generalship that are integral to the discussion as well. In 
the next chapter, I will examine how the discussion of military leadership intersects with 
Plutarch’s vested interest in the character and moral virtue of his subjects, particularly in 
terms of military education and the morality of military deception. Military narrative 
within the relevant Lives inevitably forms part of the discussion of these themes, which 
will further emphasize the importance of military narrative to both the imitation of 
generalship and to the Parallel Lives as a whole.  
  




The Character of Military Leadership: Education and Deception 
 
 It is fruitless to examine Plutarch’s treatment of generalship in the Parallel Lives 
without discussing its relationship with Plutarch’s primary interest in his subjects’ 
character and moral virtue. In the previous chapter I showed how Plutarch used extended 
pieces of military narrative to add greater nuance and detail to his portrayal of character 
in many of the Lives. In this chapter I will turn my attention to the influence of military 
education and military leadership on a statesman’s capacity for moral virtue. 
 First of all, it is important to reiterate that Plutarch saw no moral problem with 
engaging in military activity. His primary philosophical influences, Plato and Aristotle, 
certainly saw warfare as an important part of maintaining the integrity of both the state 
and the individual. Plato’s Republic in particular, while certainly not advocating war, 
recognizes its existence and the need for the rulers and protectors of a state to be well-
trained in war.94 Aristotle similarly takes war for granted, and sees it as one of the best 
ways that men are able to demonstrate the virtue of courage.95 Plutarch certainly 
acknowledges the importance of war for both the state and the display of virtue in the 
individual, as we shall see, but he also sees military achievements as something to be 
valued in their own right. Such a sentiment can be found in some of Plutarch’s 
miscellaneous essays, such as Were the Athenians more glorious in war or wisdom? 
                                                 
94 Esp. Plat. Rep. 373d-376d. See Craig (1994); Syse (2010). 
95 Arist. NE. 3.6.1115a-3.10.1118a. 
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(Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses), in which he argues that Athens deserves 
greater recognition for its military successes than its artistic accomplishments.96 
Nevertheless, it is clear from reading even a selection of the Parallel Lives that Plutarch 
not only accepted his subjects’ military careers, but actively celebrated them. As seen in 
the previous chapter, Plutarch dedicated significant space in many of his Lives to 
detailed narratives of military campaigns. These narratives do serve an important 
purpose in the Lives they feature in, as I have argued, but they also demonstrate 
Plutarch’s interest in military matters. Perhaps the clearest sign of this interest can be 
found in the formal synkriseis that conclude eighteen of the twenty-two pairs. In all but 
three of these synkriseis, Plutarch makes a point to specifically compare the military 
careers of his subjects to each other, at times in significant detail.97 Often in these 
synkriseis, Plutarch takes the opportunity to explicitly praise one or both of his subjects 
for their military accomplishments in a way that he rarely does in the individual Lives 
themselves. As will be discussed in the succeeding chapter, Plutarch also uses the 
synkriseis to encourage his readers to judge one statesman against another.98 If Plutarch 
did not see military service as conducive to moral virtue, or if he himself did not have an 
interest or appreciation for the art of generalship, it is unlikely that Plutarch would have 
                                                 
96 Admittedly, Timothy Duff (1999) has recognized that this essay appears to be a rhetorical exercise and 
may not actually reflect Plutarch’s own beliefs: he could well have been able to argue the opposite as well 
(97-8). Nevertheless, as Duff acknowledges, the positive attitude toward military achievement that 
Plutarch espouses in Bellone an pace is similar to that found across the Parallel Lives. 
97 The three pairs whose synkriseis do not mention military action are the Theseus-Romulus, Lycurgus-
Numa, and Demosthenes-Cicero. The Theseus-Romulus. does compare their bravery in war (1.3-4), but 
has no mention of military leadership in particular, and the subjects of the other two pairs were the few in 
all of the Parallel Lives to have little participation in warfare. 
98 See below, pp. 132-159. 
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featured or praised military accomplishment in the synkriseis to the degree that he does. 
 Despite Plutarch’s clear interest in warfare and the military accomplishments of 
his subjects, he by no means saw war or those who practiced it to be without moral 
ambiguity. While he praised many generals throughout the Parallel Lives for their 
actions and accomplishments in war, Plutarch also found fault with others. It is 
impossible to read the Coriolanus or the Marius, for instance, without seeing the moral 
failings of these men who dedicated so much of their lives to warfare. Similarly, the 
lengths that some generals like Lysander and Sertorius go to deceive both friend and foe 
throughout their military careers raise questions about how much praise these generals 
deserve for their unorthodox accomplishments. In the first section of this chapter, then, I 
will examine the role of military education across the Parallel Lives, focusing 
particularly on the impact that such education had on character and the importance that 
Plutarch placed on a balanced education. In the following section I will discuss 
Plutarch’s treatment of military deception in the Parallel Lives and the influence that his 
subjects’ consistent use of deception had on his portrayal in their Lives. I will conclude 
the chapter with two short case studies on Plutarch’s depiction of deception and morality 
in the Parallel Lives. The first, focusing on the Spartan Lives of Lysander and Agesilaus, 
explores the relationship between the impact of the Spartan education system on a 
general’s use of deception. The second, on the Sertorius-Eumenes, illustrates Plutarch’s 
understanding of the potential effectiveness of military deception when used by generals 
of strong character. Throughout the chapter, I will demonstrate that Plutarch considers 
military education and the use of deception in war to be not only acceptable, but to be 
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vital to the demonstration of virtue and the well-being of the state. 
 
Military Education and Character 
Throughout the Parallel Lives, Plutarch focuses on several statesmen who 
concentrated primarily – or sometimes exclusively – on military education in their early 
lives. Men such as Coriolanus and Marius are well-known for lacking a philosophical 
education, either by circumstance in Coriolanus’ case or by choice in Marius’, and 
consequently suffering from unchecked anger or ambition in their old age.99 Despite 
these very negative examples of an excessive focus on military education, however, the 
Marcellus and Philopoemen, amongst others, demonstrate that Plutarch did not always 
see a military education as having a catastrophic effect on those who favored it. In the 
following section I will first explore the connections that Plutarch makes between 
education and character in the Parallel Lives, before examining Plutarch’s conception of 
the impact and value of military education on those who pursue it.  
Much of Plutarch’s view on education can be seen in his treatise On Moral 
Virtue.100 Here, in line with the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, Plutarch argues that the 
soul is divided into two parts: the rational and the irrational, and that the rational part of 
the soul is responsible for controlling the irrational (De virt. moral. 441d-442c).101 While 
                                                 
99 Cor. 1.2-5, 21.1; Mar. 2.2-4, 28.1-2, 35.6. Coriolanus lacked a Greek education because the Romans had 
not yet been exposed to Greek culture, but Marius vehemently spurned the Greek learning that was at his 
fingertips in Rome at the end of the second century BC; nevertheless, they both suffered the same 
consequences, as will be discussed below.  
100 Timothy Duff gives the most complete overview of Plutarch’s educational views, which can be found 
in Duff (1999), 72-78. Cf. Gill (1983); Pelling (1989); Swain (1989a; 1990b); Gill (2006), 219-38; Duff 
(2008b), 1-3.  
101 Plutarch’s philosophy is unquestionably Platonic in origin, but the degree to which he was influenced 
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ideally subordinate to the rational part of the soul, however, the irrational is still 
necessary for the manifestation of vital emotions – it is the role of the rational to ensure 
that these emotions emerge at the appropriate time and to the appropriate degree (442c-
443d). It is indeed this interplay between the rational and irrational parts of the soul, 
Plutarch argues, that is the basis for a man’s character: one’s inclination to moral virtue 
is dictated by the influence and control that his rationality has over his emotions (443c). 
More specifically, he continues, the irrational part of the soul becomes habituated to a 
resting state of either vice or virtue based on the influence of the rational. If the irrational 
has been “poorly educated” by the rational then it takes on an acquired state of vice, but 
if it has been “educated well” by the rational it takes on a state of virtue (443d).102 The 
specific word that Plutarch uses to describe the action of the rational upon the irrational, 
παιδαγωγηθῇ, highlights the connection in his mind between character and education: 
the rational part of the soul is responsible for the proper development of the irrational 
just as the Greek παιδαγωγός is responsible for ensuring the correct development of a 
child’s character through his education. This is a connection which Plutarch makes in 
several of his other treatises.103  
 While Plutarch frequently makes the link between education and character in 
many of the Parallel Lives, these connections are rarely satisfying to the modern reader. 
Both Christopher Gill and Christopher Pelling have recognized that despite his clear 
                                                 
by the original texts of Plato and Aristotle in addition to contemporary Platonic and Peripatetic schools is 
still debated. Cf. R. M. Jones (1916); Babut (1969), 61-76; Opsomer (1994); Donini (1974), 63-125; 
Becchi (1975); (1978); (1981).  
102 ἡ δ' ἕξις ἰσχὺς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγενομένη, κακία μέν, ἂν 
φαύλως, ἀρετὴ δ', ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος (De virt. moral. 443d). 
103 Cf. De Aud. Poet. 28d-e; De auditu 37d-e; Prof. in Virt. 76d. 
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understanding of character development as seen in many of his essays (discussed above), 
Plutarch often failed to use details of his subjects’ early education to explain the 
development of their character. Gill argues that Plutarch, like other historians and 
biographers of his day, was primarily concerned with simply showing the character of 
his subject rather than explaining what circumstances led to his subject’s specific 
personality.104 Pelling, also noting the similarity in Plutarch’s methods to those of his 
contemporaries, suggests that while Plutarch does make an effort to individuate his 
characters in the Parallel Lives, his priority lay much more with presenting character 
than analyzing it.105 Timothy Duff has recently added more nuance to the discussion of 
Plutarch’s treatment of education and character in the Parallel Lives, and has defined 
two different methods which Plutarch uses to discuss education and character: the 
‘developmental’ model and the ‘static/illustrative’ model. In the ‘developmental’ model, 
Plutarch sees one’s character as developing throughout childhood based on education, 
habits, and other influences, and eventually becoming settled upon reaching adulthood. 
While this model appears to be closest to Plutarch’s actual understanding of character, 
particularly from his treatises in the Moralia (like On Moral Virtue, above), it is not very 
common in the Parallel Lives, and only occurs when Plutarch is discussing 
philosophical ideas or texts. Instead, the dominant model that Plutarch uses to describe 
character in the Parallel Lives is the ‘static/illustrative’ model, in which Plutarch treats a 
man’s character as essentially unchanging and uses anecdotes about his early education 
                                                 
104 Gill (1983), 469-75. 
105 Pelling (1988), esp. 257-63. 
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to illustrate – rather than explain – his character as an adult.106 In other words, Plutarch 
rarely suggests that a subject’s adult character is a direct result of his early education, 
but rather that the details of his subject’s early education serve to demonstrate aspects of 
that man’s adult character. These two models are not mutually exclusive, and there is at 
times ambiguity in a Life about the true relationship that Plutarch saw between a man’s 
education and character.107 This distinction between ‘developmental’ and 
‘static/illustrative’ models of education helps to inform our own discussion of military 
education in the Parallel Lives. Many of the statesmen discussed below showed an 
unbalanced preference for military education over literature and philosophy, and almost 
unavoidably suffered varying degrees of moral failure later in life. Indeed, as Pelling has 
observed, it is generals who most frequently appear to have one-sided educations in the 
Parallel Lives.108 As we shall see, however, despite the impression one gets from those 
Lives with the most extreme imbalance in education, Plutarch’s attitude toward the 
effects of military education is more nuanced than it seems at first. 
Considering the connection between education and character that Plutarch saw, 
then, it comes as no surprise that Plutarch frequently dedicated space in the Parallel 
Lives to the education of his subjects. As is the case for most themes in the Lives, the 
amount of detail about a particular statesman’s education that Plutarch had at his 
disposal – or the amount of detail that Plutarch deemed relevant for that particular Life – 
                                                 
106 Duff (2008b), esp. 1-3, 18-23. 
107 The Marius is a particularly good example of the potential uncertainty here, as we shall see below. See 
Duff (2008b), 16-18. 
108 Pelling (1996), xxvi-xxix; (2002), 341. 
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varied considerably depending on the subject. In some Lives Plutarch clearly struggled 
to find much relevant information about the subject’s education, as in the Eumenes and 
Timoleon, while in other Lives, such as the Pericles or the Themistocles, Plutarch knew 
the names of specific teachers and analyzed their specific impact on the subject.109 While 
Plutarch frequently possessed more detailed information on the education of his Greek 
subjects, Simon Swain has argued that Plutarch often stressed the education of his 
Roman subjects considerably more than their Greek counterparts. Sometimes, he 
observes, Plutarch only makes a clear connection between poor education and moral 
failing in the Roman Life, even when the same failing exists for the Greek counterpart 
(such as in the Pyrrhus-Marius or Coriolanus-Alcibiades); at other times, Plutarch 
simply emphasizes the education of the Roman while largely ignoring the education of 
his pair (as in the Pelopidas-Marcellus, Timoleon-Aemilius, and Cimon-Lucullus).110 
Plutarch’s greater interest in the education of his Roman subjects, Swain suggests, is 
directly linked to his interest in their character: because a Roman could not necessarily 
be assumed to have had a Greek education, unlike his Greek pair, a Roman’s possession 
or lack of a good education provided Plutarch with a clear criterion by which to 
characterize him that he did not have with the Greek counterpart.111 As we shall see 
below, Swain’s explanation appears to hold true for many of the following Lives, and it 
is indeed Plutarch’s Roman generals who lack a good education more often than their 
                                                 
109 Pelling (1990). For an in-depth examination of Plutarch’s portrayal of Themistocles’ education, cf. Duff 
(2008), 3-11. 
110 Swain (1990b), 134-5. 
111 Swain (1990b), 145. Plutarch’s focus on the Roman acquisition of character is further discussed in 
Pelling (1989), and Duff (1999), 76-77.  
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Greek pair. As the assumed ubiquity of education amongst his Greek subjects suggests, 
Plutarch saw education (paideia) as having specifically originated with the Greeks, and 
consisting primarily of the study of Greek language and literature.112 For Plutarch, then, 
it is this appreciation for and knowledge of Greek culture that provides the rational part 
of the soul with the ability to control the irrational, which is necessary for a balanced 
character. 
There are many statesmen in the Parallel Lives, however, who lack a balanced 
education, and instead received the majority of their training in military leadership. Two 
of the most famous of Plutarch’s subjects with an unbalanced military education are 
Marius and Coriolanus. Marius’ aversion to Greek culture and education is, for Plutarch, 
perhaps the most extreme out of all the subjects of the Parallel Lives. Early in the Life, 
Plutarch says that Marius, who had a warlike nature, focused on military education and 
intentionally avoided learning Greek literature or language because he judged them as 
the worthless products of slaves (Mar. 2.1-2). This lack of the “Greek Muses and 
Graces” in Marius’ upbringing, Plutarch continues, directly led to the ignoble end of his 
political career – and his life – due to his uncontrolled passions and ambition (Mar. 2.4); 
as seen above, it is precisely the literary education that Marius avoided that could have 
helped him control his irrational side. Throughout the rest of the Life, Plutarch clearly 
traces Marius’ downfall until his dying moments, when he portrays the seven-time 
consul lamenting that he had never accomplished what he had desired (Mar. 45.11-
                                                 
112 Duff (1999), 76-77. Cf. Swain (1990b), 131-136 for Plutarch’s perception of how the Romans first 
came into contact with Greek education and culture thanks primarily to the actions of Marcellus. 
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12).113 Coriolanus similarly lacked a Greek education, but as Plutarch acknowledges, 
that is due more to circumstance than intention, as Rome did not offer the opportunities 
for a literary education at the time (Cor. 1.3-6). Intentional or not, however, Coriolanus’ 
unbalanced education ultimately had the same consequences as Marius’. Coriolanus was 
prone to great anger, and lacked the reason and education to control it (Cor. 15.4). 
Coriolanus’ excessive anger, coupled with his poor ability to communicate with people 
outside of the battlefield, led to his exile by a popular jury (Cor. 21.1) and, ultimately, 
him marching on Rome at the head of an enemy army (Cor. 30).114 Marius and 
Coriolanus may have suffered the most for their excessive military education, but they 
are not the only ones with similar gaps in their upbringing. Flamininus, Fabius 
Maximus, and Marcellus, confronted as they were by the threat of Carthage, similarly 
lacked the opportunity to receive a well-rounded education (Flam. 1.4; Fab. 1.4; Marc. 
1.1-2). Plutarch saw this as a particular shame for Marcellus, who, although being 
naturally fond of war, was also a lover of Greek culture and learning (Marc. 1.1-2). 
However, because he lacked the opportunity to temper his impetuous nature with a well-
rounded Greek education, Marcellus fell victim to his ambition and threw away his life 
in ambush (Marc. 28.6-29.3).115 Romans are not the only ones Plutarch identifies as 
receiving an unbalanced military education: Pelopidas, Pyrrhus, and Philopoemen are 
similarly guilty, as we shall see shortly. However, Plutarch tends to focus on the 
                                                 
113 See Duff (1999), 103-11, 118-21, for a detailed discussion of Marius’ moral failings, characterised 
particularly by his discontent. For a fuller treatment of Marius’ military career, see Chapter 4, below. 
114 Duff (1999), 206-221 provides a fuller account and analysis of Coriolanus’ moral failings. For 
Coriolanus’ poor rhetorical ability, see Pelling (2002), 339-347. 
115 Swain (1990b), 130; Beneker (2012), 78-80. 
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consequences of such an education far more in the Roman Lives than the Greek, and so 
Marius, Coriolanus, and Marcellus provide a much clearer view of the dangers of 
excessive military education. 
 The composition and importance of Greek education for Plutarch is clear, but his 
conception of what constituted a military education is less apparent. In many cases, 
Plutarch discusses his subjects’ military education in terms of physical training, both in 
terms of the body and of skill with weapons. Coriolanus, whose nature and upbringing in 
early Rome denied him a literary education, trained in weapons from an early age and 
specifically worked to strengthen his body so that it too could act as a weapon (Cor. 2.1-
2). Plutarch similarly describes the military education of Fabius Maximus, Pelopidas, 
and Marcellus as being centered on physical fitness (Fab. 1.4; Pel. 4.1) or weapons 
training (Marc. 2.1). Marius’ military education is even more vague; Plutarch makes no 
mention of physical or weapons training, but instead simply states that Marius received a 
στρατιωτικῆς παιδείας (Mar. 2.1). In other instances, however, Plutarch goes into 
considerably more detail about what constitutes a military education. A good example of 
this is in the Pyrrhus, where Plutarch describes the Epirote as “continually studying and 
meditating” (μελετῶν ἔοικε καὶ φιλοσοφῶν ἀεὶ διατελεῖν) on the arranging of armies and 
commanding (τάξεις καὶ στρατηγίας), which he thought were the most kingly branches 
of learning (μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατον) (Pyr. 8.2-6). The repeated instances of 
educational vocabulary (such as μελετῶν, φιλοσοφῶν, μαθημάτων) suggest a level of 
intellectual rigor to Pyrrhus’ military education that is markedly absent from the physical 
training and fitness that characterized the education of Coriolanus, Fabius Maximus, 
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Pelopidas, and Marcellus. Pyrrhus focused his education, as Plutarch notes, exclusively 
on these military affairs, but despite the lack of balance with philosophy Pyrrhus’ 
education nevertheless appears thorough and respectable.  
The Philopoemen provides perhaps the most complete treatment of military 
education in the Parallel Lives. Early in his life, Plutarch says, Philopoemen took up 
physical training in weapons, horsemanship, and wrestling to prepare himself for war 
(Phil. 3.2). This matches the basic portrayal of military education seen in other Lives, 
above, but here Plutarch delves into much more detail. Philopoemen, he says, avoided 
practicing athletics after he was told that it would be detrimental to his military training 
(στρατιωτικὴν ἄσκησιν) (Phil. 3.3-4). As an adult, Philopoemen continued physical 
exercise to strengthen his body (Phil. 4.1), but also, just like Pyrrhus, dedicated much 
study to the art of generalship. Plutarch says that while Philopoemen avoided literature 
that lended itself to leisure and idle conversation, he did see the value in that which was 
devoted to τὰ πράγματα, and so was familiar with the histories of Alexander and read 
military manuals such as the Tactics of Evangelus; even then, however, his practical 
nature led him to prefer planning tactics himself rather than studying diagrams in books 
(Phil. 4.8-9). As Duff points out, there is implicit criticism of Philopoemen’s excessive 
focus on military education in these chapters, particularly in his shunning of athletics 
practice and reading for leisure, as this effectively constituted a rejection of traditional 
Greek paideia.116 Plutarch seems to make a rather more explicit criticism at the end of 
the passage, saying that Philopoemen “appears to have pursued military matters more 
                                                 
116 Duff (2008b), 12. 
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than necessary” because he considered war as the best way for him to demonstrate virtue 
(Phil. 4.10). Plutarch’s message here that one should not focus on only a single aspect of 
virtue is clear, but I would argue that it is important not to read any more into this 
statement as a condemnation of military education. Throughout the rest of the Life, 
Plutarch describes several instances of Philopoemen’s military education paying 
dividends later in his career. Immediately after explaining his single-minded focus on 
military affairs, Plutarch describes Philopoemen’s actions in the Battle of Sellasia (222 
BC) in which the Achaean fought alongside Antigonus III against Cleomenes of Sparta. 
During a crucial moment of the battle, Plutarch says, Philopoemen observed that the 
Spartans had exploited a gap in the line and were threatening their flanks, but when he 
approached Antigonus’ generals with a way to save the situation he was ignored; 
instead, Philopoemen took the initiative himself, drove back the enemy incursion, and 
then led a cavalry charge into the confused Spartans (Phil. 6.4-7). Although Plutarch 
does not specifically attribute Philopoemen’s ability to recognise and respond to a 
dangerous battlefield situation to his intensive study of military tactics, the relationship 
between the two is hard to ignore. Further instances of the practical benefits of 
Philopoemen’s military education appear later in the Life, both in and out of battle. 
Plutarch describes in detail how Philopoemen changed the inefficient way that the 
Achaeans were arranging their infantry by improving the equipment and formation of 
the soldiers to better compete with the Macedonian phalanx (Phil. 9.1-5). This is a clear 
example of Philopoemen putting his studied knowledge of military affairs into 
considered practice, and one which had a significantly positive impact on the morale and 
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performance of his soldiers (Phil. 9.13-14). Plutarch similarly attributes Philopoemen’s 
victories at the Battle of Mantinea in 207 BC (Phil. 10) and against the Spartan Nabis in 
192 BC (Phil. 14.6-12) to his ability to turn difficult tactical situations to his advantage.  
The battle against Nabis is particularly significant for its parallels to Plutarch’s 
description of Philopoemen’s military education, as Philopoemen’s dedication to reading 
the Tactics of Evangelus and to inspecting terrain and troop deployments himself (Phil. 
4.8-9) directly influenced his actions against Nabis. Finding his army in such a 
disadvantaged position because of a surprise march by Nabis that his own soldiers began 
to panic, Philopoemen nevertheless took the time to survey the terrain and alter his order 
of battle to better suit his circumstances, and his subsequent charge sent Nabis’ army 
into a rout (Phil. 14.8-9). By doing this, Plutarch effuses, Philopoemen “demonstrated 
that the art of tactics is the consummate skill in war” (14.8).117 That Plutarch provides 
several examples throughout the Philopoemen of the practical benefits of the Achaean’s 
military education suggests that he saw considerable value in such training for aspiring 
commanders.118 Of course, as several scholars have observed, for all the benefits of 
Philopoemen’s military education during his career, his lack of a philosophical 
education leads directly to his φιλονικία getting the better of him at the end of the Life 
(Phil. 17.7).119 Even in the Life with Plutarch’s most clear praise of a military education, 
the reader is left with little doubt that an unbalanced education will lead to difficulty 
                                                 
117 ἐπέδειξε τὴν τακτικὴν τῶν ἄκρων τῆς πολεμικῆς τέχνην οὖσαν (Phil. 14.8). 
118 Pelling (1997), 218 n.89, has also observed the parallel between Phil. 14.8-9 and Phil. 4.9. Cf. Livy 
35.28. 
119 Pelling (1985), 84-89; Swain (1988), 343-44; Pelling (1989), 208-9; Walsh (1992), 210-11; Pelling 
(1997), 125-135; Duff (2008), 11-12. 
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later in life. Nevertheless, the ultimate lesson in Philopoemen is not necessarily so 
straightforward. In the final chapter of the Life, Plutarch describes the attempt by a 
Roman to have all of Philopoemen’s statues torn down after the fall of Corinth due to his 
opposition to Rome. Primarily due to the intervention of Polybius, says Plutarch, the 
judges posthumously defended the actions of Philopoemen, distinguishing “between 
necessity and virtue, and what was good and what was profitable” and finding 
“correctly” that benefactors such as Philopoemen should be rewarded for the good that 
they do (Phil. 21.12).120 Simon Swain has argued that Plutarch thus saw Philopoemen as 
a genuine benefactor of Greece despite his vices.121 I would go further, and suggest that 
this closing sentiment can also be read in terms of the value of military education. 
Philopoemen’s excessive focus on military education did have an adverse effect on his 
ability to control the irrational side of his character. Nevertheless, it was precisely the 
understanding and skill he gained from his martial education that allowed Philopoemen 
to do so much good for the Greek cities. This same contrast can be seen in many of the 
other Lives whose subjects focused on military education at the expense of all else. 
Plutarch observes that Fabius Maximus gave into his temper later in life, as seen by his 
ill-considered opposition to Scipio’s plan to attack Hannibal in Africa; similarly, 
Marcellus’ impetuousness caused his senseless death in an ambush set by Hannibal. 
Both men possessed only a military education and so lacked the ability to control these 
irrational aspects of their character, but without their military education they could not 
                                                 
120 ἀλλὰ τῆς χρείας τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκεῖνοι καὶ τὸ καλὸν ὡς ἔοικε τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς διώριζον (Phil. 21.12). 
121 Swain (1988), 345. 
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have been in the position to protect Rome from Hannibal. Even Coriolanus and Marius, 
whose lack of a balanced education allowed their anger and ambition to grow unchecked 
and led them to cause harm to Rome later in their lives, still used their military ability to 
do even greater service to their state earlier in their careers. Clearly, Plutarch saw that an 
unbalanced military education could cause great harm to an individual by denying him 
the ability to control the irrational side of his character. Nevertheless, he also recognized 
that an individual’s military education was often necessary for the safeguarding and 
benefaction of the state. A similar contrast between individual and state also appears in 
Plutarch’s depiction of the use of military deception in the Parallel Lives. 
 
Deceptive Generalship 
 For Plutarch, then, neither a military education in its own right nor even an 
overriding passion for military matters had a negative impact on a man’s character in 
and of itself. In order to fully grasp the moral impact of generalship in the Parallel 
Lives, however, it is also important to examine Plutarch’s portrayal of the general at war. 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Plutarch fully accepted and even approved 
of the need for warfare in most circumstances.122 While he does condemn unnecessary 
wars at times in the Lives, particularly civil strife between Greek cities (Age.; Flam.) or 
Roman generals (Pomp.), he does not criticize generals for simply doing their jobs. 
Warfare, by its nature, requires its participants to act in ways that are often not 
acceptable in civil society in order to achieve victory, and many generals in the Parallel 
                                                 
122 See above, pp. 62-64. 
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Lives engage in lies, deceit, and treachery at various points in their campaigns. This 
section will examine Plutarch’s understanding and treatment of deception in warfare, in 
order to identify his views on the characters of those generals who frequently relied on 
deception. 
 Classical authors with whom Plutarch was familiar had differing opinions on the 
use of deception in warfare. Xenophon, for one, had a positive view of deception and 
discussed it in nearly every one of his works, even those with no relation to warfare.123 
His greatest praise of military deception comes, appropriately, in his training manual for 
cavalry officers, where he asserts that “on thinking about the successes in war, one finds 
that the most and the greatest of these have come about by means of deception.”124 
Xenophon’s approval of deception is not unequivocal, however: through the character of 
Cambyses in the Cyropaedia, Xenophon acknowledges that teaching deception to youths 
could lead them to employ deception against friends and enemies indiscriminately.125  
Nevertheless, Xenophon’s view of military deception is primarily positive, as can be 
seen at various places in his other works when he calls deception during war both just 
(Ages. 1.17; Mem. 4.2.15) and lawful (Cyr. 1.6.34). Not all authors shared Xenophon's 
feelings for military deception, however. In a well-known passage, Polybius wrote with 
apparent nostalgia for the times when wars were fought without deceit and the result of a 
campaign hinged on the outcome of a single battle, and claimed that the ancients 
                                                 
123 Krentz (2000), 169. Cf. Hunt (1998), 147, 195-6; Hesk (2000), 122-142; Danzig (2007).  
124 καὶ ἐνθυμούμενος δ' ἂν τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις πλεονεκτήματα εὕροι ἄν τις τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα σὺν 
ἀπάτῃ γεγενημένα (Xen. Hipp. 5.11). 
125 Hesk (2000), 122-142. 
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deliberately avoided deceiving even their enemies (Polyb. 13.3.2-5). While pitched 
battles certainly did occur in the Archaic and Classical period, they did not define 
ancient warfare in the way Polybius described. As decisive as the Battle of Plataea may 
have been, for example, it would never have happened if not for Themistocles’ trickery 
(of both sides) at Salamis.126 Moreover, those few pitched hoplite battles that did occur 
during the thirty years of the Peloponnesian war, such as at Delium and Mantinea, did 
nothing to speed up the conclusion of the overall war. Hans van Wees is understandably 
surprised that Polybius appears to be as naïve as the orator Demosthenes, who also 
claimed that older generations exclusively fought battles according to a strict set of rules 
(Dem. 9.48), yet he still takes the historian's claim at face value, to Polybius' 
detriment.127 Peter Krentz gives Polybius more credit by arguing that his rhetoric at 
13.3.2-6 is directed not against military deception but against Philip V and his treachery, 
which is the subject of the longer passage.128 Regardless of Polybius' level of 
appreciation for military deception, there is no doubt that he recognized its effectiveness: 
he ends his lament at 13.3.2-6 by claiming that “now they say that only a bad general 
does anything openly in war.”129 Plutarch, as we shall see, certainly appreciated the 
                                                 
126 Cf. Hdt. 8.75-76, 8.110.2-3; Plut. Them. 12.3-5, 16.4-5. Themistocles sent a letter to Xerxes urging him 
to attack the Greek navy quickly so that his own allied contingents would not have the opportunity to 
abandon the Athenians; after the battle he sent another correspondence that divulged the Greek plan to 
dismantle Xerxes’ bridge over the Hellespont, which encouraged the Persian king to retreat to Asia with 
the bulk of his army.  
127 Van Wees (2004), 115-7. See also 134, where he denies the existence of “the formal engagements of 
Polybius' imagination, fought by arrangement at a stipulated time and place.” 
128 Krentz (2000), 178, and 180 n. 18 for his argument that Polybius did not, as Pritchett (1974, 178-9) 
believed, consider ambushes as violations of honor. 
129 νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν (Polyb. 13.3.6). Cf. 
Polyb. 3.18.9 and 4.8.11-12 for more comments on the effectiveness of deception in warfare. 
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importance and efficacy of deception in warfare just as much as Xenophon and Polybius 
did. However, while he may not have lamented its use in a fit of misplaced nostalgia as 
Polybius and Demosthenes did, his praise of it is not nearly so unequivocal as 
Xenophon’s, and at times Plutarch makes much of the moral ambiguity behind deceptive 
generalship.  
In the Lives, it is clear that Plutarch is aware of these distinct styles of warfare. In 
the Philopoemen, for instance, Plutarch directly contrasts the “straightforward and noble 
warfare” (ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον πόλεμον) of the Peloponnesians and Arcadians with a 
type that Philopoemen adopted from Cretan practices, one characterized by “tricks, 
stolen marches, and ambushes” (σοφίσμασι καὶ δόλοις κλωπείαις τε καὶ λοχισμοῖς) 
(Phil. 13.9).130 Plutarch does not go into any further detail here about what constitutes 
straightforward or noble warfare, but its association with the Peloponnesians in 
particular certainly would have conjured in his contemporary readers’ minds the same 
images of traditional hoplite battles that it does in ours today. While Plutarch’s 
description of standard hoplite battles as γενναῖον in particular suggests an implicit 
moral judgment between these two types of warfare, especially when compared to the 
apparently negative vocabulary describing the contrasting style (particularly δόλοις 
κλωπείαις), his comparison between the two is decidedly neutral. Wheeler argues 
convincingly for neutral or even positive connotations of words denoting military 
trickery or deceit in Greek and Roman authors, including Plutarch. Even words such as 
ἀπάτη, δόλος, and κλοπή, he observes, which were otherwise negative, took on a vox 
                                                 
130 See Launey (1949), 285-6, for the Cretan reputation for cleverness, cunning, and duplicity. 
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media when describing military action, and frequently needed an accompanying 
adjective to indicate a negative meaning.131 Moreover, Plutarch’s commentary on 
Philopoemen’s tactics in this chapter focuses on the fact that the Arcadian was able to 
beat the Cretans at their own game by using their tricks and ambushes against them, 
even though such tactics were not natural to him (Phil. 13.9).132 The point here is surely 
to praise Philopoemen for his adaptability and skill rather than to criticize him for his 
use of unorthodox tactics.  
Nevertheless, it is still tempting to see implicit criticism of anything compared to 
that which is ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, especially upon reading the other passage in the 
Parallel Lives that contains that phrase. Early in the Lysander, Plutarch uses the same 
phrase with which he describes Peloponnesian warfare in the Philopoemen (ἁπλοῦν καὶ 
γενναῖον) to describe a type of leadership: 
τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἡγεμόνων τρόπον, ὁ Λύσανδρος τῷ 
Καλλικρατίδᾳ παραβαλλόμενος ἐδόκει πανοῦργος εἶναι καὶ σοφιστής, ἀπάταις τὰ πολλὰ 
διαποικίλλων τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ τῷ λυσιτελοῦντι μεγαλύνων, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ 
συμφέροντι χρώμενος ὡς καλῷ. (Lys. 7.3) 
  
To those who loved the straightforward and noble character of their leaders, Lysander, 
compared with Kallikratidas, appeared to be crafty and scheming, a man who wove his 
many acts of war with deceits and extolled justice when it was to his advantage, but if it 
was not, proclaimed expediency to be honorable. 
 
Lysander’s style of leadership, then, which ranked justice no higher than deception or 
expediency, is directly contrasted with that of Kallikratides, which, being 
                                                 
131 Wheeler (1988), esp. 93-110.  
132 Pelling (1997), 214 n.75, similarly suggests that the dominant focus in Phil. 13.9 is on Philopoemen’s 
adaptability, but suggests that Plutarch is also making a point regarding Philopoemen’s deviation from the 
typical Peloponnesian. 
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“straightforward and noble”, appears to have been more palatable to the Spartan elders. 
However, it is important to note that this is not necessarily Plutarch’s view as well. For 
one, the initial τοῖς δὲ serves as focalization, separating the narrator from those he is 
describing. Moreover, as Timothy Duff has argued, the words that Plutarch uses to 
describe Lysander, πανοῦργος and σοφιστής, were no longer necessarily pejorative by 
Plutarch’s day (although they certainly still could be).133 Similarly, while the Athenians 
frequently criticized the Spartans for their use of deception in much of their literature of 
the 5th century, this same use of deception was at times praised, and was still considered 
an important part of their upbringing.134 Whether or not Plutarch meant this to be a clear 
denunciation of Lysander’s use of deception – and it is certainly difficult to take this 
judgment in any positive way – it is another example of the contrast in the Parallel Lives 
between the use of trickery and deception and that which is ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον. 
However, it is also important to note that what Plutarch compares in this passage is not 
warfare, as he does in the Philopoemen, but character. While he includes Lysander’s use 
of military deception as an example of his πανοῦργος and σοφιστής character, it is not 
the central focus of this passage, and so any implicit judgment that there may be in this 
passage should not automatically be associated with the use of deception in war.   
Interestingly, Plutarch does use the phrase ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον to describe 
warfare once more in his extant corpus, although it appears in an unlikely source: the 
                                                 
133 Duff (1999), 171-74. Cf. Wheeler (1988), 27-8, 33-5, and 107-8. 
134 For a more detailed discussion of Lysander’s character and the importance of deception to Spartan 
education and identity, see below, pp. 89-111. See Hesk (2000), 20-40, for the portrayal of Spartan 
deception in Athenian literature. 
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Bruta animalia ratione uti. In this imagined dialogue between Odysseus and a man-
turned-pig on Circe’s island, the pig, Gryllus, accuses Odysseus of leading astray “by 
tricks and contrivances” men who once knew only “a straightforward and noble type of 
warfare”, and who had been “unacquainted with deceit and lies” (Brut. Anim. 987C).135 
This is only a small rhetorical point within Gryllus’ larger argument that animals are 
more virtuous than men, but is nevertheless noteworthy, especially as Odysseus is 
traditionally lauded for his cleverness and trickery.136 Although it can be difficult to 
identify Plutarch’s actual point of view in his rhetorical essays, Judith Mossman and 
Frances Titchener suggest that because Gryllus’ arguments tend to be anti-Stoic 
throughout the dialogue, the reader is encouraged to associate his arguments with the 
ideas of Plutarch.137 This, then, seems to be a more explicit denunciation of military 
deception than what is found in the Philopoemen or even the Lysander. Unlike in the 
Philopoemen, in which no moral judgment between ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον and deceptive 
warfare exists, and the Lysander, in which Plutarch describes types of character rather 
than types of warfare, in this essay Plutarch’s preference for “straightforward and noble 
warfare” is clear. This opinion, moreover, is in line with Plutarch’s views on deception 
more generally elsewhere in the Moralia: in several of his essays he decries politicians 
who use sophistry in order to trick their own citizens.138  Nevertheless, it is important not 
to read too far into this criticism of deceptive warfare in the context of the Parallel 
                                                 
135 δόλοις καὶ μηχαναῖς ἀνθρώπους ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον εἰδότας πολέμου τρόπον ἀπάτης δὲ καὶ ψευδῶν 
ἀπείρους παρακρουσάμενος (Brut. Anim. 987C). 
136 Duff (1999),172, suggests that this criticism of Odysseus’ most famous trait is part of the humour of 
this passage.  
137  Mossman and Titchener (2011), 293. 
138 Cf. De se ipsum laud. 545C, Praec. ger. reip. 802D-E, Non posse 1090A. 
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Lives. As we have seen above in the discussion of character and education in the Lives, 
the philosophical ideals that Plutarch puts forward in the Moralia do not always translate 
well into the political and historical reality of the Lives. Duff has explored this difficulty 
extensively, particularly in his case studies of pairs such as the Phocion-Cato Minor and 
the Lysander-Sulla, which show Plutarch grappling with conflict between private 
morality and public service from a variety of angles.139 The Lysander-Sulla is 
particularly noteworthy for our current focus on deception, as Plutarch depicts both 
subjects acting in morally questionable (or outright objectionable) ways for the benefit 
of their respective cities. We shall examine this moral uncertainty further in our 
discussion on deception and education in the Spartan Lives, but the concept that Plutarch 
often considers the efficacy of his subjects’ actions in the Parallel Lives as well as their 
morality is an important one when considering Plutarch’s treatment of military deception 
in the Parallel Lives as a whole. He may have argued for the moral superiority of 
“straightforward and noble” warfare in the Bruta animalia ratione uti, but Plutarch’s 
views on military deception in practice are not nearly so straightforward themselves. 
The clearest examples that Plutarch appreciated both the utility and importance 
of military deception in the Parallel Lives appear in the Sertorius. In the prologue to the 
Sertorius-Eumenes, Plutarch names Sertorius as one of the generals who achieved most 
by cunning and cleverness, alongside the other one-eyed generals Philip II, Antigonus, 
and Hannibal (Sert. 1.8). This is illustrious company for Sertorius, and such an 
introduction leads the reader to expect great things from the general; Plutarch does not 
                                                 
139 Duff (1999), 131-204. 
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disappoint. After briefly narrating his early accomplishments, Plutarch explains 
Sertorius' strengths as a general, calling him “a master of the greatest skill” in all acts of 
war which require speed, deception, or falsehood (Sert. 10.2). This characterization 
holds true throughout the entire Life, and is perhaps most clear during his campaigns 
against Metellus. Plutarch introduces Metellus, who was sent to Spain after Sertorius 
had defeated the local Roman commanders, as “the greatest and most esteemed man in 
Rome at the time.”140 As flattering as such a description may be, it says nothing about 
Metellus as a general, and Plutarch is quick to point out the stark differences between the 
two men's abilities in that field:  
προσπολεμῶν ἀνδρὶ τολμητῇ, πάσης ἐξαναδυομένῳ φανερᾶς μάχης, πᾶσαν δὲ 
μεταβαλλομένῳ μεταβολὴν εὐσταλείᾳ καὶ κουφότητι τῆς Ἰβηρικῆς στρατιᾶς, αὐτὸς 
ὁπλιτικῶν καὶ νομίμων ἀσκητὴς γεγονὼς ἀγώνων καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐμβριθοῦς καὶ μονίμου 
φάλαγγος (Sert. 12.6-7). 
 
[Metellus] was carrying on a war with a bold man who escaped from every open battle 
and who shifted all about by means of the light equipment and agility of his Iberian 
army, while he himself had become practiced in the customary contests of heavily-armed 
soldiers, and was in command of a heavy and immobile army. 
 
Here Plutarch makes a clear distinction between two contrasting styles of warfare. 
Metellus was attempting to bring about the decisive clash of two armies that, as seen 
above, was considered by many to constitute the ideal. However, no matter how skilled 
Metellus and his army may have been in a pitched battle, he and his soldiers were 
ponderous and ineffective when confronted with Sertorius' frequent movements. 
Plutarch does not refer to Sertorius' movements in this passage as a stratagem or 
deception or anything of the sort, but he clearly thought of them in this way, as becomes 
                                                 
140 ἄνδρα Ῥωμαίων ἐν τοῖς τότε μέγιστον καὶ δοκιμώτατον (Sert. 12.4). 
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apparent from his description of the same maneuvering in the Pompey: 
Τοῦ Σερτωρίου παραβόλως καὶ λῃστρικώτερον αὐτῷ προσφερομένου, καὶ ταράττοντος 
ἐνέδραις καὶ περιδρομαῖς ἄνδρα νομίμων ἀθλητὴν ἀγώνων καὶ δυνάμεως στασίμου καὶ 
βαρείας ἡγεμόνα (Pomp. 17.2). 
 
Sertorius attacked [Metellus] boldly and like a pirate, and by ambushes and 
encirclements disturbed a man practiced in customary battles and who was in command 
of a heavily-armed but immobile force. 
 
This passage provides names for Sertorius' specific tactics. He is not just escaping from 
battle and quickly moving his forces, as described in the Sertorius; rather, he is 
conducting ambushes and encirclements. This may be partly due to a change in 
perspective. In the Sertorius, the subject of the sentence is Metellus, and the reader 
experiences Sertorius' attacks from his perspective. Metellus is clearly unaware of 
Sertorius' plans; all he observes is that Sertorius refuses to fight a customary battle and 
instead continuously shifts the position of his army. The passage in the Pompey, 
however, is from Sertorius' point of view. Sertorius would have obviously been well 
aware of his own actions, and so in this case it better suits the narrative for Plutarch to 
give names to his particular tactics. Regardless of the specific vocabulary used, the 
characterization of Sertorius' actions is consistent: he refuses to give battle; he frequently 
moves his army; and he attacks Metellus without warning. That Plutarch describes the 
conflict between Sertorius and Metellus in two different ways demonstrates, in my 
opinion, that he possessed more than just a superficial understanding of the tactics 
involved. In the Sertorius, Plutarch is primarily concerned with the differences between 
the soldiers of the two armies: it was “the light equipment and agility of his Iberian 
army” that allowed Sertorius his maneuverability, just as it was Metellus' heavy and 
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immobile force that hindered his own movements. It was precisely this interplay 
between these two contrasting types of armies that led to the encirclements and 
ambushes – the cornerstones of military deception – that he describes in the Pompey.  
 These passages are perhaps most important for what they convey about 
Plutarch's conception of military deception. As seen above, Plutarch first introduces 
Sertorius as one of those generals who accomplished most through cunning and 
cleverness, and later describes him as a master of warfare which requires speed, 
deception, or falsehood. Sertorius' campaign against Metellus (and later Pompey) 
demonstrates all of these skills: he uses speed and deception to create and exploit 
opportunities against the larger and more cumbersome Roman armies. For Plutarch, 
deception was merely a part of this indirect style of warfare, which was opposed to the 
traditional clash of two heavily-armed forces. That he saw the value of deception and 
maneuver is apparent throughout the Sertorius. Sertorius' successes against Metellus are 
clear in the passage cited above (Sert. 12.6-7), but Plutarch's strongest acknowledgment 
of Sertorius' abilities comes after the exile had defeated the combined armies of Metellus 
and Pompey. By means of ambushes, encirclements, and swift marches, Sertorius 
isolated the two armies of Metellus and Pompey and forced them to retreat to separate 
safe havens. Pompey sent a letter to the senate saying he would return home if they did 
not send him money and supplies, as he had exhausted all of his own in his war in Spain. 
But, as Plutarch claims, “there was a story in Rome, that Sertorius would arrive in Italy 
before Pompey; so low had the cleverness of Sertorius brought down the foremost and 
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strongest generals at that time.”141 That Pompey especially, who gained such a reputation 
as a general both before and after the Spanish campaign, succumbed to the ambushes 
and maneuvering of Sertorius, clearly speaks to the effectiveness of such tactics, an 
effectiveness that Plutarch understood and appreciated.  
 Despite Plutarch’s likely moral qualms about the use of military deception, seen 
particularly in the Moralia, he nevertheless appreciates its usefulness for securing 
victory during war. Most generals in Plutarch's Parallel Lives display no compunction 
about using the occasional ambush or trick to help secure a victory, but there are several 
who show an unusually strong tendency toward the use of deception and stratagems in 
warfare. Lysander and his fellow Spartan Agesilaus both frequently engage in military 
deception, as do the pair Sertorius and Eumenes. Plutarch recognized the important role 
that deception played in the lives of these men. He consistently focuses on their acts of 
deception not only to establish and describe their respective characters, but also to spark 
discussion of larger themes throughout the Lives themselves. I will conclude this chapter 
with two case studies, each of which examining different aspects of Plutarch’s portrayal 
of military deception in the Parallel Lives. First, I will discuss the Lives of Lysander and 
Agesilaus in greater depth, focusing particularly on their military education in the 
Spartan system and their use of deception in war. In the Lysander and Agesilaus, perhaps 
more than in any other Lives, Plutarch draws important thematic connections between 
his subjects’ unique education and the morality of their military actions. Secondly, I will 
                                                 
141 ἦν ἐν Ῥώμῃ λόγος, ὡς Πομπηΐου πρότερος εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀφίξοιτο Σερτώριος· εἰς τοσοῦτον τοὺς πρώτους 
καὶ δυνατωτάτους τῶν τότε στρατηγῶν ἡ Σερτωρίου δεινότης κατέστησεν (Sert. 21.9).  
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consider Plutarch’s portrayal of deception in the Sertorius-Eumenes. While Plutarch is 
less concerned with the impact of education on the subjects of this pair, the correct use 
of military deception remains an important theme.  
 
Education and Deception in the Spartan Lives 
 The Spartan Lives, particularly the Lysander and Agesilaus, make an effective 
case study of both the impact of military education on character and the morality of 
deception in warfare. The Lysander shares a number of parallels with the Agesilaus, as 
befits the biographies of two contemporary Spartan leaders. Although Plutarch never 
specifically refers to the Agesilaus in the Lysander or vice versa, he certainly had each 
king in mind while writing the other's biography, particularly because they were 
contemporaries.142 Both Lysander and Agesilaus were products of the Spartan agoge 
system, which, as Plutarch makes clear early in each of their biographies, educated 
Spartan youths to be highly obedient and sensitive to public opinion (Lys. 2.1-2; Ages. 
1.1-3). For Plutarch, both Lysander and Agesilaus were particularly influenced by their 
Spartan education. Early in the Lysander, Plutarch makes a point to forestall any 
criticism of his subject’s ambition and contentiousness, saying that because his Spartan 
education bred those traits into him, Lysander’s nature should not be blamed for those 
flaws (Lys. 2.2). Nevertheless, Plutarch accepts that Lysander’s character was not 
                                                 
142 Plutarch develops the relationship between the two in Ages. 3.3-8.3 and Lys. 22.3-24.1. Jones (1966), 
66-7 places the composition of the Agesilaus-Pompey after the Lysander-Sulla, primarily due to cross-
references between the Brutus, Caesar, and Pompey. Cf. Pelling (2002), 2-11 concerning the simultaneous 
preparation of the late Republican Lives. 
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completely shaped by his Spartan upbringing, as his obedience to the strong and his 
willingness to endure burdensome authority in order to more readily achieve what was 
necessary were greater than what was usually found in a Spartan (Lys. 2.3).143 These two 
traits would certainly have been brought out by Lysander’s education as well, as we will 
see, but it is clear that Plutarch felt that they particularly characterized Lysander, and 
they consequently have a significant impact on his actions throughout his Life. As 
mentioned, Agesilaus had the same upbringing as Lysander, and was even a part of the 
same “band” as his eventual colleague (Ages. 2.1). However, while Plutarch used 
Lysander’s education in the agoge to explain away some of his less praiseworthy traits, 
he thought that Agesilaus greatly benefited from it. Most heirs-apparent were 
traditionally exempt from the harsh Spartan agoge, but because Agesilaus was not 
expected to become king he went through the usual system. This meant, as Plutarch 
observed, that Agesilaus “came to rule not uninstructed in being ruled”, and so while he 
was by nature commanding and kingly, his education added popularity and kindness to 
his character (Ages. 1.3). Agesilaus did share Lysander’s contentiousness 
(φιλονεικότατος, Ages. 2.1), once again likely due to the Spartan system, but in this case 
Plutarch does not feel the need to justify its existence in Agesilaus’ character. This is 
perhaps due to his aforementioned kindness, which, according to Plutarch, softened his 
contentiousness and tendency towards violent rage, and produced a “moderation of his 
nature” that was apparently quite attractive to the older Lysander (Ages. 2.1-2). More 
                                                 
143 θεραπευτικὸς δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ Σπαρτιάτην φύσει δοκεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ βάρος ἐξουσίας 
διὰ χρείαν ἐνεγκεῖν εὔκολος (Lys. 2.3). 
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importantly, Agesilaus also shared Lysander’s great drive for honor and aversion to 
censure, two traits which become significant in the discussion of their use of deception 
throughout their Lives. 
Some of the most striking parallels between the Lysander and the Agesilaus are 
related to the Spartans' use of deception. While Sparta’s reputation for military 
excellence lies primarily in the city’s unquestioned effectiveness in straightforward 
hoplite battles, Spartans are frequently referred to in ancient texts as being equally 
skilled at deceit and trickery. Thucydides frequently discusses Spartan actions in the 
Peloponnesian War as being characterized by their duplicity, and Pericles’ funeral 
oration in particular contrasts the natural openness and courage of the Athenians with the 
secretive closed society of the Spartans (Thuc. 2.39.1).144 Jon Hesk suggests that the 
‘tricky Spartan’ is very much an Athenian literary and societal construct that helps to 
reinforce Athens’ own self-identity.145 Unsurprisingly, Plutarch largely follows the 
traditional literary portrayal of Spartans as valuing deception. His description of the 
traditional Spartan education system implemented by Lycurgus shows the extent to 
which he saw deception as being ingrained into Spartan character; from a young age, 
Spartan boys were taught to steal supplies and food to avoid going hungry, with those 
who were caught being flogged in punishment (Lyc. 17.3-4). Moreover, newly-married 
Spartan soldiers still lived with their messmates rather than their wives, and were thus 
only able to see their wives by sneaking into their homes at night (Lyc. 15.3-5).146 
                                                 
144 Powell (1989); Bradford (1994); Hesk (2000), 26-29. 
145 Hesk (2000), 23-40. 
146 Admittedly, as Plutarch acknowledges, these nocturnal conjugal visits were introduced to encourage 
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Deception of this sort was certainly not the only lesson to be beaten into the Spartan 
youth, as the Spartan agoge also developed the courage, obedience, and endurance 
needed to succeed in traditional hoplite battles (Lyc. 16.4-5).147 As important as their 
skill in battle may have been to their mystique, however, Plutarch saw that the Spartans 
prized victory in any form, martial or otherwise. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the 
Marcellus, when Plutarch compares the Roman tradition of triumphs and ovations to the 
Spartan practice. According to Plutarch, Spartan generals who gained victory by 
deception or persuasion sacrificed an ox upon their return while those who had won 
through a battle sacrificed a cock: “For although they were the most warlike of people, 
they believed an action accomplished through reasoning and wit to be greater and 
seemlier for a man than one done with the aid of bodily strength and courage (Marc. 
22.5).148 Victory in straightforward hoplite battle was certainly to be praised, but it was 
the victory that mattered, and if victory could come without excessive loss of Spartan 
manpower, then all the better. 
 In Plutarch’s eyes, then, the education of Lysander and Agesilaus prepared both 
men to use whatever means necessary to improve the Spartan state. Through reading 
both the Lysander and the Agesilaus, it is clear that both Spartan leaders took their 
                                                 
moderation and keep passions fresh between married couples (Lyc. 15.5) rather than to specifically teach 
the values of stealth and deception. Nevertheless, it is another example of the Spartan agoge passively 
encouraging those very traits. 
147 The Spartan agoge, was, of course, considerably more dynamic and complex than what Plutarch 
describes in the Lycurgus. For recent scholarship on the Spartan education system see Kennel (1995); 
Powell (2015). 
148 καίπερ γὰρ ὄντες πολεμικώτατοι, μείζονα καὶ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπῳ πρέπουσαν ἡγοῦντο τὴν διὰ λόγου καὶ 
συνέσεως πρᾶξι ἢ τὴν μετὰ βίας καὶ ἀνδρείας (Met. 22.5). Plutarch repeats the same story at Mor. 238f. 
Cf. Ages. 33.6 for another reference to Spartan sacrifice after battle.  
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education to heart, particularly in their use of deception. Duff has correctly identified the 
difficulty in coming to moral conclusions about the Lysander-Sulla. He argues that 
Plutarch saw the lives of both men as characterized by cunning, deception, and the 
distortion of reality, and that he deliberately constructed their Lives to mimic these 
characteristics. In the Lysander-Sulla, the reader is led to consider whether Lysander's 
greater moral virtue is more preferable in a leader than Sulla's greater successes in 
service to his state.149 However, while Duff believes that Plutarch's portrayal of 
Lysander's tendency to use deception is rather ambiguous, I would argue that it is 
actually clear and consistent.150 Some of the vocabulary Plutarch uses to describe 
Lysander is vague, and could be taken either positively or negatively, but Plutarch 
explains the potential complexities of Lysander's use of deception through a series of 
anecdotes that clearly delineate between Lysander's appropriate and inappropriate uses 
of deception.  
 The most important characterization of Lysander's use of deception occurs early 
in the Life, during a comparison with his fellow Spartan commander Kallikratidas: 
τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἡγεμόνων τρόπον, ὁ Λύσανδρος τῷ 
Καλλικρατίδᾳ παραβαλλόμενος ἐδόκει πανοῦργος εἶναι καὶ σοφιστής, ἀπάταις τὰ πολλὰ 
διαποικίλλων τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ τῷ λυσιτελοῦντι μεγαλύνων, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ 
συμφέροντι χρώμενος ὡς καλῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐ φύσει τοῦ ψεύδους κρεῖττον 
ἡγούμενος, ἀλλ' ἑκατέρου τῇ χρείᾳ τὴν τιμὴν ὁρίζων. τῶν δ' ἀξιούντων μὴ πολεμεῖν 
μετὰ δόλου τοὺς ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους γεγονότας καταγελᾶν ἐκέλευεν· ‘Ὅπου γὰρ ἡ λεοντῆ 
μὴ ἐφικνεῖται, προσραπτέον ἐκεῖ τὴν ἀλωπεκῆν’ (Lys. 7.5-6). 
 
To those who loved the straightforward and noble character of their leaders, Lysander, 
compared with Kallikratidas, appeared to be crafty and scheming, a man who wove his 
many acts of war with deceits and extolled justice when it was to his advantage, but if it 
                                                 
149 Duff (1997); (1999), 161-204. 
150 Duff (1999), 170-176.  
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was not, proclaimed expediency to be honorable, a man who did not believe truth to be 
by nature stronger the falsehood, but divided the value of each according to necessity. 
Mocking those who thought it fit that the sons of Heracles did not wage war by the aid 
of deceit, he bid that ‘where the skin of the lion does not reach, it must there be stitched 
with that of the fox.’ 
 
This passage emphasizes the centrality of deception and falsehood to Lysander's life. 
The characterization opens and concludes with references to deception in war, but 
Lysander's attitudes toward expediency and falsehood appear to apply outside the 
military sphere as well, and it is these attitudes for which Plutarch first provides 
evidence. Immediately after this passage, Plutarch describes Lysander falsely rebuking 
oligarchic conspirators in Miletos in order to convince the democratic leaders to stay in 
the city where – he hoped – they could be more easily killed. Plutarch concludes: “And 
this came to pass; for all who trusted him were slain” (Lys. 8.3).151 This completely 
supports Lysander's characterization in the previous chapter, as he hid the truth of his 
intentions from the popular leaders in order to further his intentions. Although Plutarch 
makes no direct comment on Lysander’s actions in this section, he appears to show his 
disapproval of Lysander’s deceptions of the Milesians in the following chapter, by 
relating a saying of Lysander’s:  
 Ἀπομνημονεύεται δὲ ὑπὸ Ἀνδροκλείδου λόγος πολλήν τινα κατηγορῶν τοῦ Λυσάνδρου 
περὶ τοὺς ὅρκους εὐχέρειαν. ἐκέλευε γάρ, ὥς φησι, τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλοις, τοὺς 
δὲ ἄνδρας ὅρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν, ἀπομιμούμενος Πολυκράτη τὸν Σάμιον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
τύραννον στρατηγός, οὐδὲ Λακωνικὸν τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὥσπερ τοῖς πολεμίοις, 
μᾶλλον δὲ ὑβριστικώτερον. ὁ γὰρ ὅρκῳ παρακρουόμενος τὸν μὲν ἐχθρὸν ὁμολογεῖ 
δεδιέναι, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ καταφρονεῖν (Lys. 8.3-4). 
 
There is also a saying of Lysander’s, recorded by Androkleides, that speaks against his 
great looseness regarding oaths. Lysander claimed, he said, to deceive boys with 
knuckle-bones, but men with oaths, imitating Polycrates of Samos, although it is not 
                                                 
151 ὃ καὶ συνέβη· πάντες γὰρ ἀπεσφάγησαν οἱ καταπιστεύσαντες (Lys. 8.3).  
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correct for a general to imitate a tyrant, nor is it Laconian to attack the gods like one's 
enemies, but exceedingly insolent. For he who deceives his enemy with an oath admits 
to fearing him, but to despising the god. 
 
Duff suggests that it is not clear whether Plutarch agreed with the judgment of 
Androkleides, or whether he expected his readers to agree as well, but I do not believe 
that there is any doubt that Plutarch endorsed this verdict of Lysander’s deception.152 
First of all, there is every possibility that the opinion of Lysander’s pithy boast is 
actually Plutarch’s: Plutarch only specifies that the ‘saying of Lysander’ was recorded by 
Androkleides, so the commentary afterwards may well be Plutarch’s own. Even if the 
harsh judgment of Lysander’s indifference to oaths did indeed originate with 
Androkleides, Plutarch’s inclusion of it immediately after his treatment of the Milesians 
likely signifies his agreement with it, particularly because it concerns oaths. At the 
beginning of the chapter, Plutarch says that Lysander “promised” (ὑπέσχετο) to his 
friends and guests that he would help overthrow the demos (Lys. 8.1). While this is not 
an oath per se, the verb ὑπισχνέομαι could be used for promises to the gods (Il. 6.115, 
23.195), or even from the gods (Il. 12.236); even when not used in a religious sense, the 
word implied friendship and good intention (Hdt. 5.30; Pl. Ph. 235D). Given that 
Lysander would break such a promise to the extent that it led to the deaths of those he 
pledged to help, it would be surprising for Plutarch to subsequently make a comparison 
to Polycrates of Samos without believing it. Ultimately, Plutarch criticizes Lysander’s 
actions at Miletus because he harmed people he should not have: the Miletians had put 
their trust in him and had thus, in a way, considered him a friend. His act of deception, 
                                                 
152 Duff (1999), 176.  
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therefore, was instead one of betrayal. The criticism in this passage is of the same sort, 
for the stress is on correct relationships: one should not treat friends as enemies, as 
Lysander does at Miletus, nor should one treat the gods as enemies, as one does by 
breaking an oath. What increases the impact of Plutarch’s criticism is that Lysander 
acted contrary to how a Laconian should. Plutarch is willing to defend Lysander’s 
character when it coincides with his Spartan education, as seen above (Lys. 2.2), but not 
when he acts contrary to Spartan custom. 
 Up to this point the portrayal of Lysander seems to be a negative one, but the 
reader should not yet be completely satisfied with this view of Lysander's character. 
Plutarch has provided evidence of the Spartan's shifting attitudes to truth and falsehoods, 
as introduced at 7.5-6, but he has yet to show Lysander's conduct of war, the main focus 
of the earlier characterization. Returning to the original passage in question, it is clear 
that for Lysander warfare and trickery were inextricably entwined. Lysander is said to 
variegate (διαποικίλλων) his military action with tricks and deceit; this is not just an act 
of adorning or covering war with trickery, but of blending or weaving the two together 
and ultimately changing the very appearance of his type of warfare. Lysander's quotation 
further echoes that sentiment. The fox skin of cunning and deception must be stitched on 
(προσραπτέον) to the lion skin of bravery and open warfare; it is still possible to see the 
difference between the two skins, but they have been combined into a single whole.153 
From this, then, one would expect to see Lysander's military actions in the Life be 
                                                 
153 Duff (1999), 174-5 delves deeply into the many references to cunning in this passage, including the 
connection between διεποικίλλε and the fox. 
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decided upon his use of trickery. Plutarch had already described Lysander's first battle at 
Lys. 5.1-2, a naval engagement against Alcibiades' commander Antiochus which, while 
successful, contained no hint of trickery or deception. Lysander's only other real military 
action was the Battle of Aegospotami, during which he famously lulled the Athenians 
into overconfidence and fell upon the fleet while most of its soldiers had dispersed to 
find food. Despite Plutarch's earlier focus on Lysander's use of trickery in war, however, 
his narration of the battle from Lys. 10.1-11.7 conspicuously omits any mention of a 
trick or stratagem: once the two fleets had anchored opposite one another in the straits, 
everyone expected a naval battle on the following day; Lysander, however, planned 
otherwise, and ordered his sailors not to engage the Athenian fleet (Lys. 10.1); this plan 
made rashness and contempt appear amongst the Athenians (Lys. 10.3), who on the fifth 
day sailed out and back very carelessly and contemptuously (Lys. 11.1); when they had 
thus returned to their camp and left their ships, Lysander and the Peloponnesians fell 
upon them (Lys. 11.5) and killed or captured most of the army. Contrary to what one 
would expect from Plutarch's earlier description of Lysander, the vocabulary he uses to 
describe the Spartan's actions in this battle is unquestionably neutral. What Plutarch 
describes is indeed deception: Lysander made the Athenians believe he did not intend to 
give battle when he was in reality just waiting until he could gain the upper hand. Yet 
none of the vocabulary hints of any immorality. Lysander does not deceive or contrive to 
trick the enemy, he simply does not intend to give them the battle they expect.154 There is 
                                                 
154 All of these words of deception are a common part of Plutarch's vocabulary. Some select examples 
include ἐξαπατάω: Aris. 10.8, Lys. 8.4, Lys-Sulla 4.4, Pomp. 59.4, Caes. 24.3; τεχνάζω: Fab. 22.1, Tim. 
10.2, Sert. 21.3, Caes. 43.1; μηχανάομαι: Them. 16.3, Cor. 38.4, Sert. 11.1, Dem. 36.5.  
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no hint of criticism here; instead, Plutarch's sole explicit judgment of Lysander's actions 
in the battle is clearly positive. Plutarch rightly takes the Battle of Aegospotami as being 
directly responsible for ending the Peloponnesian War, and claims that by Lysander's 
prudence and cleverness, the Spartan put an end to a war that had cost Greece more 
generals than all previous wars put together (Lys. 11.7).155  
 The positive description of Lysander's military conduct may come as a surprise 
so soon after the criticism of his deceitfulness only a little earlier in the Life, but it is 
actually in line with those previous anecdotes. Lysander's actions in the battle may not 
have been blatantly deceitful, but they allowed him the opportunity to gain the upper 
hand against an otherwise superior force, certainly displaying the cunning that Lysander 
advocated at 7.6. Furthermore, this portrayal of the Battle of Aegospotami reinforces the 
moral message concerning deception that was introduced earlier in the Life. For 
Plutarch, Lysander's indiscriminate use of deception, particularly in his dealing with 
Miletus, is a moral failing because it was done in his self-interest and against Spartan 
ideals. On the other hand, Lysander’s use of deception at Aegospotami was appropriate 
because it is in accordance with his education; the Spartan agoge encouraged Lysander 
to develop his cunning and stressed the importance of victory and the praise that such 
victory brings. Plutarch sees no problem with Lysander’s use of deception to benefit the 
state. 
Given the widespread acceptance and encouragement of deception within 
                                                 
155 While δεινότης can have negative connotations and take a definition of “harshness” or “severity”, its 
pairing here with the positive εὐβουλία means that δεινότης should be seen in a positive context as well, 
so “cleverness” is more appropriate.  
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Spartan culture, then, it is no surprise that Plutarch focuses on Agesilaus' acts of 
deception just as he did Lysander's. Agesilaus' first military action is against the Persian 
Tissaphernes, and is characterized by the deception perpetrated by both parties. 
Tissaphernes originally proposed a treaty with Agesilaus granting the Ionian cities 
freedom, but subsequently broke his promise and declared war once he had raised a 
sufficient army. In response, according to Plutarch, Agesilaus declared that he would 
lead his army against Caria but instead invaded the country of Phrygia, thus “avenging 
the perjury of Tissaphernes with a just deception”.156 Plutarch does not specifically 
explain why Agesilaus' deception was just while Tissaphernes' was not, but 
consideration of Xenophon's Agesilaus, upon which much of this Life was based, 
provides the missing explanation. In his narration of the same event, at Ages. 1.17, 
Xenophon claims that once war is declared, deception is both divinely sanctioned and 
just.157 Tissaphernes' perjury is unjust because he deceived Agesilaus while the two were 
at peace, while Agesilaus is justified in his deception because war had already been 
declared. Plutarch no doubt followed the same thought process as Xenophon, as is clear 
in his subsequent summary of Agesilaus' campaigns:  
καὶ πόλεις μὲν εἷλε συχνὰς καὶ χρημάτων ἀφθόνων ἐκυρίευσεν, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς 
φίλοις ὅτι τὸ μὲν σπεισάμενον ἀδικεῖν τῶν θεῶν ἔστι καταφρονεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ 
παραλογίζεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ μόνον τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξα πολλὴ καὶ τὸ μεθ' 
ἡδονῆς κερδαίνειν ἔνεστι (Ages. 9.3). 
 
He captured many cities and seized plentiful treasures, making very clear to his friends 
that while it is unjust in the eyes of the gods to despise treaties, in deceiving one's 
enemies there is not only justice, but much glory and profit mixed with pleasure. 
                                                 
156 ἀμυνόμενος ἀπάτῃ δικαίᾳ τὴν Τισαφέρνους ἐπιορκίαν (Ages. 9.2). See Shipley (1997) for historical 
commentary on Agesilaus' Persian campaign. 
157 ἐπεὶ πόλεμος προερρήθη καὶ τὸ ἐξαπατᾶν ὅσιόν τε καὶ δίκαιον (Xen. Ages. 1.17).  




Just as Xenophon, above, Plutarch considers deception in terms of both divine and 
human justice.158 It is important to note here that these ideas about deception are ones 
which Plutarch shares; he is not blindly repeating the words of his predecessor. Donald 
Shipley has shown the ways in which Plutarch's account of Agesilaus' war with 
Tissaphernes differ from that found in Xenophon, noting particularly that Plutarch places 
more emphasis on Agesilaus' responsibility for his original deception.159 Plutarch was 
undoubtedly familiar with Xenophon's Agesilaus, but even in this short passage 
demonstrates his practice of rewriting his sources to focus on his own interests.160 That 
Plutarch's understanding of the morality of deception is his own becomes particularly 
clear late in the Agesilaus. Late in his life, Agesilaus is sent to aid the Egyptian king 
Tachos in a campaign against the Persians. When a rival, Nectanabis, induces the 
Egyptian army to come over to him and attempts to usurp Tachos' position, Agesilaus is 
forced to choose between the two (Ages. 37.5). Under vague orders to see that Sparta 
benefited from his actions, Agesilaus switches allegiances, an act which Plutarch has a 
very low opinion of: “Indeed, when this alleged motive [the benefit of Sparta] was taken 
away, the most just name for his action was treachery.”161 Plutarch's judgment here 
should not be surprising: Agesilaus was an expressed ally of Tachos, yet he abandoned 
                                                 
158 Cf. Xen. Ages. 1.13. According to Xenophon, Agesilaus thanked Tissaphernes for breaking his oath 
because it made the gods his allies in the coming battle.  
159 Shipley (1997), 148-150.  
160 See Pelling (1992) for more on Plutarch's adaptation of sources. Hamilton (1992), 4213-4221 compares 
several more passages in the Agesilaus with Xenophon's respective accounts, demonstrating Plutarch's 
attempts to provide a more independent and balanced version of Agesilaus' character. 
161 ἐπεὶ ταύτης γε τῆς προφάσεως ἀφαιρεθείσης τὸ δικαιότατον ὄνομα τῆς πράξεως ἦν προδοσία (Ages. 
37.5). 
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him (and went over to his enemy) in his time of need. Xenophon, however, sees nothing 
wrong with Agesilaus' actions here. Xenophon is rather vague in his description of the 
event, and does not name either Egyptian king. In his account, Agesilaus is most 
concerned with which king would be better able to pay his army's wages and provide a 
market, and in the end, “having decided which of the two he thought to be a better friend 
of the Greeks, joined with him.”162 It is still possible to see connections between the two 
accounts: Plutarch could have easily interpreted  Agesilaus' concern for Greek interests 
in Xenophon's account as having come directly from Sparta (which Xenophon does not 
mention), for example. It is most important, however, that Xenophon did not consider 
Agesilaus' actions to have constituted any sort of treachery or deception.163 Had Plutarch 
simply been repeating Xenophon's opinions on the correct use of deception, it is unlikely 
that he would have strayed so far as to contradict Xenophon and denounce Agesilaus for 
treachery. Rather, this is a strong example of Plutarch's independence of thought. He 
shared Xenophon's opinions on the justification of deception during war (Plut. Ages. 9.2-
3; Xen. Ages. 1.17), but had his own opinion on what constituted an act of treachery.  
 Shipley has argued that the distinction between just and unjust deception in the 
Agesilaus is not Plutarch's own view. He cites Plutarch's description of Philopoemen's 
actions on Crete, in which Plutarch sets the Cretan practice of tricks and stratagems and 
ambushes in opposition to the straightforward and noble warfare of Peloponnesians 
                                                 
162 οὕτω δὴ κρίνας ὁπότερος φιλέλλην μᾶλλον ἐδόκει εἶναι, στρατευσάμενος μετὰ τούτου (Xen. Ages. 
2.31). 
163 Shipley (1997), 388, claims that Plutarch had “some justification for seeing in Xenophon's presentation 
evidence for the accusation of treachery.” It is not clear what that evidence is, however, and Xenophon 
certainly makes no moral judgment of Agesilaus' action as Plutarch does. 
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(Phil. 13.6), as being representative of Plutarch's true attitude toward deception.164 This 
is problematic on two accounts, however. For one, Plutarch's comments in the 
Philopoemen do not entail a blanket condemnation of military deception. While the 
common Cretan style of warfare is placed in opposition to the straightforward and noble 
warfare of the Peloponnesians, Plutarch does not call Philopoemen ignoble for engaging 
in it. On the contrary, he praises Philopoemen not only for beating the Cretans at their 
own game through his use of stratagems (Phil. 13.6), but also for ambushing the army of 
Nabis after returning to the Peloponnese (Phil. 14.6-15.1). Moreover, in the synkrisis to 
the Philopoemen-Flamininus, he equates Philopoemen's success against the Cretans 
through trickery with his success against the Spartans through valor, as those two groups 
were the most warlike (Phil.-Flam. 2.2). Phil. 13.6, then, should not be seen as a moral 
judgment against the use of deception; rather, it appears to be an attempt to make a 
distinction between two different cultures of warfare. Even if the passage were an 
indictment against the use of deception, however, Shipley provides no reason that we 
should take Phil. 13.6 as representing Plutarch's views on the matter more seriously than 
Ages. 9.2, when Plutarch calls Agesilaus' actions “just deception”. Shipley twice refers 
to the phrase “just deception” as “oxymoronic” and fails to identify it as Plutarch's actual 
viewpoint; instead, on several occasions he states specifically that it was Xenophon and 
Agesilaus (and thus, presumably, not Plutarch) who saw deception as just during times 
of war.165 While Shipley is right that Plutarch shows some difference of opinion from 
                                                 
164 Shipley (1997), 38.  
165 Shipley (1997), 40, 148, on Plutarch's ἀπάτῃ δικαίᾳ being an oxymoron. Shipley (1997), 38, 148, 390 
for the belief of Xenophon and Agesilaus on the justness of deception in war. 
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Xenophon on the moralism of deception, as seen above, there is nothing to indicate that 
Plutarch disagreed with the basic principal of deception being justified during war. Even 
limiting the discussion to the Agesilaus itself, Plutarch consistently praises Agesilaus' 
wartime deception not only at Ages. 9.2 (and again at Ages. 9.4 when he repeats 
Agesilaus' opinion on the matter), but also at Ages. 38-39, when Agesilaus tricks his 
numerically superior enemy into engaging him on a narrow front. Plutarch's 
condemnation of Agesilaus' treachery at Ages. 37.5 shows that he would not have been 
afraid to say if he considered all of Agesilaus' deception to be morally wrong. Plutarch, 
then, clearly approves of the use of deception during warfare, and is in agreement (on 
basic principal at least) with Xenophon about the actions of Agesilaus. 
 Plutarch's depiction of deception by the two Spartan generals is consistent. In the 
Lysander, Plutarch makes a distinction between the correct and incorrect uses of 
deception based primarily on its victim. Lysander is to be blamed for deceiving the 
Milesian democrats because he went to the city as a friend and ally, ostensibly to help 
the inhabitants (Lys. 8.3). By breaking such ties of friendship, maintains Plutarch, 
Lysander was demonstrating his insolence towards the gods (Lys. 8.5). On the other 
hand, Lysander's deception of the Athenians at Aegospotami is praiseworthy because it 
was directed against a declared enemy, and led to the resolution of a long and bloody 
war. His deception in this case was not hubristic, but demonstrative of his prudence and 
cleverness (Lys. 11.7). Plutarch repeats the same arguments in the Agesilaus in more 
explicit terms. Plutarch describes Agesilaus' deception of Tissaphernes as 'just', because 
the Spartan had waited to act until war was declared. This is in contrast to the Persian's 
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perjury, which Tissaphernes committed against Agesilaus during a time of peace (Ages. 
9.1-3). Just like Lysander, however, Agesilaus was himself guilty of immoral deception 
because he betrayed his ally, having left the Egyptian king to whom he had pledged his 
service and joining the king's rival. Plutarch's direct denunciation of Agesilaus' treachery 
here (Ages. 37.5) reinforces the distinction he makes between just and unjust deception 
throughout the Lysander and Agesilaus. 
 Plutarch, of course, wrote three more Spartan Lives: the lawgiver Lycurgus and 
the double pair of Agis and Cleomenes. Plutarch is unclear as to whether Lycurgus 
actually took part in any military campaigns, and there is no mention of the king 
engaging in any deception during wartime.166 Nevertheless, deception is a frequent 
theme in the Life. For one, as mentioned above, the education system instigated by 
Lycurgus frequently encouraged young Spartans to engage in deception (Lyc. 15.3-5; 
17.3-4). Moreover, Plutarch framed the Life with two clear instances of deception. The 
first is an account of Lycurgus' ancestor Soüs, who not only enslaved the helots and 
gained substantial land for Sparta, but managed to keep captured territory even after his 
army was surrounded by deceiving the enemy army with a technicality.167 Plutarch says 
that Soüs was held in admiration for this and other deeds. Toward the end of the Life 
Plutarch describes another act of deception, this one perpetrated by Lycurgus himself. In 
                                                 
166 Lyc. 23.1-2. According to Plutarch, Hippias the Sophist claimed that Lycurgus engaged in many 
military campaigns, while Demetrius the Phalerean maintained that Lycurgus did not take part in any 
battles. Plutarch refuses to agree with either source, but does say that the idea of the Olympic truce shows 
Lycurgus to have had a gentle nature. 
167 Lyc. 2.1-2. Soüs agreed to hand over captured territory to the Cleitorians if they allowed him and all of 
his men a drink of water. After all of his men drank Soüs merely splashed his face with water, and so 
claimed that he did not have to relinquish his territory because not everyone had drunk water.  
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an effort to ensure the permanence of his changes to the Spartan laws, Lycurgus 
extracted a pledge from every Spartan citizen that they would abide by his policies until 
he returned from a trip to Delphi. Never intending to return, Lycurgus ended his life at 
Delphi, and the Spartans, as Plutarch relates, did not attempt to change his laws for five 
hundred years (Lyc. 29.1-6). These two passages, particularly the trick which Lycurgus 
plays on his entire city, reinforce the prominence of deception within Spartan culture 
that is seen elsewhere in the Lives. The Lycurgus shows that for Plutarch, deception was 
ingrained into legend and history of the Spartan polis, and so it would come as no 
surprise that men such as Lysander and Agesilaus would engage in it so frequently.  
 The theme of deception does not feature in the Lives of Agis and Cleomenes to 
the same extent that it does in the other Spartan Lives, as the Agis and Cleomenes is 
more concerned with the attempts by the Spartan kings of returning their city to its 
traditional way of life. Agis did not have the opportunity to engage in battle before he 
was put to death by his enemies, but Cleomenes did. He clearly shared the same 
tendency as his predecessors to turn to deception, and Plutarch's comments on his 
actions are similar to those found in the other Spartan Lives. Perhaps Plutarch's greatest 
praise for Cleomenes' generalship comes during his account of the Spartan's capture of 
Megalopolis. Cleomenes deceived Antigonus, who was encamped near the city, by 
pretending to march against Argos; however, he turned back on himself and sent one of 
his generals, Panteus, to surprise the city and take control of part of the wall. Panteus did 
so, and Cleomenes quickly came into possession of Megalopolis (Cleom. 23.1-4). 
Plutarch stresses the unexpectedness of this action twice, at Cleom. 23.1 and Cleom. 
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23.2, before he even describes it in detail, and there is no hint of condemnation for 
Cleomenes' deception.168 What does draw blame in the Cleomenes, however, is an act of 
treachery committed against Cleomenes during the battle of Sellasia. Plutarch cites the 
account of Phylarchus, who says that Cleomenes primarily lost the battle due to 
treachery (προδοσία). Before the battle, Antigonus had ordered his Illyrians and 
Acarnanians to envelope the army of Cleomenes. When the Spartan noticed their 
absence from the field, he ordered one of his commanders to look for enemies on the 
flanks and rear of his army; however, the commander, Damoteles, had previously been 
bribed by Antigonus and told Cleomenes that all was well, which led to Cleomenes' 
envelopment and defeat (Cleom. 28.1-4). The accusation of treachery here is clearly 
made against Damoteles, for he is the one guilty of deceiving his commander and ally. 
While it is specifically Phylarchus, and not Plutarch, who calls the action treachery, 
based on what we have seen regarding the deception of allies in the other Spartan Lives 
(particularly at Ages. 37.5) there should be little doubt that Plutarch would have agreed 
with Phylarchus' assessment. It is worth noting here that Plutarch makes no denunciation 
of Antigonus' use of either encirclement or bribery to achieve his victory. This is 
consistent with the standard Greek thought, as described by Wheeler, that while blame 
should fall on one who commits treachery, it is a valid stratagem for a general to bring 
about such treachery.169  
                                                 
168 Plutarch does not use one of the many words for stratagem or deception, such as στρατήγημα, δόλος, or 
ἀπάτη, to describe Cleomenes' action here; rather, he calls it an unexpected deed (ἔργον ἀπροσδόκητον) at 
Cleom. 24.1. Nevertheless, the element of surprise is integral to nearly all acts of deception, and so this 
should clearly be seen as one.  
169 Wheeler (1988), 45.  
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 The Agis-Cleomenes, then, reinforces the clear distinction Plutarch makes 
between just and unjust deception in the other Spartan Lives. Plutarch's interpretation of 
the morality of deception, particularly the idea of just deception during war, is certainly 
built on the ideas of his predecessors. However, his own beliefs in what constituted 
treachery show a clear departure at times from those of his sources, as particularly seen 
through his implicit contradiction of Xenophon regarding Agesilaus' actions at Ages. 
38.5. For Plutarch, it is not always morally acceptable for a general to deceive someone 
with whom he is not actively at war: Tissaphernes was in the wrong for breaking his 
truce with Agesilaus (Ages. 9.1-2), and both Lysander (Lys. 8.3) and Agesilaus (Ages. 
38.5) acted treacherously when they deceived their supposed allies. However, Plutarch 
supports and praises those generals who use deception appropriately – that is, during war 
against an established enemy. Lysander's trick against the Athenians at Aegospotami 
(Lys. 10.1-11.7), Agesilaus' deception of Tissaphernes (Ages. 9.2-3) and stratagem 
against the Egyptians (Ages. 39.1-5), and Cleomenes' surprise march on Megalopolis 
(Cleom. 23.1-4) are all examples of good generalship in the Spartan Lives.  
 It is this question about the morality of deception that makes it so important to 
consider the Spartan Lives together when investigating Plutarch's portrayal of military 
deception. While there are other pairs of Lives that portray clever and deceitful generals, 
such as the Sertorius-Eumenes discussed below, with few exceptions those Lives do not 
demonstrate the distinction between moral and immoral deception that Plutarch makes 
so clear in the Spartan Lives. The non-Spartan generals, on the whole, consistently use 
deception “correctly”, rather than indiscriminately as Lysander and Agesilaus often 
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appear to. Plutarch's thoughts on the matter are most clear in the Agesilaus, after 
describing Agesilaus' treachery towards the Egyptians: “But the Lacedaemonians assign 
the first share of the good to the interest their country, and neither understand nor believe 
in another justice than that which they think will strengthen Sparta.”170 This comment 
appears specific to this circumstance, as Agesilaus had previously justified his treachery 
by saying he was acting in Sparta's best interest (Ages. 37.6). However, this aspect of 
Spartan character actually appears as an underlying theme throughout most of the 
Spartan Lives. Plutarch's admonition of Spartan self-interest conforms very well to the 
initial description of Lysander's use of deception, when Plutarch describes the Spartan as 
a man who “extolled justice when it was to his advantage, but if it was not, proclaimed 
expediency to be honorable, a man who did not believe truth to be by nature stronger the 
falsehood, but divided the value of each according to necessity” (Lys. 7.5). After the 
Agesilaus, Lysander no longer appears unique in his attitudes toward deception, but 
rather in line with standard Spartan practice. Likewise, his betrayal of the Milesian 
democrats looks to have been an act made for the sake of Sparta rather than for his own 
self-interest, as it was a part of the Spartan strategy to install oligarchic governments 
(Lys. 8.3). Although Plutarch does not explicitly link this aspect of Spartan character to 
the actions and laws of Lycurgus, it is not difficult to make the connection. Young 
Spartans were forced to steal (Lyc. 17.3-4) and act stealthily during marriage (Lyc. 15.3) 
not for their own sake, but for the eventual benefit of the Spartan state as a whole. More 
                                                 
170 Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρώτην τοῦ καλοῦ μερίδα τῷ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντι διδόντες οὔτε 
μανθάνουσιν οὔτε ἐπίστανται δίκαιον ἄλλο πλὴν ὃ τὴν Σπάρτην αὔξειν νομίζουσιν (Ages. 37.5). 
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importantly, Lycurgus deceived the entire citizen body with the welfare of the city in 
mind, so that it would maintain the laws that he had instituted (Lyc. 29.1-6). Plutarch by 
no means attempts to justify the immoral deceptions committed by Lysander and 
Agesilaus – he still calls Agesilaus' action against the Egyptians treachery despite his 
following commentary – but to say that Plutarch makes “a powerful condemnation of 
Sparta's imperial policies” at Ages. 37.6, as Shipley does, may be going too far.171 
Rather, Plutarch appears to see the use of deception in the Spartan Lives as a way in part 
to demonstrate the difficulties in balancing the morality of one's actions against the 
necessities of the state. Lycurgus walks a fine line in his Life with his use of deception, 
but he is ultimately successful in encouraging and using deception appropriately for the 
benefit of all. Plutarch clearly approved of Lycurgus' ultimate deception, maintaining 
that Sparta was the first city in Greece for its government and fame for five hundred 
years because it observed Lycurgus' laws (Lyc. 29.6). Plutarch's opinion of the actions of 
Lysander and Agesilaus, on the other hand, is significantly more mixed. While Lysander 
and Agesilaus place the welfare of Sparta before all else throughout their respective 
Lives, like Lycurgus before them, they are unable to find the proper balance that their 
predecessor did, and often cause great harm to others in their attempts to further Sparta's 
interests. Nevertheless, while Plutarch identifies instances where Lysander and Agesilaus 
used deception incorrectly, he does not count them as major stains against their 
character; as seen at the beginning of the Lysander, Plutarch takes into account the 
unforgiving Spartan education system and its insistence on the importance of the state. 
                                                 
171 Shipley (1997), 389.  
   
110 
 
In the Spartan Lives, then, Plutarch is so concerned with the morality of deception 
because the Spartans, particularly Lysander and Agesilaus, are not. For Plutarch, there is 
no debate about the acceptable uses of deception, and his judgment of the actions 
themselves is swift and concise: it is acceptable – and even praiseworthy – to deceive 
one’s established enemies, but unacceptable to deceive those who count themselves as 
friends.172 It is because the Spartans appear to follow a different value system than his 
other subjects – and presumably his readers – that Plutarch makes clear to his audience 
which deceptions are acceptable and which are not. This certainly appears to fall into the 
category of 'expository' or 'protreptic' moralism, by providing clear advice or examples 
of proper action. However, as Pelling and Duff have observed, Plutarch's moralism is 
rarely as simple as that.173 As discussed earlier, Duff has argued that the Lysander-Sulla 
leads the reader to question “what happens when the demands of personal virtue conflict 
with the good of one's state.”174 Plutarch's depiction of deception in the Spartan Lives 
has shown, however, that he saw no difference between a Spartan's idea of personal 
virtue and the good of the state. It is not a conflict that Plutarch explores in the Spartan 
Lives, then, but the results of a complete subservience of moral judgment to the public 
good.175 Plutarch's depiction of the individual acts of deception is protreptic: his 
                                                 
172 This is very similar to the concerns about deception put forward by Cambyses in Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia during his dialogue with the young Cyrus about military leadership. Cambyses explains to 
Cyrus that boys should not be taught to deceive men until they are able to understand the difference 
between the acceptable targets of deception (enemies) and unacceptable ones (friends) (Xen. Cyr. 1.6.1-
2.1.1). See Hesk (2000), 122-142. 
173 Pelling (1995), 205-220; Duff (1999), 68-71. 
174 Duff (1999), 204. 
175 In his analysis of the synkrisis to the Agesilaus-Pompey, Hamilton describes Agesilaus as 'presented on 
the one hand as a model Spartan, brave virtuous, and obedient to the commands of his state, but on the 
other hand as ambitious beyond measure, hypocritical about justice when it appears to conflict with his 
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judgment concerning the morality of such acts is consistent and clear. His depiction of a 
society in which the state comes before personal morality, however, is far more 
descriptive. The use of military deception acts as a lens through which the reader can 
observe the positive and negative effects of such a society on the individual and the 
wider world.  
 
Moral Deception in the Sertorius-Eumenes 
The Sertorius-Eumenes demonstrates a different aspect of Plutarch's portrayal of 
deception. In the Spartan Lives, Plutarch is primarily concerned with the morality of 
deception, and particularly its appropriate use in military and non-military contexts. 
However, even though Plutarch portrays both Sertorius and Eumenes as relying on 
deception to an even greater extent than many of the Spartans, he demonstrates little 
concern about the morality of deception in their respective Lives. Plutarch leaves any 
ethical concerns regarding the generals' use of deception in the Sertorius-Eumenes 
implicit, and instead focuses on the practical benefits that deception can bring: the pair 
functions as an effective case study of how to use deception successfully and 
appropriately. 
Plutarch opens the Sertorius-Eumenes by favorably comparing Sertorius with 
Philip II, Antigonus, and Hannibal, all of whom were known for both their use of 
deception and their lack of two eyes (Sert. 1.8). Not only is Sertorius their equal in 
                                                 
objectives, and capable of treachery and perfidy on occasion' (1992, 4206). I would argue that for 
Plutarch, the negatives in Hamilton's description were just as much a part of being a 'model Spartan' as the 
positives; he certainly saw Lysander in much the same way. 
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achieving military success through deception, Plutarch claims, he also surpasses each of 
them in a particular aspect of character: he was more prudent with women than Philip; 
more faithful to his friends than Antigonus; and more gentle to his friends than Hannibal 
(Sert. 1.9). The individual characteristics that Sertorius possessed over his fellow 
generals, I would suggest, are unimportant; what matters is that in the first chapter of the 
pair Plutarch presents Sertorius as a general who both used deception effectively and 
possessed a sound moral character. This not only introduces the reader to an important 
theme in the Sertorius-Eumenes, deceptive generalship, but also, I would suggest, 
predisposes the reader to viewing Sertorius’ actions in a positive moral light. 
We have already examined Sertorius' skill at employing deception while on 
campaign. Sertorius consistently defeated trained Roman armies under Metellus and 
Pompey by using trickery and indirect warfare to take advantage of the poor mobility of 
the Roman infantry.176 Sertorius' most admired military exploit, according to Plutarch, 
was forcing the Characitani out of an unassailable system of caves by contriving to have 
the wind carry an enormous quantity of dust into their hideout, thus “subduing by skill 
(σοφία) that which could not be taken by arms” (Sert. 17.7).177 This achievement was 
not so much a matter of deception, but it still clearly falls under the mantle of cleverness 
and indirect warfare. While Sertorius' use of deception appears to be more strongly 
rooted in warfare than Lysander's, he does not abstain from using deceit outside of the 
battlefield. Most notable is Sertorius' trick with the doe, which he makes his soldiers 
                                                 
176 See above, pp. 84-88. 
177 ὡς τὰ δι' ὅπλων ἀνάλωτα σοφίᾳ κατεργασαμένῳ (Sert.17.3). 
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believe to be a gift and messenger from Diana, “knowing”, as Plutarch says, “that the 
barbarians were by nature easily led to superstition” (Sert. 11.3).178 However, unlike 
Lysander's deception of his friends, which is soundly criticized, Sertorius' deception of 
his own soldiers appears to be as praiseworthy as many of his other actions. Plutarch 
associates this action with Sertorius' mildness (πρᾶος) and efficiency as one of the 
reasons that the Roman attracted so many followers (Sert. 11.1), and the deception has 
the intended effect of making the barbarians more amenable to his command (Sert. 
12.1). Plutarch’s approval of Sertorius’ deception of his own men, as surprising as it may 
seem, is not the contradiction that it might at first appear. First of all, it is important to 
note that Sertorius' trick with the doe is not harmful to the barbarians in any way; in fact, 
it can be seen to have benefited them as much as Sertorius, as it raised their morale and 
made them a more effective fighting force. This brings to mind Lycurgus' deception of 
his own people at the end of his life (Lyc. 29.1-6), which similarly proved to benefit the 
deceived as much as the deceiver. More importantly, I would argue, is that while the 
barbarians whom Sertorius deceives are indeed his own allies and soldiers, they are not, 
crucially, Romans. Sophia Xenophontos has argued that Plutarch uses the Sertorius to 
explore how a commander might educate and civilize his foreign subordinates, and cites 
such tricks discussed above as Sertorius’ successful methods of improving the morals of 
his barbarian soldiers.179 Sertorius’ deception of his own soldiers, then, brings them not 
just a practical benefit but a moral one as well. There is no contrast in the Sertorius, as 
                                                 
178 γινώσκων εὐάλωτον εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν εἶναι φύσει τὸ βαρβαρικόν (Sert. 11.3). The doe reappears from 
20.1-3. 
179 Xenophontos (2016), 161-68. 
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there is in the Lysander and the Agesilaus, between just and unjust deception: all of 
Sertorius' tricks, both on and off the battlefield, earn Plutarch's praise. Xenophontos 
suggests that Plutarch’s unambiguous support of Sertorius’ deception in his Life can be 
difficult to reconcile with his views on deception in the Moralia, such as those discussed 
earlier in this chapter, but indicates that Plutarch allows for statesmen to adjust their 
ethics when confronted with unexpected political or military realities.180 Plutarch’s 
support for Sertorius’ use of deception may indeed clash with his opinions on deception 
in the Moralia, but it is completely in line with his views on military deception in the 
Spartan Lives. Throughout his Life, Sertorius uses deception appropriately to both 
achieve victory over his enemies and improve the circumstances of his allies. 
Plutarch treats the use of deception similarly in the other half of the pair, the 
Eumenes. While Plutarch does not rank Eumenes with the most warlike, one-eyed 
generals that he lists at the beginning of the Sertorius, he does match him with Sertorius 
as being “given to command and wars of stratagem” (Sert. 1.11). In the Life itself, 
Eumenes uses deception precisely as Sertorius does: not only against his enemies, but 
against his own soldiers as well. Although Eumenes' military cunning isn't as prevalent 
as Sertorius', it still comes into play in the Life, particularly in Eumenes' campaign 
against Antigonus. When Eumenes learned that Antigonus was making a quick march 
through uninhabited country, he ordered his limited army to create a false camp with 
such a large number of fires that Antigonus diverted his march; it was only after 
                                                 
180 Xenophontos (2016), 165. This is similar to Duff’s argument that the Parallel Lives allow Plutarch an 
opportunity to explore what happens to philosophical ideals when put into practice. See above, pp. 81-84. 
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Eumenes sent no subsequent army against him that Antigonus realized he had been out-
generaled (Eum. 15.3-7). This is the only clear use of military deception that Plutarch 
attributes to Eumenes. However, given that it was Antigonus Monopthalmos whom 
Eumenes tricked, a man Plutarch names at the beginning of the pair as one of the 
masters of deception, this one example serves as high praise for Eumenes' military 
cunning.  
 More relevant to the discussion of ethical deception, the Eumenes contains 
several examples of Eumenes deceiving his allies in a similar manner to Sertorius' trick 
with the doe. Eumenes' underhandedness is clear from the beginning of the Life, when 
he conceals money from Alexander and placates the king's wrath after the death of 
Hephaestion by proposing honors for Alexander's closest friend (Eum. 2.2-5). Eumenes' 
full skill at deception, however, becomes apparent through his actions toward his own 
soldiers. The first example of this comes after Eumenes had defeated Neoptolemus' 
attempt to usurp his position as satrap. After the battle, Neoptolemus turned to Craterus 
for help and persuaded him to attack Eumenes by arguing that Craterus' popularity with 
the Macedonians would cause Eumenes' soldiers to desert to him at first sight. Plutarch 
narrates what follows with high praise for Eumenes' generalship:  
 Τὸ μὲν οὖν προαισθέσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτοῦ τὸν Εὐμενῆ καὶ προπαρασκευάσασθαι 
νηφούσης ἄν τις ἡγεμονίας, οὐ μὴν ἄκρας θείη δεινότητος· τὸ δὲ μὴ μόνον τοὺς 
πολεμίους ἃ μὴ καλῶς εἶχεν αἰσθέσθαι διαφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ 
στρατευομένους ἀγνοοῦντας ᾧ μαχοῦνται προενσεῖσαι τῷ Κρατερῷ, καὶ ἀποκρύψαι τὸν 
ἀντιστράτηγον, ἴδιον δοκεῖ τούτου τοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἔργον γενέσθαι (Eum. 6.5-7). 
 
Now, that Eumenes perceived his approach and made preparations, one might regard as 
sober generalship, though indeed not highest ability; but that he was able not only to 
keep his enemies from learning things which would be harmful to him, but also to fling 
his soldiers at Craterus before they learned whom they were fighting, and to hide from 
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them the enemy general, seems to be a deed characteristic of this general. 
 
Plutarch is not overly impressed that Eumenes learned of Craterus' attack: he specifically 
stops short of calling it anything more than “sober generalship”, likely because Plutarch 
would have expected any good general to keep abreast of his enemy's position. What 
instead stands out to Plutarch is Eumenes' deception not only of Craterus, but of his own 
troops as well. Calling Eumenes' deception characteristic of him does not on the surface 
appear to be particularly high praise. However, the μεν...δε construction which describes 
Eumenes' actions puts Plutarch's opinion of Eumenes' deception in clear opposition to 
his opinion of Eumenes' scouting: his initial actions did not display the “highest ability”, 
but his deception did, and it is this deception that is particularly characteristic of 
Eumenes. It is important, here, that Plutarch's praise extends to include Eumenes' 
deception of his own soldiers. In keeping the presence of Craterus hidden from his army, 
Eumenes exerted the same sort of control over them that Sertorius maintained over his 
soldiers by means of the doe. Eumenes did not deceive his soldiers in order to do them 
harm, but in order to preserve his army and achieve victory; his actions, therefore, 
particularly because they directly led to his success in battle, are praiseworthy despite 
their deceptiveness.  
 An even more blatant example of Eumenes deceiving his own men occurs a few 
chapters later, when he comes across Antigonus' baggage train isolated from its 
protection. Fearing that his soldiers would become overburdened and insolent if they 
captured so many spoils, Eumenes secretly informed the enemy commander of his 
exposed position while his own troops were resting, and pretended to be upset that the 
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baggage train subsequently escaped before he had the chance to attack (Eum. 9.3-5). 
This could easily be seen to be far worse than Eumenes' first deception of his troops, as 
Eumenes here is effectively colluding with his enemy. However, once again Plutarch 
sees nothing negative in this act of deception. This incident immediately follows the 
story of Eumenes making a special effort to burn and bury the bodies of his fallen 
soldiers after a defeat, and so serves as another example of the high-mindedness and 
constancy which Plutarch attributes to Eumenes (Eum. 9.1). Plutarch, then, uses this act 
of deception as an example of Eumenes' good character. Eumenes may have acted out of 
self-interest instead of kindness (as Antigonus explains to his commanders at Eum. 9.6), 
but by tricking his own men he not only kept his soldiers in a better fighting condition, 
he also prevented the enslavement of the women and children from the baggage train, 
which is laudable no matter the motive.181  
 The Eumenes highlights a dimension of Plutarch's treatment of deception that, 
while present in the Sertorius, becomes more clear when looking at the pair as a whole. 
In the Lysander, there appears to be a clear distinction between military and non-military 
deception: Lysander's stratagem against the Athenians at Aegospotami is unquestionably 
an act of generalship, while his breaking of oaths and his lying to the Milesian 
democrats are unrelated to warfare. The distinction is even more clear in the Agesilaus: 
                                                 
181 There is a clear parallel here between Eumenes' actions and those of Themistocles immediately before 
the battle of Salamis. When it looked as though the Athenians' allies were about to abandon them to 
protect the Peloponnese, Themistocles sent a message to Xerxes advising him to attack (Them. 12.3-4). 
Themistocles deceived both his allies and his enemies, but in so doing he turned the tide of the Persian 
War and preserved Greek independence. As is the case in the Eumenes, Plutarch finds no fault with 
Themistocles' actions, and even puts support for his plan into the mouth of Aristides, the most just of the 
Greeks (Them. 12.6; Aris. 7.5-6). 
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Plutarch deemed both Tissaphernes and Agesilaus to have committed treachery when 
they deceived those with whom they were not at war. In the Sertorius-Eumenes, 
however, the line between military and non-military deception becomes blurred. 
Sertorius' stratagems during his campaigns in Spain and Eumenes' deception of 
Antigonus are still clearly military acts, but so too are the tricks that the two generals 
played on their own soldiers. While the two generals did deceive their own men, their 
tricks were motivated by a desire to maintain the cohesion and control over their 
respective armies, with the ultimate goal of strengthening themselves and weakening 
their enemies. Sertorius was commanding almost exclusively barbarian soldiers, and 
these had very different standards of discipline and loyalty than the Roman legionaries 
he would have been accustomed to. Playing on his soldiers' superstitions by means of 
the doe was Sertorius' way of ensuring the continuing loyalty of his soldiers, which was 
as important to his military successes as his lauded tactical abilities. The same can be 
said for Eumenes' actions as well. Eumenes knew that his Macedonian soldiers were 
likely to desert if they knew they faced the beloved Craterus. By concealing the identity 
of their enemy, Eumenes was safeguarding the integrity of his army and giving himself 
the opportunity to fight his old comrade. Later on, he likewise deceived his soldiers to 
prevent them from capturing Antigonus' baggage train. Plutarch is clear that Eumenes 
feared his soldiers would become overburdened and insolent had they taken the spoils 
(Eum. 9.3-4); Eumenes' action was motivated by his desire to maintain his army as an 
effective fighting force. Plutarch commends the deceptions that Sertorius and Eumenes 
committed against their own troops, and treats them not as acts of treachery, but as 
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examples of their abilities as generals. 
In the Sertorius-Eumenes, then, Plutarch treats the generals' use of stratagems 
separately from their characters. Throughout the Sertorius, Plutarch praises the Roman 
above all for his moderation: he appears as the sole voice of reason in Marius' party, and 
is the only one of his confederates not to engage in murder after gaining power in Rome 
(Sert. 5.4); he was not easily affected by pleasure or fear (Sert. 10.2); he was given to 
neither anger nor cruelty (Sert. 18.6); and “he appeared to indulge his passion less than 
any other general” (Sert. 18.6).182 Perhaps most importantly to a comparison with 
Lysander and Agesilaus, when Sertorius had gained control over the city of Tingis, he 
“did not injure those who were in need of him and those who put their faith in him” 
(Sert. 9.5), a clear contrast to Lysander's actions in Miletus and Agesilaus' in Egypt.183 
Plutarch portrays Sertorius as being even more dedicated to the use of trickery and 
deception than Lysander and Agesilaus; yet unlike the Spartans, Sertorius' moral 
character is consistently good, as Plutarch prefaced at the beginning of the Life (Sert. 
1.9). Plutarch does provide examples of Eumenes' deceptiveness early in that Life, 
particularly at Eum. 2.2-5, in the opening chapters which often introduce a characters' 
background and character (named by Duff as a 'proemial opening').184 However, in the 
proem Plutarch also stresses Eumenes' faithfulness and the trust that his fellows – 
particularly Alexander – placed in him.185 This lessens the impact of Eumenes' less noble 
                                                 
182 ἐλάχιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι τῶν στρατηγῶν (Sert. 18.6). 
183 τοὺς δεηθέντας αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστεύσαντας οὐκ ἠδίκησεν (Sert. 9.5). For Lysander's treatment of those 
who put their trust in him see pp. 94-96, above; for Agesilaus', see pp. 100-101. 
184 Duff (2011), 224-225. For the identification of the proemial opening in the Eumenes, cf. Duff (2011), 
234.  
185 οὔτε συνέσει τινὸς οὔτε πίστει λείπεσθαι δοκῶν τῶν περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον (Eum. 1.2). That Eumenes was 
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actions, and sets the reader up to expect that Eumenes' future acts of deception will be 
morally acceptable and not harm those who put their trust in him.186 There is no 
indication in the Sertorius-Eumenes that Plutarch thought either man to have a worse 
character for so often engaging in deception. Their frequent use of tricks and stratagems 




There seems to be little doubt that for Plutarch, who was so concerned with the 
ideas of harmony and mixing, the ideal education consisted of both philosophical and 
military training.187 As we saw in the first section of this chapter, Plutarch considered an 
education based on Greek language and literature to be vital to the proper development 
and maintenance of an individual’s character. At the same time, many of his subjects 
also put the skills learned during their military educations to great use in the service of 
their respective states. The ideal subject in this regard, although one not mentioned in 
this chapter, may well be Phocion. Early in his career, Plutarch says, Phocion saw that 
the statesmen of his day had all specialized in their profession: men either spoke in the 
                                                 
given sole command of a force in India (Eum. 1.2), and that Alexander gave Eumenes control of important 
documents both before and after he caught Eumenes hiding money from him (Eum. 2.2-3), testify to the 
trust placed in him. 
186 It is true that Eumenes plainly deceived Alexander when he hid money from him, but Plutarch does not 
appear to see this as a serious offense. He makes no explicit judgment of Eumenes' deception, except to 
say that Alexander knew that Eumenes was lying (Eum. 2.2), and relates that Alexander regretted his 
attempt to catch Eumenes after his tent burned down completely and did not take any of the money owed 
(Eum. 2.3), so the two hundred talents that Eumenes withheld clearly made little difference to the king. 
187 See Wardman (1974), 57-63 and Duff (1999), 89-94 for the importance of harmony in Plutarch. 
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assembly as politicians or held the office of general, but did not do both. Phocion, 
however, sought to bring back the type of public service given by men such as Pericles, 
Aristides, and Solon, who were able to effectively perform both important roles in the 
same way that their patron goddess Athena was the goddess of both war and statecraft 
(Phoc. 7.5-6). Phocion’s desire to balance the roles of both politician and general within 
his person reflects the theme of mixing ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements that Duff has identified 
as running throughout the Life.188 That Plutarch approved of Phocion’s method of 
leadership – in part exemplified by his traditional role as a politician-general – can be 
seen at the end of the Life: Phocion’s ‘trial’ after his removal from power is a complete 
sham, and Athens appears completely bereft of a strong leader without Phocion at the 
helm (Phoc. 34.5-35.5).  
While Plutarch might have idealized a figure such as Phocion who successfully 
performed both jobs of the traditional Greek statesman, this chapter demonstrates that 
Plutarch recognized that reality was rarely so harmonious. His treatment of military 
education across the Parallel Lives shows a clear understanding of its importance to a 
well-rounded statesman, and while Plutarch is quick to point out the dangers of a lack of 
Greek education, he never goes so far as call military education useless or morally 
damaging in its own right. Indeed, it is often through their military achievements that 
morally questionable statesmen such as Marius or Lysander demonstrate their greatest 
virtue through their service to the state.  
The importance that Plutarch attributed to public service is also seen in his 
                                                 
188 Duff (1999), 145-7. 
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treatment of military deception. Despite any misgivings he might have about the 
morality of deception, Plutarch clearly recognized its importance in the Lives of many of 
his subjects. Throughout the Lives, Plutarch shows deception to have been a common 
and accepted aspect of both Greek and Roman warfare, and one of the most effective 
tools at a general's disposal. In this sense, he followed the tradition of writing about 
military deception that had remained relatively unchanged from the time of Homer, but 
Plutarch was not blindly copying his predecessors. He followed neither Xenophon's 
zealous praise for military deception nor Polybius' resigned acceptance of its necessity, 
but rather portrayed the correct use of deception as a clear virtue for any general. 
Plutarch displayed an interest in the idea of stratagems and deception beyond what one 
would expect of an author with no military background, and lavished praise on generals 
like Sertorius who used it appropriately and effectively. Plutarch clearly understood 
subtleties to the use of deception: one could not properly evaluate it without considering 
its target and motivation. In the Spartan Lives, Plutarch sees a general's use of deception 
as closely related to his character and background. According to Plutarch, the Spartan 
education that Lysander and Agesilaus received not only taught them to value the 
welfare of their city above all else, but also emphasized the usefulness of deception to 
achieving their goals. Because of this, throughout their respective Lives they frequently 
employ deception in ways that appear morally questionable to outsiders. Plutarch's 
interest in these Lives lay not so much in the acts of deception themselves, but rather in 
examining the impact that such a narrow understanding of justice had on a subject's 
actions; military and non-military deception provided an effective framework with clear 
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moral boundaries from which Plutarch could explore larger moral issues. In the 
Sertorius-Eumenes, Plutarch leaves moral considerations aside to explore the efficacy of 
military deception. Throughout this pair, both generals continuously struggle against 
great odds: Sertorius faced the resources of the Roman Republic, while Eumenes fought 
for survival against some of the greatest of Alexander's successors. Nevertheless, the 
mastery of deception that both generals displayed brought them numerous victories and 
ensured their survival longer than one could have reasonably expected. Unlike Lysander 
and Agesilaus, Sertorius and Eumenes consistently use deception in a way that Plutarch 
considers morally appropriate: perhaps, although there is certainly nothing in the 
Sertorius-Eumenes that explicitly makes this connection, because the two men were 
unburdened by Spartan education system. Regardless, these case-studies demonstrate 
Plutarch’s understanding of both the moral complications and practical applications of 
military deception. 
Questions of morality, character, and virtue underpin Plutarch’s portrayal of 
military leadership in the Parallel Lives, just as they do other aspects of the work. 
Plutarch by no means overlooks the moral virtue of his subjects when they are engaged 
in warfare, and indeed is quick to identify instances when generals exhibit moral failings 
in their pursuit of victory. At the same time, Plutarch demonstrates considerable respect 
for those men who were able to further the interests of their state through military 
achievement, even if their own character may have suffered as a result. Throughout the 
Parallel Lives, Plutarch is willing to bend – though not break – his philosophical ideals 
in order to recognize virtue wherever he sees it. 




Synkrisis and Generalship 
 
 The formal synkriseis that conclude the majority of Plutarch's Parallel Lives 
have long been the subject of debate. They explicitly compare a pair's subjects against 
each other on a variety of topics, often – but not always – drawn from the preceding 
Lives. Modern scholarship no longer questions the authenticity of the concluding 
synkriseis, as was once done, but many scholars are still troubled by what they see as the 
crudeness or simplicity of the passages when compared to the Lives themselves.189 Much 
of the uncertainty over the these concluding synkriseis stems from the difficulty in 
determining their purpose in the Lives. Four of the twenty-two extant pairs of Lives do 
not have a synkrisis: Themistocles-Camillus, Phocion-Cato Minor, Alexander-Caesar, 
and Pyrrhus-Marius. The lack of a synkrisis for every pair makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions about the purpose of these synkriseis, a problem that is compounded 
because it is not clear why these four particular pairs are missing them. Scholarly 
opinion on exactly why these four do not have a synkrisis is divided between those who 
believe that Plutarch specifically did not write them and others who attribute their 
absence to the accident of transmission. I agree with the latter opinion, but it is worth 
considering both arguments. 
Hartmut Erbse was one of the earliest modern proponents for the idea that 
                                                 
189 Pelling (1986), 83 ff., though he has since become more receptive: Pelling (2002), 359; Rosenmeyer 
(1992), 227 n. 42; Mossman (1994), 60. 
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Plutarch intentionally avoided writing a synkrisis for the four pairs which lack one. He 
argues that Plutarch was not able to identify significant differences in the Phocion-Cato 
Minor to compose an effective synkrisis, and that he was unable to find sufficient points 
of similarity to do the same for the other three pairs.190 This argument, in my view, does 
not give Plutarch enough credit. For one, the Phocion-Cato Minor is not the only pair 
whose subjects are unusually similar; as Wardman notes, “Plutarch says of Cicero and 
Demosthenes (Dem. 3.3) that there are so many similarities that one might think that god 
was trying to make the same man; but this did not stop him from attempting a 
comparison”.191 The synkrisis to the Demosthenes-Cicero contrasts the two men on their 
range of interests (Dem.-Cic. 1.1-3), their effective political power (Dem.-Cic. 3.1-4), 
and their time in exile (Dem.-Cic. 4.1-4), so Plutarch clearly had no problem finding a 
number of differences for such an apparently similar pair. The Timoleon-Aemilius 
provides another counter-example. Plutarch opens the synkrisis by saying that a 
comparison of the two does not show many differences (Tim.-Aem. 1.1), and while the 
synkrisis turns out to be one of the shortest, as Larmour notes, Plutarch did still make the 
effort.192 If Plutarch wrote synkriseis for two pairs which he specifically said were 
particularly similar, it is likely he could have found sufficient differences between 
Phocion and Cato Minor as well. 
 It is equally doubtful that Plutarch would have been unable to find enough 
similarities between the other three pairs to compose formal synkriseis. For one, Plutarch 
                                                 
190 Erbse (1956), 404-6. 
191 Wardman (1974), 237. 
192 Larmour (1992), 4176. 
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would not have written parallel biographies for any of his subjects if they did not have at 
least some similar traits to link them together. It is true that both the Themistocles-
Camillus and the Pyrrhus-Marius lack the “formal” proem in which, as Stadter observes, 
Plutarch usually puts forth his reasons for comparing two particular men, and that this 
proem to the Alexander-Caesar provides no more useful similarity than the fact that they 
both performed illustrious deeds (Alex. 1.1). 193 Nevertheless, scholars have identified 
points of similarity for each pair that could have easily translated into a formal synkrisis. 
Hamilton notes several similarities between Alexander and Caesar, including ambition, a 
focus on their reputations, generosity towards fellow-soldiers, kindness towards defeated 
enemies, and eventual tyrannical tendencies.194 In his discussion of parallels within the 
Themistocles-Camillus, Larmour observes that both men come from undistinguished 
families, both men became involved in civil strife, and both men saved their cities from 
a barbarian invader only to be exiled later for their military success.195 Finally, Duff 
identifies the important themes of greed and discontent in the Pyrrhus-Marius, to which 
Buszard adds the common themes of hope, severity, military skill, and political 
failure.196 So then, just as observation of other Lives shows that the Phocion-Cato Minor 
does not have too many similarities to allow for a synkrisis, an analysis of the three other 
pairs that lack a synkrisis demonstrates that they do not have too few similarities to 
preclude one. There is nothing about any of the four pairings in and of themselves that 
                                                 
193 Stadter (1988), 275-95. For more recent work on the beginnings of Lives, see Duff (2008a), 190-191; 
(2011), 224-225. 
194 Hamilton (1969), xxxiv, n.4.  
195 Larmour (1992), 4177-8. 
196 Duff (1999), 101-30; Buszard (2002), 62-148. 
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would prevent Plutarch from writing a concluding synkrisis for them.  
 Pelling provides a different explanation for the missing synkriseis, one which 
attempts to draw conclusions from the way the pairs currently end. In Pelling's view, 
Plutarch decided not to write a formal comparison for these particular pairs because he 
ended them in such a way that a concluding synkrisis would only harm their overall 
impact.197 Pelling believes that the Phocion-Cato Minor and the Alexander-Caesar do 
not receive a synkrisis for two reasons: (1) the richness of the final passage of the Cato 
Minor and the Caesar; and (2), the implicit comparisons made with the earlier Life in 
each ending. He calls the ending of the Cato Minor “particularly dramatic” in its 
description of Cato's final moments, a death scene with many parallels to Phocion's end; 
for this reason, Pelling “can understand if [Plutarch] was reluctant to compromise so fine 
an ending with a formal synkrisis”.198 He makes the same argument for the Alexander-
Caesar. Not only does the Caesar end “marvelously” with the narrative of Caesar's 
guardian spirit taking revenge on Brutus and Cassius, but it also makes many implicit 
connections with the Alexander, most notably through the introduction of the 
supernatural.199 That Pelling's argument relies so much on aesthetics detracts from its 
impact; just because a passage appears particularly striking or dramatic to modern 
readers does not mean that Plutarch would have felt as strongly about it. As will be seen 
in greater detail later, the synkrisis has several purposes at the end of a pair of Lives, and 
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providing a “pleasing” conclusion is not necessarily one of them.200 Finally, the Parallel 
Lives bring up a variety of themes and methods of comparison in each pair (Plutarch 
names ten points of comparison between Demetrius and Antony at Dem. 3.4), so it 
seems unlikely that Plutarch would have found one or two implicit comparisons at the 
end of the Cato Minor or the Caesar to be a sufficient replacement for a formal synkrisis 
in which he often discusses multiple such parallels between his subjects.  
 Pelling's arguments for the other two pairs are even less convincing. He notes 
that the Themistocles-Camillus has one of the most abrupt beginnings of any of the 
Parallel Lives, and maintains that its equally sudden ending without a synkrisis might 
therefore have seemed like an appropriate conclusion.201 However, such a clipped 
introduction and conclusion could just as easily suggest that sections have been lost due 
to transmission, as scholars believe happened to the Alexander-Caesar.202 Even Pelling 
admits that “it is not clear to a modern audience why [a perfunctory beginning] should 
have excluded a synkrisis”.203 Finally, Pelling believes that Plutarch's unusually harsh 
criticism of Marius at the end of his Life (something that is normally reserved for the 
conclusion) explains the lack of a synkrisis after the Pyrrhus-Marius.204 He does, 
however, count the Alcibiades as another Life that ends rather unsympathetically for its 
subject, yet has no explanation for why the Coriolanus-Alcibiades has a synkrisis despite 
this.205 If there are two pairs of Lives that end with a criticism of their subject, one with 
                                                 
200 For a similar argument, see Larmour (1992), 4156. 
201 Pelling (2002), 378, 386 n.70. 
202 Duff (1999), 254. 
203 Pelling (2002), 378. 
204 Pelling (2002), 378. 
205 Pelling (2002), 386 n. 68. 
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a synkrisis and one without one, it is impossible to tell which is the anomaly based on 
that single criteria.  
 Arguing for the intentional absence of synkriseis on a case by case basis as 
Pelling does leaves one open to these sorts of contradictions; the Marius is not the only 
Life with a rather unsympathetic ending, and the Cato Minor and Caesar are not the 
only Lives with dramatic conclusions (the Antony ends with the striking narrative of 
Cleopatra's death, for instance), but they are the only ones without a formal synkrisis. 
Searching for such exceptions to Plutarch's usual trends has its merits, however, as 
Plutarch did not rigorously maintain the same structure throughout the Parallel Lives. 
The Agis and Cleomenes-Tiberius and Caius Gracchus is probably the most obvious 
example of Plutarch's flexibility, as it changes the standard formula of treating only one 
Greek and one Roman per pair. In addition, as Duff notes, Plutarch reverses the usual 
order of treating the Greek before the Roman in three pairs: the Coriolanus-Alcibiades, 
the Aemilius-Timoleon, and the Sertorius-Eumenes.206 Plutarch normally presents the 
more simple Life first to serve as a base from which to understand the more complex 
themes in the second, and at least in the case of the Coriolanus-Alcibiades the Greek is 
clearly the more difficult of the two.207 Regardless of the reason for the switch in order, 
these three reversals do show that Plutarch was willing to adapt the structure of his 
Parallel Lives to new material. For this reason, it is wrong to say that Plutarch must have 
written the four missing synkriseis simply because all of the other Lives have them; on 
                                                 
206 Duff (1999), 254. 
207 Buszard (2002), 84; Duff (1999), 205-240. 
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the other hand, the individualized arguments which Pelling presents are not strong 
enough to stand on their own. 
 Duff expands on Pelling's argument for the Pyrrhus-Marius, making it perhaps 
the most thought-provoking of those that cite unique circumstances for the missing 
synkriseis. Instead of looking at Plutarch's general lack of sympathy for the rather 
pathetic end of Marius' life, Duff focuses on a final reflective passage that implicitly 
compares Marius (and by association Pyrrhus) with the philosophers Plato and 
Antiparos. These two are set as a paradigm for wise men who remember and value the 
good things that fortune has given them even in bad times (Mar. 46.1-2); in contrast to 
them are “forgetful and foolish” people (Plutarch names neither Marius nor Pyrrhus) 
who ignore current good fortune and instead dream of greater things in the future, with 
the result that they fail to consolidate what they have gained and eventually lose 
everything (Mar. 46.3-5). This perpetual discontent is perhaps Plutarch's greatest 
criticism of Pyrrhus and Marius and is a central theme to both Lives, and Duff suggests 
that this passage may help explain the lack of a formal synkrisis for the pair.208 There is 
no doubt that this chapter acts as a fitting conclusion to the pair, not only tying together 
the main theme of the book but also alluding to the defective education that was most 
likely responsible for both of their shortcomings (Pyr. 2.6, 6.7, 8.6-7; Mar. 2.2-4).209 The 
fact remains, however, that this is not a true synkrisis. It is syncritic in character, but it 
puts the protagonists on the same side of the comparison instead of against each other, 
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making a direct comparison of the two impossible. In addition, there is no opportunity 
for the reader to exercise his own judgment; with the eminent philosophers Plato and 
Antiparos on one side against the unnamed “forgetful” and “foolish” on the other, 
Plutarch presents in no uncertain terms who acts correctly and who does not. Therefore 
this passage raises no difficult questions and prompts no re-evaluation of the major 
themes of the work – the primary purpose of the Plutarchan synkrisis, according to Duff 
– and instead acts as a sort of glorified summary of the preceding Lives.210 Duff's 
exploration of Pelling's argument for the unique ending of the Pyrrhus-Marius has merit, 
but even such a rounded conclusion as exists in the pair does not accomplish what a real 
synkrisis would and so is not a fitting substitute for one. 
 It is impossible to say with certainty whether Plutarch did or did not write the 
four missing synkriseis, but the current arguments which advocate that he intentionally 
never wrote them fail to convince. Both Erbse and Pelling run into problems because 
they focus on features of the pairs in question that pairs with synkriseis also happen to 
have. The passage that Duff identifies at the end of the Pyrrhus-Marius appears to be a 
suitable replacement at first glance, but on subsequent observation it lacks several of the 
defining features of the formal synkrisis. It is certainly possible that we have the 
Phocion-Cato Minor, Alexander-Caesar, Themistocles-Camillus, and Pyrrhus-Marius as 
Plutarch meant them to be, but considering the problems inherent in the transmission of 
ancient texts, and knowing that other parts of the Parallel Lives have failed to last to the 
modern day (such as the whole of the Epimanondas-Scipio), it is safer to assume that the 
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four missing synkriseis have simply been lost to time. Moreover, by starting from the 
position that Plutarch had originally written a synkrisis for every pair, looking for trends 
amongst the surviving synkriseis in an attempt to determine their purpose is far more 
productive. 
 
Rhetorical Purpose of the Synkriseis 
Another significant difficulty in determining the purpose of the concluding 
synkriseis is that there are no programmatic statements about the synkriseis such as those 
that preface a handful of the Parallel Lives.211 That the synkriseis do not invariably 
follow the themes and tone of the pairs they follow, and that they do not simply 
summarize the information given in their Lives, have also caused considerable 
discussion on their proper interpretation. Despite the difficulties, several scholars have 
developed reasonable explanations of the purpose of the synkriseis. In his book on 
moralism in Plutarch's Lives, Duff proposes that Plutarch intended the final synkriseis to 
force the reader to reassess the complex moral issues raised in the biographies and to 
consider the difficulties of making moral judgments.212 His argument acknowledges the 
rhetorical origins of the formal synkriseis, a technique with which Plutarch's readers 
would have been very familiar, and considers that Plutarch's audience would not have 
been troubled by the dramatic shift in tone and structure between the Lives and the 
synkriseis.  
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 Duff's treatment is an effective one when reading the comparisons in terms of 
Plutarch's moralism, as much recent scholarship has done. In terms of the more 
straightforward consideration of military leadership, however, a recent article by Jeffry 
Tatum provides a better base. Like Duff, Tatum builds on an understanding of the place 
of the synkrisis in Greek and Roman rhetorical education. He argues convincingly that 
Plutarch meant the concluding synkriseis to specifically focus the reader's attention on 
judging which man was better.213 This helps to explain the common discrepancies 
between the Lives and synkriseis; while the Lives focus on understanding the particular 
virtues of each man, the purpose of the synkriseis is judgment, and so the synkriseis will 
naturally focus on themes that promote critical comparisons of the subjects. 214 This is 
important for our understanding of Plutarch's depiction of military leadership in the 
synkriseis; in the Lives themselves, Plutarch has the luxury of describing particular 
campaigns and battles in depth, but in the synkriseis he must give his audience criteria 
by which to judge the generalship of men who were often both geographically and 
chronologically distinct. The synkriseis, then, have the potential to show what specific 
criteria Plutarch considered to be important when discussing military leadership. 
 There is difficulty in seeing the synkriseis as an invitation to critically judge the 
two subjects against one another, however, because the typical Plutarchan synkrisis is a 
study in balance and equality. Whether or not Plutarch felt particularly biased towards or 
against one of his subjects in a pair, he did his utmost to treat both of them equally in the 
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synkrisis. This manifests itself most clearly in the structure of the synkriseis. In some, 
such as the Theseus-Romulus, Plutarch favors one of his subjects in all matters for the 
first half of the synkrisis before completely praising the other for the second half; in 
others, such as in the Demetrius-Antony, Plutarch will change the subject he currently 
prefers several times over the course of the synkrisis.215 In both cases the subjects 
receive relatively equal treatment. Neither one will appear to be a better man overall, but 
rather each will come across as more praiseworthy in some aspects and less in others. In 
some cases, Plutarch's opinion on a particular comparison is clear. There is little doubt, 
for instance, as to what one should think about the respective deaths of Cimon and 
Lucullus: Plutarch explains that Cimon died in the field at the head of his army, “not 
exhausted, nor perplexed, nor making feasts and dinner parties the prizes of arms and 
campaigns and trophies” as Lucullus did (Cim.-Luc. 1.2).216 Plutarch clearly sees 
Cimon's death to be much more laudable than that of Lucullus, and he expects his 
readers to have the same view.217 His opinion in other instances, however, is not so 
apparent. In his comparison of Demetrius' and Antony's ultimate downfalls, Plutarch 
claims that Demetrius “caused his soldiers to be hostile towards him”, while Antony 
“left behind the goodwill and confidence” of his troops (Dem.-Ant. 6.2).218 Plutarch 
                                                 
215 See Duff (1999), 257-262 for more on Plutarch’s equal treatment of his subjects in the synkriseis. On 
the synkrisis to the Theseus-Romulus in particular, see Larmour (1988). For the synkrisis to the Demetrius-
Antony, see Pelling (1986b), 89-90; (1988b), 19-20; Duff (1999), 278-281. 
216 ἀλλ' ἀκμὴν ἐχόντων ἐτελεύτησεν, ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου μέντοι καὶ στρατηγῶν, οὐκ ἀπειρηκὼς οὐδ' ἀλύων, 
οὐδὲ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν στρατηγιῶν καὶ τῶν τροπαίων ἔπαθλον ποιούμενος εὐωχίας καὶ πότους (Cim.-
Luc. 1.2). 
217 See Pelling (2002), 371-376 for the deaths of Cimon and Lucullus in Plutarch. 
218 ὥστε τοῦ μὲν ἔγκλημα εἶναι τὸ δυσμενεῖς οὕτω πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι τοὺς μαχομένους, τοῦ δὲ τὸ 
παρεσκευασμένην εὔνοιαν τοιαύτην καὶ πίστιν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν (Dem.-Ant. 6.2). 
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gives no indication of his own opinion in the matter, and leaves the reader little in the 
synkrisis itself on which to form his own judgment. It appears, then, that Plutarch is 
tacitly acknowledging that Demetrius and Antony are equally to blame for their eventual 
downfalls. At times, Plutarch takes this tendency towards equality even further and 
argues both for and against his subjects on a particular point. In the Dion-Brutus, for 
instance, Plutarch originally censures Brutus for plotting against Caesar when Caesar 
was still friendly towards him; Dion, on the other hand, only fought against Dionysius 
after being wronged by him (Dion-Brut. 3.3). Plutarch immediately backtracks, 
however, claiming that this same point proves Brutus' hatred of tyrants to be consistent 
and sincere, whereas Dion's was only brought about by resentment (Dion-Brut. 3.4-6). 
Plutarch does not limit himself to interpreting an episode a single way; by 
acknowledging that Brutus's hostility towards Caesar despite the man's friendship can 
count both for and against him Plutarch allows for more flexibility in his discussion and 
encourages his readers to consider their own interpretations of other events. The 
Aristides-Cato Major contains another example of this: after criticizing Aristides for his 
poverty and the harm it caused to his descendants Plutarch turns the argument around, 
admitting that Aristides' poverty was not due to any bad qualities and criticizing Cato for 
esteeming the acquisition of wealth in his writing (Aris.-Cato 3-4). This sort of balance 
appears to make any attempt to successfully judge between Dion and Brutus or Aristides 
and Cato an exercise in futility, as Plutarch guides the reader into accepting that a 
perceived fault can just as easily be called a virtue.  
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 This balance in the Plutarch synkrisis appears to dissuade any attempts at judging 
one man superior to another. Indeed, Duff argues that Plutarch's tendency of focusing on 
the equality of his subjects “prevents the synkrisis from becoming a mere exercise in 
grading or ranking, a ritual prize-giving to whichever of the subjects might be judged 
superior”, and that the equality instead serves to turn the reader's attention away from the 
characters themselves and towards the virtues and vices which they demonstrated in 
their lives.219 This is an understandable reaction to the balance of the synkriseis. It is 
difficult to read Plutarch's comments about Dion and Brutus, quoted above, and not 
reflect on the enormity of the choice each man made between loyalty to one's friend and 
loyalty to one's city. However, Tatum suggests that the equality of the Plutarchan 
synkrisis, regardless of its opportunities for introspection, does not necessarily preclude 
ritualized judgment. He cites a discussion of synkriseis attributed to Hermogenes of 
Tarsus, in which the rhetorician explains that it was a common exercise for skilled 
orators to present balanced synkriseis of two unequal things. These falsely balanced 
synkriseis, as Tatum notes, did not encourage moral debate, but rather served to test both 
orator and audience; they required significant skill on the part of the orator to give an 
impression of equality and close attention by the audience to make an accurate judgment 
on which subject is superior.220 Plutarch was certainly a skilled author and rhetorician, 
and no doubt capable of arguing for the equality of two unequal things. It is true that the 
rhetorical synkrisis, according to ancient authors, could indeed intentionally argue for 
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the equality of two subjects rather than the superiority of one over the other; however, 
Tatum regards a warning by Menander Rhetor against comparing two families at a 
wedding with a synkrisis as evidence that the common reaction to a synkrisis was indeed 
a critical evaluation of superiority.221 Menander advises his reader against συγκρίνων, 
but to instead link the two families κατὰ ἀντεξέτασιν, “so that you do not seem to 
diminish one and glorify the other”.222 That Menander specifically uses ἀντεξέτασιν for 
‘comparison’ in opposition to συγκρίνων suggests that he considered the synkrisis to be 
a completely different form of comparison. Moreover, that he was concerned that an 
audience could interpret a synkrisis as a judgment for or against a particular subject, 
regardless of the author’s intentions, suggests that synkriseis were often used for such a 
critical purpose. It seems likely that Plutarch would have been aware of this reaction to 
synkriseis, and would have used it to his advantage in his writing.  
That Plutarch did indeed intend his concluding synkriseis to elicit such 
judgments finds confirmation in the endings to several synkriseis. The Philopoemen-
Flamininus, for example, ends with this pronouncement: “After this examination, since 
the difference is hard to define, consider whether we shall make this judgment fairly if 
we award the Greek the crown for military experience and generalship, and the Roman 
the crown for justice and goodness” (Phil.-Flam. 3.5).223 Plutarch concludes the 
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222 ἢ γὰρ γένος γένει συνάψεις οὐ συγκρίνων, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇς τὸ μὲν ἐλαττοῦν, τὸ δὲ αὔξειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ  
ἀντεξέτασιν προάγων τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ συνάπτεται (Men. Rh. 2.402.26-28). 
223 ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτως ἐξεταζομένων δυσθεώρητος ἡ διαφορά, σκόπει μὴ τῷ μὲν Ἕλληνι τὸν ἐμπειρίας        
πολεμικῆς καὶ στρατηγίας στέφανον, τῷ δὲ Ῥωμαίῳ τὸν δικαιοσύνης καὶ χρηστότητος ἀποδιδόντες, οὐ 
φαύλως διαιτᾶν δόξομεν (Phil.-Flam. 3.5). 
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Lysander-Sulla similarly, claiming that Sulla was a better general and had more 
successes, while Lysander had more self-control and had fewer failings (Lys.-Sulla 
5.5).224 These synopses oversimplify the comparisons made in the synkriseis, let alone 
the Lives themselves, yet Plutarch clearly expected his reader to judge the superiority of 
one man against the other. Furthermore, it does not follow that Plutarch would expect his 
readers to make such comparisons in some synkriseis and not others, so Plutarch would 
have likely written the other synkriseis with the assumption that his readers would make 
similar comparisons without his explicit direction. However, it is important to note that 
in the synkriseis to both the Philopoemen-Flamininus and the Lysander-Sulla, Plutarch 
judges the two men across a range of different criteria. He does nothing to suggest that 
he or his readers should judge one man’s ultimate superiority to the other. I would argue, 
then, that Plutarch does not invite his reader “to judge which is the better man”, as 
Tatum argues, but to judge which man was superior in several different aspects of 
comparison. 225 I do not mean to say that Plutarch expected readers to judge between the 
two men in terms of every comparison; the simplicity of Plutarch's summaries suggests 
that he passed judgment on only a handful of issues, and Plutarch's reluctance to 
comment on some of the more complex and ambiguous issues (like those from the Dion-
Brutus and Aristides-Cato Major, above) supports Duff's argument that some 
comparisons required serious introspection. At the same time, there are some themes, 
such as that of military leadership, that are straightforward enough to allow consistent 
                                                 
224 Cf. Cor.-Alc. 5.2 and Ag./Cleom.-Gracchi 5.7. See Duff (1999), 200-204 for the synkrisis to the 
Lysander-Sulla. 
225 Tatum (2010), 13; his emphasis. 
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judgment. In this chapter I will examine Plutarch's treatment of military leadership in the 
synkriseis in an attempt to judge, as Plutarch appears to have intended, whether the 
Greek or the Roman was the superior general in each pair. As one would expect, 
Plutarch does not explicitly declare the superior general in many of the synkriseis; rather, 
in many cases Plutarch's treatment of his subjects' military careers appears on the surface 
to be balanced. However, I intend to show that, by a careful reading of generalship in the 
synkriseis, it is possible to judge the superior general even in those cases where the two 
men appear to be equal. I will begin by identifying many of the key ways by which 
Plutarch assesses generalship in the synkriseis, after which I will apply those aspects of 
generalship which Plutarch judges most important to the more troublesome synkriseis in 
order to better understand Plutarch's true assessment of the pair. I will conclude by 
considering the relationship of Plutarch's depiction of generalship in the synkriseis to 
that in the Lives themselves. 
 
Assessment of Generalship in the Synkriseis 
 In the synkriseis, then, Plutarch guides his reader in a direct comparison of his 
subjects in order to judge each man's strengths and weaknesses in relation to a number 
of particular themes. Military leadership is a particularly common topic, occurring in 
fifteen of the eighteen extant synkriseis, and Plutarch examines this theme in a number 
of different ways.226 Three of the most common criteria Plutarch applies to his 
                                                 
226 The Theseus-Romulus, Lycurgus-Numa, and Demosthenes-Cicero are the only three synkriseis not to 
discuss generalship. The.-Rom. 1.3-4 compares their bravery in war, but has no mention of military 
leadership in particular. 
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comparisons of military leadership are the number of victories, the strength of 
opponents, and responsibility for success. Plutarch takes all three of these into account 
during his comparison of the generalship of Pelopidas and Marcellus, so that particular 
synkrisis will serve as a start to our investigation of Plutarch's methods.  
 Perhaps the most basic comparison of military leadership Plutarch makes in the 
synkriseis is the number and magnitude of a general's victories and defeats.  He 
compares Pelopidas and Marcellus in this way after discussing conflicting reports of 
Marcellus' career: “Since, then, Pelopidas was not defeated in a single battle as general, 
and Marcellus won more victories than any Roman of his day, it would seem, perhaps, 
that difficulty of conquering one is made equal to the invincibility of the other by the 
great number of his victories” (Pel.-Marc. 2.1).227 For Plutarch, Marcellus' larger 
number of victories makes up for the defeats he suffered in his career and makes him 
equal to Pelopidas, who never lost a battle but presumably fought far fewer. There is no 
sign here that Plutarch takes into account any other aspect of the careers of the two men; 
his comparison of their victories is independent of his judgments about other aspects of 
generalship, a trend we will see continue throughout the synkriseis. Also evident here is 
the tendency towards equality that was discussed earlier.228  Plutarch, as will become 
apparent, does have strong opinions on the superiority of one general over the other in 
several pairs, but when he does not, as appears to be the case here, he often attempts to 
                                                 
227 ἐπεὶ τοίνυν Πελοπίδας μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἡττήθη μάχην στρατηγῶν, Μάρκελλος δὲ πλείστας τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν 
Ῥωμαίων ἐνίκησε, δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως τὸ δυσνίκητον πρὸς τὸ ἀήττητον ὑπὸ πλήθους τῶν κατωρθωμένων 
ἐπανισοῦσθαι (Pel.-Marc. 2.1). 
228 See pp. 132-135.  
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place the two men on equal footing.  
 Plutarch counts victories in the Pericles-Fabius Maximus as well, but his 
judgment in that pair is more complex. Plutarch opens his comparison of the two 
generals' leadership by assessing the specific battles of each man: “In pitched battle, 
Fabius seems to have won no victory except that for which he celebrated his first 
triumph; whereas Pericles set up nine trophies for his wars on land and sea. However, no 
such exploit is recorded of Pericles as that by which Fabius snatched Minucius from the 
hands of Hannibal and preserved an entire Roman army” (Per.-Fab. 2.1-2).229 Plutarch 
here addresses both quantity and quality of victories: Pericles had many more victories 
than Fabius did, but Fabius had a more impressive victory than any of Pericles'. Taken 
on its own, Plutarch’s comparison of the quantity and quality of military victories in the 
synkrisis of the Pericles-Fabius Maximus appears rather balanced and straightforward. 
The “winner” of each category is clear, and on the surface this comparison seems as 
balanced as that seen above in the Pelopidas-Marcellus. When examined in the context 
of a close reading of the associated Lives, however, Plutarch’s implicit judgment of the 
two men’s generalship becomes far more decisive. For one, while comparing the number 
of victories the two men fought Plutarch only considers “pitched battles”, those fought 
ἐκ παρατάξεως. Therefore, interestingly, the battle in which Fabius saved Minucius is 
not the single victory that Plutarch compares against Pericles’ nine. Rather, the battle for 
                                                 
229 ἐκ δὲ παρατάξεως Φάβιος οὐ φαίνεται μάχῃ νενικηκώς, πλὴν ἀφ' ἧς τὸν πρότερον εἰσήλασε θρίαμβον, 
Περικλῆς δ' ἐννέα τρόπαια κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἔστησεν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. οὐ μὴν λέγεται 
τοιαύτη πρᾶξις Περικλέους οἵαν ἔπραξε Φάβιος Μινούκιον ἐξαρπάσας Ἀννίβου καὶ διασώσας ἐντελὲς 
στρατόπεδον Ῥωμαίων (Per.-Fab. 2.1-2). 
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which he celebrated his first triumph was fought against the Ligurians in his first 
consulship, which Plutarch describes in a single sentence before narrating the arrival of 
Hannibal into Italy (Per. 2.1). The battle in which Fabius saved Minucius was a large 
battle by any standards, as the two generals had four legions between them (Fab. 10), 
but as Plutarch describes it, the battle was not fought ἐκ παρατάξεως. Instead, Hannibal 
had initially led Minucius into a devastating ambush, and when he saw what had 
befallen his colleague Fabius had quickly marched his troops straight from camp to the 
battle and so turned defeat into victory (Fab. 11-12). Since this action began organically 
rather than by a mutual agreement as pitched battles typically did, Plutarch clearly 
considered it to be of a different sort than the majority of those fought by Pericles. That 
Plutarch can make such a technical distinction between types of battles speaks to his 
familiarity with military narrative, but it also demonstrates Plutarch's tendency to be 
selective in his characterization of his subjects: by only comparing Pericles and Fabius 
in their battles fought ἐκ παρατάξεως, he knowingly omits the many skirmishes and 
ambushes that characterized Fabius' campaigns against Hannibal. This in turn 
contributes to the synkrisis clearly favoring Pericles' generalship, as we shall see later. 230 
 Furthermore, after praising Fabius' single victory, Plutarch lessens its impact by 
stating that Pericles likewise never had such a defeat as Fabius did when he was tricked 
by Hannibal's stratagem with the oxen (Per.-Fab. 2.2). In this instance, Fabius had 
managed to trap Hannibal’s army in a narrow defile by occupying the only exits with his 
                                                 
230 For Plutarch’s comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus across the entire pair, see Stadter (1975). 
Stadter (1989) provides the best commentary on the Pericles itself, while Xenophontos (2012) is an 
excellent source for Plutarch’s treatment of Fabius’ generalship in the Life. 
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infantry without Hannibal noticing. Once Hannibal had realized the perilousness of his 
situation, however, he ordered his troops to tie torches to the horns of 2,000 captured 
cattle and drive them at the Roman positions in the middle of the night. The Roman 
sentries who saw this thought that they were being attacked by an entire army and fled, 
and Fabius, fearing an ambush in the night, hesitated long enough that Hannibal was 
able to gain the high ground almost unopposed and thus escape from a very serious 
plight. Plutarch says that Fabius suffered much scorn after this defeat, specifically 
because in trying to defeat Hannibal through judgment and foresight he instead was 
completely out-generaled (Fab. 6.1-7.2). What Plutarch leaves unsaid, but what would 
not be lost on most of his readers, is that this particular failure of Fabius’ cost Rome its 
best chance of defeating Hannibal early in the war. In contrast to the synkrisis of the 
Pelopidas-Marcellus, then, Plutarch’s comparison of the quantity and quality of victories 
in the Pericles-Fabius Maximus is neither simple nor balanced. Plutarch’s decision to 
only compare number of victories in pitched battles rather than all military engagements 
subtly tips the balance of generalship in favor of Pericles by ignoring Fabius’ successful 
skirmishes against Hannibal. Moreover, Plutarch immediately counters any impact of 
Fabius’ more impressive victory with his mention of his more humiliating defeat. By his 
subtle manipulation of details, then, Plutarch leads his readers to see Pericles as both a 
more prolific and a more consistent general.231  
The comparison of the quality of a general’s victories is unavoidably far more 
                                                 
231 We have already examined many examples of Plutarch’s manipulation of details to support his own 
conclusions about generalship throughout Chapters 1 and 2. For more on this practice in Plutarch’s Lives 
more completely, see Pelling (1980); Larmour (1992). 
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subjective than the comparison of quantity, and this ambiguity is often compounded 
when Plutarch compares generals from different cultures and time periods. The same 
synkrisis of Pelopidas and Marcellus from which we started appears to demonstrate the 
internal struggle Plutarch could face when comparing military leadership:  
καὶ μὴν οὗτος μὲν εἷλε Συρακούσας, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπέτυχεν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι 
μεῖζον εἶναι τοῦ καταλαβεῖν Σικελίαν τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ προσελθεῖν καὶ διαβῆναι πρῶτον 
ἀνθρώπων πολέμῳ τὸν Εὐρώταν, εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία τοῦτο μὲν φήσει τις τὸ ἔργον 
Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ Πελοπίδᾳ προσήκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ Λεῦκτρα, τῶνδὲ Μαρκέλλῳ 
διαπεπραγμένων ἀκοινώνητον εἶναι τὴν δόξαν (Pel.-Marc. 2.1-2). 
 
[Marcellus], it is true, took Syracuse, while [Pelopidas] failed to take Sparta. But I think 
to have reached Sparta, and to have been the first of men to cross the Eurotas in war, was 
a greater achievement than the conquest of Sicily; unless, indeed, it should be said that 
this deed belongs rather to Epaminondas than to Pelopidas, as well as the victory at 
Leuctra, while Marcellus did not share the glory of his accomplishments. 
 
This passage brings up the two other major aspects of generalship that Plutarch 
examines. The first is the comparison of a general's enemies. Plutarch here compares 4th 
century Sparta with 3rd century Sicily, and believes that Pelopidas' successes against 
Sparta, even though he failed to take the city itself, were more impressive than 
Marcellus' defeat of Syracuse and subjugation of Sicily. For Plutarch, then, Sparta was a 
more dangerous enemy than Syracuse and Sicily, but he gives no evidence to back up his 
opinion. Like so often in the synkriseis, he leaves it to his readers to develop their own 
conclusions based on their own background knowledge of the subject. 
 The second aspect of generalship that this passage considers is agency: 
Pelopidas' exploits against Sparta are meaningless if Epaminondas was in fact primarily 
responsible. Unlike his belief in the strength of Sparta over Syracuse, Plutarch's opinion 
on Pelopidas' contribution to the battle of Leuctra is unclear in both the synkrisis and the 
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Life itself.232 Compounding the difficulty is Plutarch's statement in the previous chapter 
that Pelopidas' defeat of the Lacadaemonians at Tegyra and Leuctra is “certain” (Pel.-
Marc. 1.7). If Pelopidas' victories are certain, why call his contribution into question a 
few sentences later? There appears to be no easy answer to this question, and 
inconsistencies such as this are one of the reasons scholars have been so troubled by the 
synkriseis. It could simply be a symptom of Plutarch's desire for a balanced portrayal – 
he may have considered his praise of Pelopidas' successes against Sparta too strong of a 
point on which to end the comparison of two generals he believed equal to one another, 
and so introduced the possibility of doubt in order to re-balance the synrkrisis.233 While 
the question of responsibility serves to balance the comparison of Pelopidas' and 
Marcellus' generalship, Plutarch uses the theme to a more conclusive effect in many 
other synkriseis, and we shall examine it in more depth after returning to Plutarch's 
comparisons of antagonists. 
 Just as Plutarch believed that the Sparta of Pelopidas' time was greater than 
Sicily in Marcellus', he had clear opinions on the relative strengths of other adversaries 
as well. In the Cimon-Lucullus, for instance, Plutarch claims that Cimon's achievements 
                                                 
232 Plutarch highlights Pelopidas' boldness in blocking a Spartan flanking attempt during the battle of 
Leuctra, and says that he gained as much glory for the victory as Epaminondas, who was in command 
(Pel. 23). Both were boeotarchs after the battle and both voted to cross the Eurotas and take the war to 
Sparta (Pel. 24.1-2), but Plutarch does not assign either man ultimate responsibility for the Theban 
successes. See Georgiadou (1997), 32-37 for the synkrisis of the Pelopidas-Marcellus, and a discussion of 
Plutarch’s uncertainty concerning Pelopidas’ agency. Despite the impact that this uncertainty has on 
Plutarch’s judgment of his generalship, she suggests that Lucullus appears better in comparison to 
Marcellus because of his internal synkriseis with Epimanondas. 
233 The closest parallel to this is the end of the Coriolanus-Alcibiades. Plutarch spends nearly the entire 
synkrisis praising Alcibiades at the expense of Coriolanus, but concludes the final sentence by declaring 
that all the rest of Coriolanus' attributes were brilliant and far exceeded Alcibiades. See Duff (1999), 281-3 
for more on this synkrisis.  
   
146 
 
are less impressive because the Persians of his time had already been humbled by Greek 
victories at Salamis and Plataea, whereas Lucullus defeated Mithridates and Tigranes 
when they were at their height (Cim.-Luc. 3.5). When the issue of agency is not in doubt, 
as it was in the case of Pelopidas and Marcellus, Plutarch finds the strength of a 
general’s opposition to be an effective method of comparison. Similar comparisons 
occur in the Lysander-Sulla, Agesilaus-Pompey, and Timoleon-Aemilianus, and in each 
case Plutarch finds that the Roman fought against superior opponents. The Lysander-
Sulla gives Plutarch's most vivid portrayal of the matter: 
τρυφὴν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ παιδιὰν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον διαναυμαχεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου κυβερνήτην, 
καὶ Φιλοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατᾶν δημαγωγόν, Ἄδοξον, ἄκραν γλῶσσαν 
ἠκονημένον· οὓς οὐκ ἂν ἱπποκόμῳ Μιθριδάτης οὐδὲ ῥαβδούχῳ Μάριος ἠξίωσε 
παραβαλεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (Lys.-Sulla 4.4). 
 
For I think it is the merest child's play to win a sea-fight against Antiochus, Alcibiades' 
pilot, and to deceive Philocles, the Athenian demagogue, 'Inglorious one, who provokes 
with a sharp tongue', such men as these Mithridates would not have though fit to 
compare with his groom, nor Marius with his lictor. 
 
It is no surprise that the scale of wars between the Classical Greek poleis cannot 
compare to that of wars fought by Roman generals at the height of the Republic, and 
Plutarch readily acknowledges the military strength of the later states. At the same time, 
Plutarch places less significance in pure numbers than one might expect from an author 
without a military background. For example, Plutarch claims that while Pompey was far 
superior to Agesilaus in terms of number of victories and scale of battles, Pompey's 
abandoning of Rome to Caesar and his many blunders at Pharsalia make him inferior to 
Agesilaus in actual generalship (Age.-Pomp. 3-4). For all that Plutarch praises the scale 
and scope of Pompey's earlier campaigns, he is just as ready to see Pompey's failings as 
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a general during the civil war with Caesar. Duff, then, seems to overreach when he says 
that Plutarch generally favors the Roman leader for generalship because his campaigns 
were on a larger scale.234 We will examine later whether Plutarch prefers Greek or 
Roman generalship more often, but Plutarch's evaluation of a leader's military abilities 
did not solely depend on the scale or strength of his opponents. 
 Related to the comparison of the relative strengths of generals' antagonists is the 
question of agency and responsibility for success. This is a common theme in the 
synkriseis, and one that Plutarch often addresses outside of a military context as well. In 
the Pericles-Fabius Maximus, for example, Plutarch claims that Pericles owed some of 
his successes to good fortune because he was in charge at the height of Athens' power 
and benefited from the actions of its earlier leaders, while Fabius took charge of Rome 
as it was beset by disaster and raised the city back up again (Per.-Fab. 1.1-3). Similarly, 
Plutarch opens the synkrisis of Demetrius and Antony with praise for the Roman, 
because while Demetrius acquired power and fame directly from his father, Antony 
achieved his through his own successes (Dem.-Ant. 1.1-3).235 For Plutarch, personal 
responsibility is important. He does not begrudge anyone good fortune, but he is much 
more ready to praise the man who did not have advantages bestowed by birth.236 In 
terms of military leadership, these advantages normally came from the army a general 
had available to him. In the Philopoemen-Flamininus, Plutarch says that Flamininus was 
                                                 
234 Duff (1999), 269 n.98. 
235 Cf. Thes.-Rom.4.1-2; Aris.-Cato 1.1; Ag./Cleom.-Gracchi 1.1-2; for other instances of the theme in a 
non-military context. 
236 See in particular Swain (1989c). 
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able to make use of Rome's growing strength while on campaign, whereas 
Philopoemen's Greek cities were fully in decline (Phil.-Flam. 2.1). Therefore, “the one 
[Flamininus] commanded good soldiers, but the other [Philopoemen], as commander, 
made his soldiers good” (Phil.-Flam. 2.1). Moreover, Flamininus won victories with the 
established armor and tactics of the Roman army, while Philopoemen had to reform 
these aspects of his army to be effective, “so that in the one case what was most essential 
for victory did not exist and had to be discovered, while in the other it lay ready for 
service” (Phil.-Flam. 2.3). Plutarch is rarely so pithy in his judgments, but the clear 
vision in his mind between the resources each general had at his disposal makes the 
comparison rather lopsided for him. This method of comparison also allows Plutarch to 
comment indirectly on other aspects of generalship, such as Philopoemen's ability to 
train his troops and introduce military innovations.237  
 The other aspect of this theme relates more to personal responsibility rather than 
fortune of birth. We have seen this already in the Pelopidas-Marcellus when Plutarch 
introduces doubt in Pelopidas' responsibility for the Theban victories over the Spartans, 
and it appears in other synkriseis as well. In the Aristides-Cato Major, Plutarch 
maintains that Aristides was not the first man in any of the battles he was involved in, 
whereas Cato was primarily responsible for his two victories in Spain and at 
Thermopylae (Aris.-Cato 2.1-3). There is no question in Plutarch's mind about their roles 
in their respective victories, and this judgment follows Plutarch's descriptions of the 
battles in the Lives themselves. The same criterion appears in the Demetrius-Antony: 
                                                 
237 Cf. Tim.-Aem.1.-2 for a similar comparison on the quality of troops. 
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“And again, Demetrius was himself the author of his successes; Antony, on the contrary, 
won his greatest and fairest victories through his generals, on fields where he was not 
present” (Dem.-Ant. 5.5).238 This comparison of the two generals appears to lack strength 
because of its brevity, especially when compared to the Aristides-Cato Major, which 
specifically mentions the battles in question, but it is in fact consistent with the Lives.239 
Thus Plutarch is sensitive to a general's responsibility for success on several levels: not 
only does he consider advantages a general gained from fortunate birth, but he also takes 
into account how responsible a leader was for the victories he was associated with. 
 For all of the potential difficulties of comparing generals across time and culture, 
Plutarch approaches his judgments from a variety of angles. Plutarch's method of 
counting victories may be a bit simplistic at times, but his comparisons of antagonists 
and his judgments of fortune and responsibility can show considerable depth, and often 
contain analyses of other more specialized aspects of generalship. It is difficult, then, not 
to disagree with Alan Wardman, who took Plutarch's disparagement of Marcellus' 
campaigns in Sicily as symptomatic of the author's lack of enthusiasm for the general's 
art.240 The quality of Plutarch's military analysis notwithstanding, it is clear from the 
previous examples that Plutarch had more than a passing interest in generalship. He 
could very easily have condensed judgment of each pair's military careers into a single 
                                                 
238 πάλιν δὲ τῶν μὲν κατορθωμάτων αὐτουργὸς ὁ Δημήτριος γέγονε, καὶ τοὐναντίον ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἐν οἷς οὐ 
παρῆν καλλίστας καὶ μεγίστας διὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀνῃρεῖτο νίκας (Dem.-Ant. 5.5). 
239 Ant. 34.5-6. This is actually the only direct comparison of military leadership in the synkrisis of 
Demetrius and Antony, which is surprising given the fame of both men as generals. This is likely due to 
the focus of this pair on the moral character of the two, though the synkrisis as a whole is troublesome. See 
Duff (1999), 278-81. See below, pp. 160-167. 
240 Wardman (1974), 239. 
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sentence, as he does in the Demetrius-Antony; instead, as we have seen, he often devotes 
significant space to comparing military leadership across several different criteria. 
 After examining many of the specific aspects of generalship that Plutarch 
addresses in the synkriseis, it should come as no surprise that Plutarch does not always 
declare a particular subject to be a superior general. We have seen that Plutarch seeks 
equality in his discussions of generalship just as he does with non-military themes; his 
back-and-forth in the Pelopidas-Marcellus is a clear example, and the Coriolanus-
Alcibiades, Agesilaus-Pompey, and Timoleon-Aemlianus show similar attempts at 
balance.241 In some instances, however, Plutarch does indeed pass clear judgment on 
who he felt to be the better general. As discussed above, Plutarch declares Sulla to be 
both a better general and more brave than Lysander (Lys.-Sulla 5.5), and judges 
Philopoemen to “win the crown for military experience and generalship” over 
Flamininus (Phil.-Flam. 3.3). This sort of final decision is rare in the synkriseis; the only 
comparable endings occur in the Nicias-Crassus, Coriolanus-Alcibiades, and 
Agis/Cleomenes-Gracchi, but none of those contain judgments about military 
superiority.242 In theory, these explicit final judgments on generalship could help to 
define Plutarch’s opinions on particular aspects of military leadership, particularly in 
those instances where Plutarch’s implicit judgments are less clear. Unfortunately, 
however, the two synkriseis which end with clear statements of military superiority are 
                                                 
241 Pel.-Marc. 1.2-3, 2.1-2; Cor.-Alc. 1.1-2; Age.-Pomp. 3.1-5; Tim.-Aem. 1.1-2. Plutarch shows the most 
balanced evaluation of generalship in the Pelopidas-Marcellus. In the Agesilaus-Pompey and Timoleon-
Aemilianus, he praises each general in turn for different abilities, but in both cases finds one general to be 
superior to the other. 
242 Nic.-Cras. 5.2; Cor.-Alc. 5.2; Ag./Cleom.-Gracchi 5.6. 
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also two of the least troublesome comparisons that we have. There is no question in the 
synkrisis itself whom Plutarch favors as the better general, and so his explicit judgment 
in favor of Sulla's military leadership at the end of the synkrisis is unsurprising.243 
Similarly, Plutarch finds in favor of Philopoemen over Flamininus in every comparison 
of their generalship in the synkrisis, so his final evaluation only confirms his opinion on 
the military leadership of the two men. Timothy Duff suggests that these final judgments 
in the synkriseis, particularly in the case of the Lysander-Sulla, can be interpreted as 
providing pleasing complexity to the end of a pair by suggesting that neither subject 
should be seen to excel in every category of statesmanship.244 Such an interpretation of 
the final judgments as a whole is certainly valid, but is surely not the case when one 
looks specifically at the judgments on military leadership; these instead provide pleasing 
closure by confirming and reinforcing Plutarch’s evaluation earlier in the synkrisis. 
 Because Plutarch only explicitly passes a final judgment on the generalship of 
his subjects in the Lysander-Sulla and the Philopoemen-Flamininus, it is necessary to 
look elsewhere in the synkriseis to determine which skills or attributes Plutarch 
considered important for a military leader. Fortunately, in several synkriseis Plutarch 
indeed explains his opinion on various aspects of generalship. An example of this, albeit 
                                                 
243 Duff disagrees, instead calling this final judgment in favour of Philopoemen’s generalship “crude and 
surprising”, because he finds it paradoxical that the Greek Philopoemen is judged superior to the Roman 
general who conquered Greece (1999, 269). This observation, however, fails to take into account the 
actual military actions of these two men, treating them instead as inseparable from their native cities. 
Indeed, one of Plutarch’s greatest praises of Philopoemen’s generalship, as we have seen, is that he was 
able to accomplish what he did with only the limited resources of the Achaean League at his disposal 
(Phil.-Flam. 2.1). That being the case, that Plutarch believes Philopoemen to be the better general should 
be in no way surprising. 
244 Duff (1999), 204-5; 267-269. For more on the synkrisis to the Philopoemen-Flamininus (and the entire 
pair), see Pelling (1997).  
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a short one, can be found in the Timoleon-Aemilianus. After suggesting that it is possible 
to find in favor of Aemilius’ military accomplishments because his main opponent 
Perseus was at the height of his power while Timoleon’s main opponent Dionysius was 
at his weakest, Plutarch attempts to balance out the comparison by considering the 
resources of the two men. While Aemilius had experienced and disciplined soldiers, he 
argues, Timoleon found success with disorderly mercenaries, and “when equal successes 
follow on unequal equipment, the greater credit accrues to the commander” (Tim.-Aem. 
1.2). This is the same concept that underpins Plutarch’s comparison of Philopoemen and 
Flamininus, in which Plutarch praises Philopoemen’s generalship because he 
accomplished what he did without the use of trained Roman legions.245 This is hardly the 
most groundbreaking insight, yet it shows that Plutarch was willing to make broad 
statements about generalship that could be applied beyond a particular synkrisis. That is 
not to say that what Plutarch says in one synkrisis should be blindly applied to his other 
works; the synkriseis are, after all, rhetorical pieces first and foremost. Nevertheless, 
these parallels do show that Plutarch’s conceptions of what make a good general are 
consistent across several different synkriseis. 
 The Timoleon-Aemilianus is not the only synkrisis in which Plutarch comments 
on a specific aspect of generalship. In the Pericles-Fabius Maximus, Plutarch passes 
judgment on the foresight of the two leaders: “And if it is the part of a good general not 
only to improve the present, but also to judge correctly of the future, then Pericles was 
such a general, for the war which the Athenians were waging came to an end as he had 
                                                 
245 Phil.-Flam. 2.1. See p. 148. 
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foreknown and foretold” (Per.-Fab. 2.3).246 Once again, Plutarch's focus here goes 
beyond the scope of this particular pair of leaders and describes the “good general”. He 
is not only comparing Pericles and Fabius against each other, but also against an 
idealized leader who demonstrates foresight, a trait which Plutarch clearly associates 
with good generalship. Unfortunately, foresight is not a particularly common theme in 
the synkriseis; the other general who was equally known for his foresight was 
Themistocles, but the Themistocles-Camillus lacks a synkrisis that might allow a 
comparison with the Pericles-Fabius Maximus. Nevertheless, this pronouncement, like 
the one in the Timoleon-Aemilianus, gives just as clear a picture of Plutarch's verdict on 
the particular pairs as his final summaries in the Lysander-Sulla and Philopoemen-
Flamininus. Moreover, Plutarch’s high opinion of foresight in military leaders parallels 
his preference for the thoughtful and considered generalship, as seen in Chapter 1. 
 Plutarch makes similar broad statements of generalship in two other pairs, the 
Agesilaus-Pompey and the Cimon-Lucullus. As mentioned earlier, despite the greater 
scale of Pompey's victories, Plutarch finds Agesilaus to be a better general, almost 
entirely because of Pompey's actions during the civil war.247 The first point in Agesilaus' 
favor is that he did not abandon Sparta to the Theban army after Leuctra, while Pompey 
gave up Rome to Caesar's small army without a fight (Age.-Pomp. 3.3-4). Plutarch 
follows that comparison with a strong statement about generalship: “Therefore the most 
                                                 
246 εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὀρθῶς τὸν 
ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν, Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ὡς Περικλῆς προέγνω καὶ προεῖπεν ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ πόλεμος (Per.-Fab. 
2.3). 
247 See Hillman (1994); Duff (1999), 275-278 for the synkrisis to the Agesilaus-Pompey. 
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important job of a good general is to force his enemies to fight when he is superior, but 
not to be forced to fight when he is inferior in power” (Age.-Pomp. 4.1).248 Agesilaus did 
this, Plutarch says, and so should be considered a “good general”, but Pompey did not, 
and forced the battle of Pharsalia on land, where his forces were inferior to Caesar's 
(Age.-Pomp. 4.1). To drive home his judgment of Agesilaus' superiority, Plutarch further 
condemns Pompey for succumbing to the agitation of his bad advisers rather than 
following his own instincts (Age.-Pomp. 4.2-3).  
 Plutarch's comment on generalship in the Cimon-Lucullus seems less like an 
axiom of good generalship and more like a clever way to sum up an argument, but still 
bears repeating for its indication of Plutarch's opinion on this particular pair. Plutarch's 
main argument is that Lucullus did significantly more damage to the Persians than 
Cimon, because while after Cimon's death the Persians were able to stem the tide of 
Greek victories against them, after Lucullus' victories against Mithridates and Tigranes 
neither ruler even attempted to fight Pompey (Cim.-Luc. 3.1-4). “Therefore”, Plutarch 
says, “greater is the general, as is the athlete, who hands over his antagonist to his 
successor in a weaker plight” (Cim.-Luc. 3.3).249 Like Plutarch's other pronouncements 
on generalship, there is nothing in the statement to suggest that Plutarch held a 
particularly nuanced knowledge of military leadership. However, these comments do 
serve to demonstrate that Plutarch believed not only that generalship could be qualified 
                                                 
248 Ὃ τοίνυν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ μάλιστα, κρείττονα μὲν ὄντα βιάσασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους 
μάχεσθαι, λειπόμενον δὲ δυνάμει μὴ βιασθῆναι (Age.-Pomp. 4.1). 
249 μείζων οὖν στρατηγὸς ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς ὁ τῷ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσθενέστερον παραδοὺς τὸν ἀντίπαλον (Cim.-
Luc. 3.3). 
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in certain ways, but also that one could identify a good general based on his actions. His 
praise of Lucullus in the synkrisis is consistent with his positive portrayal of Lucullus’ 
victories over Mithridates and Tigranes in the Life itself.250  
 In most of the other pairs, Plutarch's preference for the generalship of one leader 
over the other is equally clear, primarily because he only judges the pair on one aspect of 
military leadership. Plutarch finds Alcibiades more effective than Coriolanus because he 
won several sea battles (Cor.-Alc. 1.1-2); he judges Dion to be a superior general to 
Brutus because of better planning (Dion-Brut. 3.1-2); Demetrius was more responsible 
for his victories than Antony (Dem.-Ant. 5.5); Publicola had a greater series of victories 
than Solon (Sol.-Pub. 4.1); and Cleomenes is the only leader out of the four in his pair 
whom Plutarch credits with achieving military victories as a general (Ag./Cleom.-
Gracchi 3.2). Plutarch compares a few different aspects of the generalship of Sertorius 
and Eumenes, but they all revolve around Eumenes having fewer resources and more 
hardships than Sertorius, so the Greek appears to be the stronger general (Ser.-Eum. 1.1-
3).  
 It is more difficult to determine Plutarch's preference in the three remaining 
pairs, however, and to attempt to do so we must apply Plutarch's judgments from his 
more straightforward synkriseis. We have seen that Plutarch believes Cato to be solely 
responsible for his successes, while Aristides was only one of many generals in his 
victories against the Persians. In the second half of the synkrisis, however, Plutarch 
praises Aristides because he was involved in some of the most important victories of the 
                                                 
250 See above, pp. 41-47. 
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Greek cities, whereas Cato's victories gained little for Rome (Aris.-Cato 5.1). Plutarch 
makes no other comment on the generalship of the two men, and so on the surface ends 
the synkrisis with a point in each man's favor. The emphasis Plutarch places on being 
responsible for one's victories in other synkriseis, such as the Timoleon-Aemilianus and 
Lysander-Sulla, appears to tip the scales in favor of Cato, however, despite the 
significance of the Persian Wars. The Nicias-Crassus is a more difficult case. Plutarch 
thinks poorly of Nicias for giving up command against the Lacadaemonians to Cleon, 
but to an extent forgives Crassus' rashness against Spartacus (Nic.-Cras. 3.1-2). On the 
other hand, Plutarch praises Nicias' foresight in predicting his failure at Sicily, condemns 
Crassus for completely underestimating the Parthians (Nic.-Cras. 4.1-2), and thinks that 
Nicias deserves significantly more credit for his actions on Sicily than Crassus does for 
his in Parthia (Nic.-Cras. 5.1). Once again Plutarch makes points for both men in turn, 
and comes to no clear consensus. Plutarch does show Nicias, however, as possessing the 
foresight of the “good general” that he describes in the Pericles-Fabius Maximus, in 
stark contrast to Crassus' complete failure to show the same trait, so in this case 
Plutarch's preference appears to be with the Greek.  
 This returns us to the synkrisis of Pelopidas and Marcellus. Plutarch's full 
treatment of the two leaders' generalship is more than twice the length of the two 
passages quoted earlier, so a summary of all the arguments he makes will help to put his 
points in order. Firstly, Marcellus routed a much larger number with a small number of 
horsemen, while Pelopidas failed in a similar battle and paid with his life (Pel.-Marc. 
1.2); Pelopidas' victories at Tegyra and Leuctra can be compared with Marcellus’ 
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victory, and Marcellus accomplished nothing by stealth or cunning to match Pelopidas' 
slaying of the tyrants of Thebes (Pel.-Marc. 1.3); Hannibal was a great adversary of the 
Romans, but so was Sparta for the Thebans (Pel.-Marc. 1.4); Pelopidas' victories at 
Tegyra and Leuctra are fact, but Polybius says that Marcellus never actually defeated 
Hannibal in battle (Pel.-Marc. 1.4); Plutarch agrees with many other authors that 
Marcellus achieved many small victories against Hannibal, even though they had little 
effect on the outcome of the war (Pel.-Marc. 1.5); Marcellus gave the Romans the 
courage to stand up to Hannibal and keep fighting despite their many defeats (Pel.-Marc. 
1.6-7); Pelopidas never lost a battle and Marcellus won more victories, and this makes 
them equal (Pel.-Marc. 2.1); Pelopidas failed to take Sparta, but Marcellus captured 
Syracuse (Pel.-Marc. 2.1); failing to take Sparta is more impressive than capturing 
Sicily, unless Epaminondas deserves credit for the Theban victories, because Marcellus 
took Syracuse, defeated the Gauls, and stood up to Hannibal all on his own (Pel.-Marc. 
2.2). Plutarch's comparison of military leadership in this synkrisis is likely more 
convoluted than that in any other. A few, such as the Lysander-Sulla or Agesilaus-
Pompey, are longer, but neither of those addresses as many different aspects of 
generalship, or alternates which man is favored so often as this one. The difficulty in 
choosing the superior general should not lead the reader to trust too much in Plutarch's 
statement of their equality in victories at Pel.-Marc. 2.1; rather, one should apply that 
balance only to that particular aspect of their generalship. Plutarch does not always 
explicitly name the superior general, but it has been possible to determine one in all of 
the other synkriseis, so there is no reason to suppose that Plutarch would not expect his 
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readers to also pass judgment on one of these men. The equality at Pel.-Marc. 2.1 just 
means that the comparison will not hinge on Pelopidas' invincibility or Marcellus' 
greater number of victories, but on a different aspect of their generalship. Which aspect 
that is, in this case, will be up to the individual reader; Plutarch has provided many 
options, but the decision will likely come down to the final point. If the reader agrees 
with Plutarch's estimation of the strengths of Sparta and Sicily he will likely judge 
Pelopidas to be the better general; if, however, the reader disagrees with that, or believes 
that Epaminondas was the one truly responsible for the Theban victories, he will favor 
Marcellus. The decision could go either way, but it seems more convincing to find in 
favor of Marcellus. Plutarch introduces doubt in the final point about Pelopidas' 
responsibility for the battle at Leuctra, which invites the reader to think back about the 
preceding Life. Plutarch praises Pelopidas' role in the battle, but does not deny in the end 
that it was Epaminondas who was the commanding general and responsible for the plan 
that led to Theban victory (Pel. 23). Moreover, given Plutarch's positive feelings about 
Epaminondas, it is likely that he would agree with giving him more credit for the Theban 
victories. In the end, as we have seen throughout the synkriseis, Plutarch values personal 
responsibility for victories quite highly when comparing two generals, and if Marcellus 
won his greatest victories on his own then he should be considered to be a greater 
general. 
Plutarch wrote his synkriseis in order that his reader would compare the subjects 
from the preceding Lives and determine who was more praiseworthy in a variety of 
subjects. The man whom Plutarch favors – and would expect his reader to favor – in any 
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particular aspect is not always readily apparent, but by applying Plutarch's judgments 
from the more straightforward synkriseis we have been able to identify the better general 
in every synkrisis which discusses military leadership. It is safe to say that Plutarch 
judges the Greek general superior to his Roman counterpart in two-thirds of the 
synkriseis: Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Agesilaus, Dion, Timoleon, Eumenes, 
Demetrius, Cleomenes, and Philopoemen are the superior Greeks, while Publicola, Cato, 
Lucullus, Sulla, and Marcellus are the praiseworthy Romans. It is of course unlikely that 
Plutarch meant this discrepancy as a larger commentary that Greeks made better 
generals than Romans.251 Just as he considers each theme in the synkriseis and each 
aspect of generalship separately, he likely considered each pair to stand on its own, even 
if it was composed at the same time as others.252 Given the rhetorical nature of the 
synkriseis, attempting to discern Plutarch’s judgments about military leadership in them 
is an appropriate task, and one that has illustrated many parallels between the synkriseis 
and the military narratives in the Lives themselves. That being said, it is important not to 
read too much into which man Plutarch judges more highly in any particular synkrisis. 
Just because Plutarch may rate one general lower than another in the pair in no way 
means that his generalship was not worthy of praise, study, or imitation. Many of the 
criteria Plutarch uses to compare generals, as we have seen, are quite subjective, and in 
nearly all circumstances are ultimately down to interpretation. The act of forming 
judgments from the synkriseis, in my opinion, is important for its own sake, because it 
                                                 
251 For the Parallel Lives as a form of cultural resistance: Duff (1999), 301-309; Whitmarsh (2001), 117 
ff.; Goldhill (2002), 254 ff.  
252 Pelling (2002), 1-44, argues convincingly that Plutarch wrote most of the Civil War Lives concurrently.  
   
160 
 
compels the reader to re-evaluate his own views on generalship. This self-reflection, in 
turn, improves the reader’s own understanding of the subject. 
The Unity of the Lives and Synkriseis 
The synkriseis, however, and the judgments within them, do not stand on their 
own. In an extensive recent article, Timothy Duff argues for the unity of the Plutarchan 
“book”, and that the prologue, Lives, and synkrisis, although clearly distinct units, 
should be read together as a whole.253 This encompasses both a structural unity and a 
thematic one. The Theseus-Romulus is widely recognized as the best example of this 
thematic unity: Plutarch lists six reasons for comparing the two leaders in the prologue, 
addresses those parallels within the two Lives, and then directly compares Theseus and 
Romulus according to five of those six themes in the synkrisis.254 The synkrisis of the 
Theseus-Romulus is rare for following the themes of its prologue and narrative so 
precisely, and Larmour attributes the close thematic unity of the pair to Plutarch feeling 
less constrained by a need for historical accuracy.255 Most pairs, however, while not as 
polished and precise as the Theseus-Romulus, demonstrate at least some consistency 
between synkrisis and Lives. We have examined the potential that synkriseis provide by 
their focus on comparison and judgment, but have at the same time seen the difficulties 
of gaining much insight into Plutarch's understanding of generalship from the limited 
format of the synkriseis alone. Some of the judgments of military leadership in the 
                                                 
253 Duff (2011). 
254 See Wardman (1974), 238; Larmour (1988); Duff (1999), 258; Duff (2010), 239-40, 254; for more 
discussion of the Theseus-Romulus. 
255 Larmour (1988), 361-2. 
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synkriseis are based on so little that it is not unreasonable to question how well those 
judgments follow from the details in the preceding Lives. It is worthwhile to investigate, 
then, whether the thematic unity of the Plutarchan book that Duff proposes is equally 
valid for Plutarch's depiction of generalship. In the remainder of this chapter I intend to 
examine one of Plutarch's more limited comparisons of generalship in the synkriseis 
alongside the Lives which it follows and assess the consistency of Plutarch's depiction of 
generalship across the books as a whole.  
 My focus in this section is on the Demetrius-Antony, which contains one of the 
briefest comparisons of military careers in the synkriseis. We have already seen that 
there is some level of consistency between Plutarch's judgment in the synkrisis and the 
Lives: Plutarch names Demetrius the better general in the synkrisis because he was more 
responsible for his victories than Antony (Dem.-Ant. 5.2), and Plutarch declares that “it 
was generally said of Antony” that he won his best successes through the agency of his 
generals in Antony's Life (Ant. 34.5-6). This agreement between Life and synkrisis is 
encouraging, but does little to change the appearance that Plutarch bases his entire 
comparison of the generalship of these two men on a single sentence from the one of the 
Lives.256 The lack of detail about generalship in the synkrisis, however, appears to belie 
the treatment of the subject in the Lives themselves. In the Demetrius, Plutarch portrays 
the military career of the Macedonian king as a turbulent one. His first taste of command 
                                                 
256 This is not the only instance where Plutarch assigns a surprising amount of importance in the synkrisis 
to a brief point in one of the preceding Lives. Plutarch glosses over Fabius' single παρατάξεως battle, 
which he compares in the synkrisis to Pericles' nine, in a single sentence at the beginning of Fabius' Life 
(Fab. 2.1); similarly, Tiberius' taking of the walls of Carthage, which Plutarch compares with Cleomenes' 
many victories, is in an equally obscure passage in the Life and does not even mention Carthage by name 
(Tib. 4.4-5).  
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unfortunately came against Ptolemy in Syria, and Demetrius suffered a convincing 
defeat; however, Plutarch says that despite his inexperience he acted like a “dignified 
general acquainted with reversals of fortunes” and immediately began rebuilding his 
army (Dem. 5.6).257 Demetrius certainly endured several reversals in his military 
fortunes over the course of his career, and Plutarch balances his brief mentions of many 
of Demetrius’ successes with more detailed descriptions of Demetrius’ more high-profile 
losses, such as his failed siege of Rhodes (Dem. 21-22), his defeat at the battle of Issus 
(Dem. 28-29), and the loss of his entire army to the generalship of Agathocles (Dem. 
46.3-5) and Seleucus (Dem. 49.1-3).  
 Plutarch's characterization of Demetrius' military career in the Life does not 
contradict the synkrisis. Demetrius was very much involved in his campaigns, to what 
one could easily call an excessive degree; not only did he personally take part in the 
assaults of cities, twice leading to severe injury, but he also led the successful yet 
reckless cavalry charge that led to his defeat at Ipsus. For Plutarch, Demetrius' most 
impressive victory was likely his defeat of Ptolemy in the naval battle off Cyprus. 
Plutarch describes it as a “fair and brilliant” victory (Dem. 17.1), and his description of 
the battle shows Demetrius making quick tactical decisions and leading the decisive 
charge. Demetrius was indeed “the author of his successes” (Dem.-Ant. 5.5), as well as 
his failures.  
 It is time now to turn to the Antony. According to Plutarch, Antony showed great 
promise early in his career. He took part in campaigns in Egypt as Master of Horse under 
                                                 
257 ἐμβριθοῦς στρατηγοῦ κεχρημένου πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς (Dem. 5.6). 
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Gabinius, and demonstrated “many deeds of bold and perceptive leadership” on several 
occasions, especially when he completely outflanked an enemy army (Ant. 3.9-10).258 
The first time Plutarch describes Antony in command of an army is at Mutina, a battle 
which he lost to the combined forces of Pansa and Hirtius (Ant. 17). He recovered from 
his initial defeat as well as Demetrius, however, and managed to gain control of Lepidus' 
camp by subverting his soldiers (Ant. 18). The description of Philippi is an important 
one for our understanding of Antony's generalship. Plutarch initially claims that Antony 
was “everywhere victorious and successful” in the battle (Ant. 22.1). His description of 
the first day of the battle follows:  
τῇ μέν γε προτέρᾳ μάχῃ Καῖσαρ ὑπὸ Βρούτου κατὰ κράτος ἡττηθείς, ἀπέβαλε τὸ 
στρατόπεδον καὶ μικρὸν ἔφθη τοὺς διώκοντας ὑπεκφυγών· ὡς δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς 
ὑπομνήμασι γέγραφε, τῶν φίλων τινὸς ὄναρ ἰδόντος ἀνεχώρησε πρὸ τῆς μάχης.  
Ἀντώνιος δὲ Κάσσιον ἐνίκησε· καίτοι γεγράφασιν ἔνιοι μὴ παραγενέσθαι τῇ μάχῃ τὸν 
Ἀντώνιον, ἀλλὰ προσγενέσθαι μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἤδη διώκουσι (Ant. 22.2-3). 
 
In the earlier battle, at least, Caesar was defeated by the strength of Brutus, lost his 
camp, and barely escaped his pursuers by fleeing; although he himself wrote in his 
Memoirs that he withdrew before the battle after hearing of a friend's dream. But Antony 
conquered Cassius; although some have written that Antony was not present at the 
battle, but came up after the battle when his men were already in pursuit.  
 
We have here a number of conflicting accounts of the battle. The first shows Antony 
successful and his temporary colleague utterly routed. Plutarch then cites Octavian's 
memoirs and other unnamed sources that place both Octavian and Antony away from the 
battle, which, if true, would wipe away the glory of Antony's victory and the shame of 
Octavian's defeat.259 Plutarch does not seem to favor either of these alternate stories, 
                                                 
258 πολλὰ καὶ τόλμης ἔργα καὶ προνοίας ἡγεμονικῆς ἀποδειξάμενος (Ant. 3.9). 
259 See Pelling (1988), 26 for Plutarch's use of Octavian's memoirs. As is clear in this passage, Plutarch did 
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however, so his primary account supports his claim of Antony's successes in the 
battle.260 As Pelling notes, Plutarch's comment about Antony's use of his subordinates to 
gain successes (Ant. 34.5) sets up a contrast with the subsequent Parthian campaign, in 
which Antony plays a major role.261 Antony's impressive preparations for the Parthian 
War (Ant. 35.1, 37.3, 38.2) echo Demetrius' penchant for building ships and siege 
engines, but Plutarch criticizes Antony's management of the campaign, blaming his haste 
on a desire to return to Cleopatra (Ant. 38.1). Despite this, however, Plutarch portrays 
Antony's actions during the campaign in a positive light, especially when he saved the 
whole army from defeat after the overzealous actions of one of his commanders (Ant. 
42-3), and Antony was still an inspiring figure for his soldiers (Ant. 43.2). In his 
summation of the campaign, Plutarch attributes to Antony eighteen victories, and lays 
the reason for defeat not on Antony but on his lack of skilled horsemen to pursue the 
fleeing Parthians and capitalize on his successes (Ant. 50.1-2). 
 Like Demetrius, then, Antony's military career was mixed. He had his successes, 
both as soldier and commander, he acquitted himself well during the failed Parthian 
campaign, and Plutarch gives him the benefit of the doubt at Philippi. He lost at Mutina 
and Actium, however, and it is true that his subordinate Ventidius, who avenged Crassus 
in the eyes of the Romans (Ant. 34.2) and was the only man up to Plutarch's time to 
                                                 
not seem to have been notably biased by his use of the source and does not necessarily take Octavian's 
version of events as fact.  
260 Pelling (1988), 172. Pelling notes that Plutarch presents Antony's absence as truth during his longer 
description of Philippi in Brut. 42.3, but that this slanderous account possibly derives from Livy or 
Messalla. Appian BC 4.110-12 describes Antony as being active in the fighting and responsible for the 
final victory.  
261 Pelling (1988), 212.  
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celebrate a triumph over the Parthians (Ant. 34.5), achieved much greater success against 
the Parthians than Antony did.262 Upon closer inspection, then, the Antony supports 
Plutarch's judgment of their generalship in the synkrisis as much as the Demetrius does: 
Antony gained credit for many victories that he was not responsible for, while Demetrius 
was actively involved in all of his battles, and for Plutarch that is enough to judge in 
favor of Demetrius. While the Lives may support the synkrisis, however, the limited 
comparison of their generalship in the synkrisis is even more disappointing and 
surprising after reading their respective Lives. Firstly, the comparison is more a 
judgment of their military careers rather than their generalship itself; not being present at 
the battles of Ventidius, Sossius, or Canidius does not detract from Antony's actual 
abilities as a general, and is merely the symptom of achieving such a level of power and 
responsibility as he did in the last days of the Republic. Secondly, the Lives illuminate a 
number of additional (or alternate) ways that Plutarch might have contrasted the military 
abilities of the two men. That both Lives have a maritime theme is widely 
acknowledged, and the comparison of their experiences as naval commanders would be 
a straightforward one: Demetrius won his most brilliant success in his naval battle 
against Ptolemy near Cyprus (Dem. 16), whereas Antony's naval defeat at Actium 
spelled the end of his military fortunes (Ant. 64-67).263 Plutarch might also have 
compared how each man's vices affected his military campaigns, as he makes clear 
                                                 
262 Plutarch also cites two more of Antony's commanders, Sossius and Canidius, for respective victories in 
Syria and Iberia (Ant. 34.6).  
263 See Pelling (1988), 22 on the maritime theme of the Demetrius-Anthony. Plutarch makes a similar 
comparison at Cor.-Alc. 1.2, where he claims that Alcibiades' successes at sea as well as on land show him 
to be a more well-rounded general. 
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statements on the subject in both Lives: Demetrius left his luxurious life behind him 
while on campaign (Dem. 19.3), but Antony let his desire to be with Cleopatra distract 
him from his initial management of the Parthian campaign (Ant. 38.1). Either one of 
these would have been a much more satisfying method of comparison in the synkrisis, 
building as they do on the themes of the Lives, while providing more of a comment on 
the actual generalship of the two men and still favoring Demetrius.  
 The discussion of generalship in this synkrisis may be disappointing, but it is not 
completely superfluous. Plutarch's judgment of Demetrius and Antony's military careers, 
as limited as it may be, still engages the reader and invites him to think back to the 
preceding Lives and consider other aspects of their generalship. And while Plutarch's 
judgment of the two seems to be based on their careers rather than their actual abilities, 
his narrative is skillful enough that his favored Demetrius still appears to be the superior 
general. Antony has his strengths, most notably the much stronger relationship with his 
soldiers that his boldness and care engendered.264 Plutarch's narrative of Demetrius' 
career, however, highlights the general's ability to recover from defeats, his competency 
on land and sea, and the many victories he earned against the other Hellenistic kings. 
The judgment in the synkrisis in Demetrius' favor, even if it only acknowledges their 
military careers, is equally valid when compared to their actual abilities as generals.  
 While there is consistency between Plutarch's depiction of generalship in the 
Lives of Demetrius and Antony and their attendant synkrisis, the synkrisis itself adds few 
                                                 
264 Especially Ant. 18, when he takes over Lepidus' camp, and Ant. 43.2 during the Parthian campaign, in 
contrast to Demetrius' soldiers deserting him to Pyrrhus and Seleucus (Dem. 44, 49.1-3). 
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factual details to our understanding of the generalship of the two men. The comparison 
of their generalship in the Lives themselves is clear, and the short judgment of their 
careers at the end of the synkrisis still appears to be little more of an afterthought. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that by its nature the synkrisis promotes a more complete 
understanding of the military leadership of the two men than is possible through reading 
the individual Lives alone. The small contrasts in the military careers of Demetrius and 
Anthony, for instance, are easy to overlook in the Lives themselves because of both the 
frequent parallels between them and the numerous other themes that make up each Life. 
The synkrisis, however, by its brief but direct judgment of their military careers, prompts 
the reader to re-examine the details of Demetrius’ and Anthony’s campaigns and to 
evaluate whether they agree with Plutarch’s own analysis. This can in turn be applied, as 
we have seen, to every synkrisis that addresses the military leadership of its subjects.  
 
Conclusion 
 It is not a surprise that the synkriseis contain only a limited treatment of the 
military careers of their subjects, as the details, of course, belong in the Lives 
themselves. The synkriseis are only one small part of the Parallel Lives, and so our 
picture of generalship from the synkriseis will be a correspondingly small one; yet 
however small, it must not be dismissed. The formal synkriseis that conclude most pairs 
of Lives often contain significant comparisons of their subjects’ generalship across a 
range of criteria. These comparisons demonstrate the degree to which Plutarch analyzed 
his subjects’ actions on the battlefield, and serve to reinforce the more detailed examples 
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of effective generalship found in the preceding pairs. Throughout this chapter, we have 
seen that Plutarch’s judgments frequently revolve around the more intangible aspects of 
military leadership. Simple measures like the number or scale of victories certainly play 
a part of the comparison between some generals, as in the Pelopidas-Marcellus or 
Pericles-Fabius Maximus. More frequently, however, Plutarch considers less 
quantifiable measures, such as the foresight of Pericles and Fabius Maximus or how 
much Philopoemen or Flamininus are personally responsible for the success of their 
armies. The synkriseis provide an opportunity to understand Plutarch’s own thought-
process in a way not often possible in the Lives themselves. 
 More importantly than what we as modern readers can learn about generalship 
from the concluding synkriseis, however, is the impact that these comparisons would 
have had on Plutarch’s contemporary audience. By demonstrating that Plutarch was 
actively engaged in judging the superiority or inferiority of his subjects’ abilities and 
career based on their actions, the synkriseis implicitly encourages his readers to do the 
same. Plutarch does not always name one general to be superior to the other in a pair, 
but his explicit judgments are clear and consistent enough that one can accurately apply 
them to pairs which otherwise appear to be equal. As discussed above, these formal 
synkriseis were a common rhetorical technique at the time, and Plutarch’s readers would 
have been very familiar with reading or even composing these types of formalized 
comparisons. The process of making the judgments between generals that Plutarch 
encourages in the synkriseis requires that the reader both re-examine the preceding Lives 
and reflect on what he himself considers to be effective military leadership. Whether or 
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not the reader comes to the same conclusions as Plutarch (when such conclusions are 
even known), the process involved in judging specific acts of generalship is a significant 
aspect of the self-improvement that Plutarch expected from his readers of the Parallel 
Lives. Even if there is little of immediate value to an aspiring general in a particular pair, 
the evaluation prompted by the concluding synkriseis is nevertheless a valuable learning 
experience and integral to a successful reading of the Parallel Lives. 
  




Case Study of the Pyrrhus-Marius 
 
 Over the previous chapters, I have examined Plutarch’s treatment of military 
narrative, military education, and the use of deception in the Parallel Lives, and have 
observed how Plutarch uses both internal and concluding synkriseis to effectively 
compare the military leadership of his subjects. In this chapter, I apply these themes to 
the examination of military leadership in a single pair: the Pyrrhus-Marius. Pyrrhus and 
Marius were neither the most famous nor the most successful generals to feature in the 
Parallel Lives: Alexander and Caesar are surely their superiors in both of these respects. 
Nevertheless, there is arguably no other pair of statesmen in the Lives so defined by their 
military accomplishments as Pyrrhus and Marius. Plutarch appropriately dedicates a 
significant amount of space in both Lives to the detailed narratives of his subjects' most 
important military campaigns, through which it is possible to trace many themes that 
provide a more nuanced interpretation of the pair than is usually seen. 
 In terms of its moral message, the Pyrrhus-Marius is an uncomplicated pair: both  
caution strongly against the dangers of excessive hope, greed, and ambition.265 The first 
third of the Pyrrhus covers the Epirote's struggles to secure his small kingdom and 
expand it into Macedon. Although he achieves initial success against Demetrius, Pyrrhus 
is soon driven back to Epirus by Lysimachus, another opportunistic Hellenistic king. It is 
                                                 
265 Esp. Pyrrh. 13.1-2, 14.1-14, 26.1; Mar. 2.4, 28.1-2, 34.6, 45.11-12. See Duff (1999), 101-130; Buszard 
(2002). 
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at this point that Pyrrhus has the opportunity to live a quiet, comfortable life as king of 
Epirus, a point which Plutarch makes clear in a dialogue between Pyrrhus and his 
adviser Cineas.266 Instead, Pyrrhus accepts an invitation from Tarentum to assist the city 
against the encroachment of Rome, and sails to Italy on the first of a series of 
progressively unsuccessful campaigns. After nominal victories against the Romans at 
Herculaneum and Asculum, Pyrrhus is left with such a depleted force that he crosses 
over to Sicily to take advantage of a seemingly easier opportunity for glory. In Sicily, 
Pyrrhus is once again unable to consolidate his initial gains, and is forced to retreat to 
Italy after alienating his allies; a disastrous battle against the Romans at Beneventum 
then drives Pyrrhus back to Greece. Still unable to endure peace, Pyrrhus launches yet 
another campaign, this time against Antigonus Gonatas, which follows the same pattern 
as the others. Finally, after a successful battle against Antigonus, Pyrrhus attempts to 
capture Sparta while its king and army are absent, but is driven back by its small 
garrison, losing one of his sons in the process. Pyrrhus meets his own end shortly 
thereafter: when Antigonus refuses to engage him in another pitched battle, Pyrrhus 
attacks the city of Argos instead, but is killed in the confused street-to-street fighting 
which ensues. Pyrrhus' fortunes are cyclical. Throughout the Life, every success is 
followed by a defeat that leaves him in a worse position than he started from.  
 The Marius, on the other hand, follows a different pattern. In contrast to the 
constant fluctuations of Pyrrhus' life, Marius' career, as Plutarch describes it, centers on 
                                                 
266 See Duff (1999), 112-3 for a detailed discussion of the significance of this passage to the rest of the 
Pyrrhus.  
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a single dramatic change of fortune. Marius begins his political career after earning the 
favor of Scipio while serving under him in Spain, and eventually gains a reputation for 
being a staunch defender of Rome for his actions as tribune and his victory over 
Jugurtha. Marius' subsequent defeat of the invading Germanic tribes increases his 
popularity and influence even more, and leads to five successive consulships. Even after 
achieving such unparalleled success, however, Marius is not satisfied; as Plutarch 
succinctly puts it, “he desired his sixth consulship more than anyone desired their first” 
(Mar. 28.1). It was this unrelenting ambition that leads to his ultimate downfall and 
disgrace: not only does Marius ally with dubious politicians like Saturninus and 
Sulpicius in order to oppose the nobles, but he also becomes cowardly in public affairs 
because of his desperation to please the multitude. From this point on Marius' career 
suffers a steady decline, and even further military success during the Social War is 
unable to counteract the damage from his frequent political failures. Marius' ambition to 
gain the command of the subsequent war against Mithridates, even after giving up his 
command at the end of the Social War due to his physical infirmities, drives him into an 
even greater downward spiral. Despite having achieved a seventh consulship shortly 
before his death – admittedly through no political acumen of his own – Marius dies 
discontented and delusional, believing that he had finally achieved the command which 
he so coveted (Mar. 45.10).  
 Although the danger of excessive ambition and discontent is Plutarch's main 
ethical focus in the pair, the military leadership of both Pyrrhus and Marius plays a 
central role in both Lives. For one, the generalship of Pyrrhus and Marius contributes 
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much to the characterization of both men. Relatively early in the Pyrrhus, Plutarch 
explains that Pyrrhus showed no interest in anything except the art of generalship, which 
Pyrrhus saw as the only pursuit worth of a king (Pyrrh. 8.3). Pyrrhus’ scholarly yet 
blinkered focus on military matters is an important theme in the Life: most significantly, 
it prevents him from putting his actions into perspective, a problem particularly clear in 
his conversation with his adviser Cineas, and ultimately leads to him jumping from one 
ill-fated military campaign to another.267 While in the end it is Pyrrhus' ambition that 
leads to his lack of real success and untimely death, Plutarch makes clear parallels 
between Pyrrhus' ambition and his excessive focus on military matters throughout the 
Life. Just as with Pyrrhus, much of Plutarch's early characterization of Marius revolves 
around the Roman's warlike nature and military education. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Marius' lack of a political education left him with a harsh temper, and he displayed a 
strong distaste for the study of Greek language and literature (Mar. 2.1-2). Although 
Marius' outstanding military achievements gave him the opportunity to retire from 
public life at the height of his influence and reputation, his absolute focus on military 
affairs without the benefit of a rounded education meant that he continued to pursue 
opportunities for military glory until his ignoble death. 
 While their militaristic natures do have a demonstrably negative impact on their 
respective lives, at the same time, as we shall see, it is in the military sphere that both 
Pyrrhus and Marius demonstrate their greatest virtue. Pyrrhus established a great 
reputation for his generalship among the Hellenistic kingdoms from an early age, and his 
                                                 
267 See n. 264, above. See also pp. 73-76 for the impact on excessive military education in Greek Lives. 
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physical courage and prowess in battle drew comparisons to Homeric heroes. Marius, as 
well, was at his best on the battlefield, and protected Rome from a potentially 
catastrophic Germanic invasion. It is this contrast between failure and success, as it is 
played out on the battlefield, that will form an important theme in this chapter. I will 
examine Plutarch's portrayal of each of their major military campaigns in turn, and 
identify how each of these victories or defeats reflects on the respective general's 
military leadership. Over the course of each Life, it becomes clear that Plutarch 
identifies both Pyrrhus and Marius as exemplifying a particular and contrasting style of 
military leadership: while Pyrrhus practiced a heroic and personal style of generalship in 
which his own fighting ability played an integral part, Marius' leadership was 
characterized by effective preparation and planning rather than the direct intervention of 
the general. Although Plutarch does not explicitly pass judgment on either of these styles 
of generalship, I will argue that a combined reading of the Pyrrhus-Marius calls into 
question the validity of Pyrrhus' vaunted military reputation and clearly portrays Marius 
as the superior general.  
 
Pyrrhus' Military Leadership 
From the beginning of the Pyrrhus, Plutarch builds up high expectations of 
Pyrrhus' military ability. Pyrrhus acquits himself well while fighting under Demetrius at 
the Battle of Ipsus (Pyrrh. 4.3), and when he later comes into conflict with Demetrius in 
Macedonia he defeats Demetrius' general Pantauchus in single combat (Pyrrh. 7.4-5).268 
                                                 
268 This fight is the first of many in the Pyrrhus that contains clear Homeric parallels. See Mossman 
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Plutarch uses Pyrrhus' victory against Pantauchus as an opportunity to focus on Pyrrhus' 
generalship. As mentioned above, Plutarch observes that Pyrrhus dedicated a significant 
portion of his time to studying military affairs: 
τῆς δὲ περὶ τάξεις καὶ στρατηγίας ἐπιστήμης αὐτοῦ καὶ δεινότητος ἔνεστι δείγματα 
λαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων ἃ περὶ τούτων ἀπολέλοιπε. … καὶ ὅλως τοῦτο μελετῶν ἔοικε 
καὶ φιλοσοφῶν ἀεὶ διατελεῖν ὁ Πύρρος, ὡς μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατον (Pyrrh. 8.4, 8.6). 
 
Concerning his knowledge of and shrewdness in arranging and commanding troops, it is 
possible to acquire evidence from the writings on the subjects that he left behind. … 
And really, Pyrrhus always seemed to continue to be studying and attending to this 
subject, considering it to be the most kingly branch of learning. 
 
There are several important points here. First of all, as discussed in Chapter 2, Plutarch’s 
vocabulary in this passage (ἐπιστήμης, φιλοσοφῶν, μαθημάτων) suggests a decidedly 
academic interest in military affairs, something not seen to the same degree in any other 
Life.269 This further builds the audience’s expectations of great military achievements 
from Pyrrhus in the future, coming immediately on the heels of his victory over 
Pantauchus: not only was he physically powerful in battle, but he was well-versed in the 
arts of generalship as well. However, I would suggest that this passage is actually more 
ambiguous than it initially seems. First of all, this appears to be a mere statement of fact 
rather than explicit praise of Pyrrhus' knowledge of generalship: Plutarch does not 
actually qualify the degree of Pyrrhus' experience or ability, he just says that it exists. 
More strikingly, perhaps, is that even though the rest of the Life is filled with narrative 
                                                 
(1992), 95; Fenik (1968).  
269 While Philopoemen expressed a similar interest in military education and writings, Plutarch attributes 
to Philopoemen a greater interest in observation and practice than literary pursuits, and the description of 
Philopoemen’s military education lacks the same specific vocabulary of learning that is seen here. See pp. 
65-76, above, for a discussion of Plutarch’s conception of military education. 
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of Pyrrhus' most important military campaigns, Plutarch directs the reader to look for 
proof of Pyrrhus' military abilities in his writings rather than his actions.270 One would 
expect that if Pyrrhus was as knowledgeable about military tactics and leadership as 
Plutarch implies, the reader would be able to see proof of it in his actions as well; as we 
shall see, however, Plutarch may have had good reason to direct the reader to examine 
his writings rather than his actions. It could well be, of course, that Plutarch points 
toward Pyrrhus’ writings to further the point made by the vocabulary that Pyrrhus had a 
particularly academic interest in the subject. Either way, by focusing so much on 
Pyrrhus’ study of the subject, Plutarch appears to be implying that Pyrrhus had difficulty 
applying his knowledge to real-world situations. 
 Nevertheless, Plutarch follows his statement of Pyrrhus’ interest in military 
affairs by relating the contemporary consensus of Pyrrhus' military abilities. Macedonian 
soldiers, Plutarch says, greatly admired Pyrrhus, and compared his swiftness and 
strength in battle to Alexander.271 Plutarch then quotes two generals who are also full of 
praise for Pyrrhus' abilities: “It is said also that Antigonus, when asked who was the best 
general, replied, “Pyrrhus, if he lives to be old” (Pyrrh. 8.5).272 This verdict of Antigonus 
applied only to his contemporaries. Hannibal, however, declared that the foremost of all 
generals in experience and ability was Pyrrhus, that Scipio was second, and he himself 
                                                 
270 Plutarch is referring to Pyrrhus' Hypomnemata, which he cites again after the battle of Asculum at 
21.12. The Hypomnemata are not extant, and our only other account of the work comes from Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus (A.R. 20.10; FgrH 229.1). See Leveque (1957), 20; Buszard (2002), 108.  
271 The frequent connections between Pyrrhus and Alexander in the Pyrrhus have received considerable 
attention, particularly by Mossman (1992) and Buszard (2008). I will discuss the significance of these 
connections with regard to their similar military leadership later in the chapter. 
272 Although Plutarch does not specify which Antigonus this quote comes from, I agree with Buszard that 
it is most likely Antigonus Monopthalmos. See Buszard (2002), 109 n.122. 
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third, as I have written in my Life of Scipio” (Pyrrh. 8.5). While this praise initially 
appears impressive, on further examination it is problematic. Buszard has observed that 
the comparison to Alexander's military ability draws attention to the fact that Pyrrhus 
lacked many of the other positive traits that characterized Alexander, particularly his 
self-control and rationality.273 Buszard has also suggested that the qualification in 
Antigonus' praise, “if he lives”, implies that Antigonus saw the character flaws that 
would lead to Pyrrhus' untimely death.274 I would argue that the quotation from Hannibal 
raises an even larger question about Pyrrhus' generalship, because it is noticeably 
different than other extant accounts of the story; not only do Livy and Appian give a 
conflicting record of the conversation between Scipio and Hannibal, but Plutarch 
himself does so as well in the Flamininus. In the version found in these three sources, 
Hannibal rates Alexander the greatest general in history, Pyrrhus the second greatest, and 
himself third.275 Whether this was an innocent mistake of Plutarch's based on conflicting 
sources or an intentional alteration is, of course, impossible to know, especially since the 
Scipio, in which Plutarch claims to have also included the anecdote, is not extant. I 
would suggest, however, that this is indeed a case of Plutarch changing a familiar story 
to better suit this particular Life.276 The most telling piece of evidence for this, to my 
mind, is the absence of Alexander from Hannibal's list. If Plutarch were simply repeating 
the same story found in Livy and the Flamininus, it is almost inconceivable that Plutarch 
                                                 
273 Buszard (2008), 200.  
274 Buszard (2002), 108-110.  
275 Flam. 5; Livy 9.16.19 ff.; Appian Syr. 2.10. 
276 Cf. Pelling (1980); Larmour (1992); for Plutarch's adaptation and manipulation of his source material.  
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could have momentarily forgotten Alexander, whose specter is so prevalent throughout 
the Pyrrhus.277 Even if Plutarch is actually discussing a different story than the one 
which appears in other sources by qualifying the generals as 'best in experience and 
ability', rather than just 'the best', there is no way that Alexander would not be at the top 
of those categories as well. I would suggest, rather, that Plutarch's alteration of this 
anecdote is meant to make the reader question this praise from Hannibal. Throughout the 
Pyrrhus, as we will see, there is a frequent disconnect between the praise of Pyrrhus' 
military ability by his contemporaries and Pyrrhus' actual military accomplishments. It is 
in this chapter, particularly through the references to Antigonus and Hannibal, that 
Plutarch first introduces this important theme. Buszard points out that the two generals 
that Plutarch cites regarding Pyrrhus' generalship were themselves both defeated in 
battle, and that this suggests that Pyrrhus' military ability, like their own, would not be 
enough on its own to guarantee success.278 I would further argue that the failures of these 
two generals, along with the ambiguities in the anecdotes themselves, actually call into 
question the real effectiveness of Pyrrhus' generalship. Antigonus' praise contains the 
important qualification “if he lives”, and Hannibal's praise, particularly because of its 
inconsistencies with other versions of the story and because of the absence of Alexander 
from his list of history's best generals, appears to be ingenuine.  
 Plutarch's introduction to Pyrrhus' generalship, then, is troubling on two levels. 
Firstly, Plutarch refuses to pass his own judgment on Pyrrhus' military abilities, instead 
                                                 
277 See above, n. 271.  
278 Buszard (2002), 109-110. 
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directing the reader to examine examples of it on his own. Plutarch's refusal to comment 
directly on Pyrrhus' generalship contrasts strongly with a similar passage in the Caesar, 
in which he lavishes praise on Caesar's military abilities: he says that Caesar “showed 
himself as good a warrior and commander as any of history's greatest and most respected 
generals” (Caes. 15.2). There is no ambiguity here, and no reliance on the opinions of 
others, much unlike the passage from Pyrrhus. That Plutarch instead focuses on 
contemporary opinions of Pyrrhus' generalship would not be problematic on its own, if 
the anecdotes themselves did not pose such difficulties. However, because the anecdotes 
from Antigonus and Hannibal cast doubt on to both Pyrrhus' lasting potential and the 
validity of such praises in general, this introduction of Pyrrhus' generalship is not as 
positive as it might immediately seem. 
 The reader's first chance to truly observe Pyrrhus' generalship comes during his 
battle against the Romans at Herculaneum. While still waiting for reinforcements from 
Tarentum, Pyrrhus encamped his army near Herculaneum, and went to observe the 
disposition of the Roman army stationed on the other side of the river Siris. Famously, 
Pyrrhus was both amazed and discomfited by the discipline of the soldiers and the order 
of the camp, as he expected the Romans to be little more than barbarians.279 Wishing to 
preempt the arrival of Pyrrhus' allies, the Romans soon crossed the river in force despite 
the guard that Pyrrhus had left, and Pyrrhus was obliged to give battle (Pyrrh. 16.8-10). 
Plutarch depicts Pyrrhus in glowing terms at the beginning of the battle:  
                                                 
279 Mossman (2005) has a detailed discussion of this early meeting between Greeks and Romans, and 
examines its significance both for the Pyrrhus-Marius and Plutarch's methodology in the rest of the 
Parallel Lives.  
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καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἔργοις οὐκ ἀποδέουσαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀρετῆς, μάλιστα δ' ὅτι 
τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τὸ σῶμα παρέχων τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ τοὺς καθ'αὑτὸν ἀμυνόμενος ἐρρωμένως, 
οὐ συνεχεῖτο τὸν λογισμὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξέπιπτεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν ἐφορῶν 
διεκυβέρνα τὸν πόλεμον, αὐτὸς μεταθέων ἑκασταχόσε καὶ παραβοηθῶν τοῖς 
ἐκβιάζεσθαι δοκοῦσιν (Pyrrh. 16.11). 
 
He showed by his deeds that his excellence was not inferior to his fame; and this most of 
all because, while offering his hands and body in the fight and vigorously repelling his 
assailants, he did not confuse his calculations nor lose his presence of mind, but, guiding 
the battle as if he were surveying it from a distance, he himself ranged hither and thither 
and brought aid to those whom he thought to be overwhelmed. 
 
This is exactly what the reader would expect of Pyrrhus after his initial successes and the 
praise of his generalship earlier in the Life, and is one of the clearest manifestations of 
Pyrrhus’ virtue. It certainly invokes the image of Alexander, who similarly demonstrated 
an ability to direct his soldiers from horseback in the midst of the fighting.280 The most 
important thing to note from this depiction of Pyrrhus' generalship is the emphasis on his 
own personal action. His calculations and presence of mind during the battle, 
unquestionably good traits for any commander, were directed solely to identifying which 
part of the line was in the most danger and required aid. He did not give orders or 
formulate new plans in order to help his soldiers, however, but instead considered that 
his own presence, and particularly his own fighting ability, were enough to render aid to 
any of his soldiers who were hard pressed.281 This is by no means unreasonable, 
                                                 
280  While Plutarch’s depictions of Alexander’s battles are too short to contain such parallels, Alexander’s 
ability to command during battle can be seen in more detailed sources, where he is shown observing the 
battle, receiving messages, and issuing orders during the fighting. Cf. Arr. 3.13.3-4, 3.14.1, 3.15.1; Q. 
Curt. 3.11.2-4, 4.15.6-9, 4.16.3. 
281 Mossman (1992), 100 cites this passage as evidence that Pyrrhus had an intellectual approach to 
warfare, in contrast to Alexander's unceasing boldness, because he was able to maintain a clear view of the 
battle even while in the thick of the fighting. I would argue, however, that Pyrrhus' understanding of the 
battle is not enough to make him an intellectual commander. If Pyrrhus did use his clear perception of the 
battle to issue orders or develop plans to take advantage of the enemy's weakness, then I would agree with 
Mossman's assertion. However, because Pyrrhus is solely concerned with identifying where he should 
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particularly given the superb fighting skills that Pyrrhus demonstrated earlier against 
Pantauchus, and we should hesitate to see this portrayal of Pyrrhus' generalship as 
anything other than praise it is meant to be. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that even here 
Plutarch acknowledges the connection – and possibility of doubt – between Pyrrhus’ 
δόξα and ἀρετή. This is only the beginning of the battle, and the next section of 
Plutarch's narrative, I suggest, demonstrates the limitations of this individualistic style 
generalship. 
 One of Pyrrhus' companions, Leonnatus the Macedonian, noticed that an Italian 
was mirroring Pyrrhus' actions as he went back and forth across the line of battle, and 
appeared to be intent on attacking him. This soon came to pass, as the Italian charged 
upon Pyrrhus and threw him from his horse. Although Pyrrhus was saved by his 
companions and the Italian killed, the Epirote began to show caution after his brush with 
death, and gave his conspicuous cloak and armor to another companion so that he might 
avoid being so targeted by other Roman soldiers (Pyrrh. 16.8-17.1). Pyrrhus' 
uncharacteristic caution here, according to Plutarch, although it preserved his life, nearly 
cost him the battle; for Megacles, who received Pyrrhus' armor, became the new target 
of the Roman assaults, and when he was killed and the armor of Pyrrhus paraded 
through the Roman ranks, Pyrrhus' soldiers lost heart and likely would have fled the 
field had Pyrrhus not rode along the line with his face bare to show that he was still alive 
                                                 
personally be fighting, I believe that his style of generalship is no more intellectual than, and indeed not 
dissimilar to, Alexander's. A true example of an intellectual general in this pair, I would suggest, is Marius, 
as shall become clear in the discussion of his Life. 
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(Pyrrh. 17.2-3).282 After this event, relates Plutarch, the outcome of the battle was very 
much uncertain, and it was only after Pyrrhus' elephants had crowded back the Roman 
infantry and frightened the Roman horses that Pyrrhus was able to order a decisive 
charge by his Thessalian cavalry and finally route the Romans (Pyrrh. 17.3). This 
victory, as Mossman suggests, is marred not only by Pyrrhus' excessive casualties and 
the loss of his best troops, but also his failure to live up to the actions of his models 
Alexander and Achilles in similar circumstances.283 I would further argue that 
Herculaneum demonstrates some of the limitations of Pyrrhus' generalship. Pyrrhus' 
conspicuous armor and frequent interventions on the battlefield led him to be targeted 
and nearly killed by observant Romans. Moreover, Pyrrhus appeared entirely reactive 
during the battle. He was so busy “darting hither and thither himself” to aid his own 
soldiers that he never took the opportunity to use his superlative fighting ability in a 
decisive way against the Romans, by means of which Alexander won each of his famous 
victories against the Persians and Indians.284 Most tellingly, despite Pyrrhus' personal 
heroics, it was ultimately Pyrrhus' elephants that proved decisive in the battle, and it was 
a cavalry charge which he ordered – not a cavalry charge which he personally led – that 
finally routed the Romans. 
 The battle of Asculum plays out differently than Herculaneum, but the end result 
                                                 
282 Mossman (1992), 99-100 expands upon the clear Homeric parallels with Pyrrhus' exchange of armor, 
and notes that Pyrrhus' motive for giving his armor to Megacles – self-preservation – falls far short of 
Achilles' reasoning for giving his armor to Patroclus.  
283 Mossman (1992), 100. 
284 While the melee that erupted around Alexander at the Granicus means that his charge across the river 
there could hardly be called decisive, his charges against Darius at Issus and Granicus broke through the 
Persian infantry and directly led to the rout of both the king and his army on each occasion. See Bosworth 
(1988), 41-3, 61-2, 83-4.  
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of the battle is the same, and Plutarch focuses on many of the same aspects of Pyrrhus' 
generalship. In the first day of the battle of Asculum, Plutarch says, Pyrrhus was forced 
to fight in regions where his cavalry and elephants could not operate effectively, and 
after a day's fighting on uneven ground the battle was inconclusive. The following day, 
Pyrrhus attempted to regain control of the battlefield by stationing his light troops on the 
uneven ground and placing the rest of his forces in a dense array. This, as Plutarch says, 
gave the Romans “no opportunity for sidelong shifts and counter-movements, as on the 
previous day”, and so they were obliged to fight in the open against Pyrrhus' elephants 
and cavalry (Pyrrh. 21.6). The fighting was consequently fierce, as the Romans tried in 
vain to rout the Greek infantry before the elephants could overwhelm them. Eventually, 
however, the Romans were driven back at the point where Pyrrhus was, but Plutarch 
maintains that the elephants caused the greatest havoc among the Roman forces (Pyrrh. 
21.7). Once again driven back by Pyrrhus' elephants, the Romans retreated to their camp, 
and this gave Pyrrhus a second costly victory. On the one hand, even though Pyrrhus 
was forced into unfavorable terrain on the first day of Asculum, just as he was forced to 
fight at Herculaneum before his allies joined him, Pyrrhus did demonstrate a level of 
initiative before the battle on the second day so that he could make use of his cavalry 
and elephants. On the other hand, even though Plutarch singles Pyrrhus out as 
successfully pushing the Roman line back, by grammatically juxtaposing Pyrrhus' effect 
on the Romans with the much greater effect of the elephants, Plutarch once again 
demonstrates that it was ultimately the elephants who proved decisive in the battle rather 
than Pyrrhus himself.  
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 Although technically victorious at Herculaneum and Asculum, Pyrrhus suffered 
such major casualties in these two battles that he lost nearly all confidence in ever 
actually defeating the Romans. Consequently, when Pyrrhus was presented with the 
opportunity to secure a power base in Sicily by helping the Greek cities there drive out 
the Carthaginians, he immediately established a token garrison in Tarentum and brought 
the rest of his army to the island (Pyrrh. 22.1-2). Plutarch's narrative of Pyrrhus' time on 
Sicily is brief, but it follows the same pattern as the rest of the Pyrrhus. Immediately 
upon Pyrrhus' arrival in Sicily he gained the support of several cities, which allowed him 
to quickly assemble an army and achieve an early victory against the Carthaginians 
(Pyrrh. 22.4).  Plutarch focuses on Pyrrhus' attack on Eryx, which was the strongest 
Carthaginian fortress on the island. In the frontal assault, Plutarch says, Pyrrhus was the 
first to scale the ladders and mount the walls, and of the many enemies who attacked 
him: 
ἀμυνόμενος τοὺς μὲν ἐξέωσε τοῦ τείχους ἐπ' ἀμφότερα καὶ κατέβαλε, πλείστους δὲ  
περὶ αὑτὸν τῷ ξίφει χρώμενος ἐσώρευσε νεκρούς. ἔπαθε δ' αὐτὸς οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
προσιδεῖν δεινὸς ἐφάνη τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔδειξεν ὀρθῶς καὶ μετ' ἐμ- 
πειρίας ἀποφαίνοντα τῶν ἀρετῶν μόνην τὴν ἀνδρείαν φορὰς πολλάκις ἐνθουσιώδεις καὶ 
μανικὰς φερομένην (Pyrrh. 22.10-11). 
 
Defending himself, he pushed some from the wall on either side and hurled them to the 
ground, but he heaped most corpses around him with the using his sword. He himself 
suffered nothing, but was a terrible sight for his enemies to look upon, and proved that 
Homer explained correctly and with experience that valor, alone of the virtues, often 
displays motions due to divine possession and frenzy.  
 
Aside from the explicit Homeric reference in this scene, Pyrrhus' actions at Eryx have 
strong parallels to Alexander's battle against the Malli, and this is perhaps the one 
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comparison between Pyrrhus and Alexander in which Pyrrhus appears superior. 285 Both 
men scattered their enemies with missiles and were the first to climb the walls, but while 
Pyrrhus defeated all of his foes from the top of the wall and remained uninjured, 
Alexander became isolated after jumping into the city and was nearly killed after 
suffering several wounds (Alex. 63.3-10).286 Pyrrhus' success at Eryx, then, appears as a 
form of redemption after his strategic failure in Italy. Unlike at Herculaneum and 
Asculum, where Pyrrhus failed to live up to the heroic ideals portrayed by Achilles and 
Alexander, at Eryx he met and even surpassed the achievements of his predecessors. 
Eryx is the first battle since Pyrrhus' victory over Pantauchus that actually seems to 
validate the high praise for Pyrrhus by his contemporaries. At the same, just like in that 
earlier battle, Pyrrhus’ victory hinges entirely on his own fighting ability. The actions of 
his soldiers at Eryx appear to be immaterial, even their existence is only made implicit 
by Pyrrhus' signal to sound the trumpets and his leading forward of the scaling 
ladders.287 Otherwise, it is Pyrrhus personally who scatters the defenders with missiles, 
scales the ladder, and defeats the many enemies who dared confront him on the wall.288 
This exceptional valor and apparent invincibility, which Plutarch compares with the 
                                                 
285 Cf. Iliad 5.185; 6.101; 9.238. Cf. Alex. 63. 
286 The precise vocabulary in the two passages does differ, and Pyrrhus does order trumpets to sound 
before the assault, which Alexander does not do. Nevertheless, the imagery of their primary actions 
(scattering the enemy, bringing up ladders, and being the first to scale the walls) is so similar that I believe 
the parallel to be intentional. Compare τῇ δὲ σάλπιγγι σημήνας καὶ τοῖς βέλεσι τοὺς βαρβάρους 
ἀνασκεδάσας καὶ τὰς κλίμακας προσαγαγών, πρῶτος ἐπέβη τοῦ τείχους (Pyrr. 22.9) with τοὺς μὲν γὰρ 
ἀνθρώπους βέλεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀπεσκέδασε, πρῶτος δὲ διὰ κλίμακος τεθείσης ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος 
(Alex. 63.3).  
287 τῇ δὲ σάλπιγγι σημήνας … καὶ τὰς κλίμακας προσαγαγών (Pyrrh. 22.9).  
288 That Pyrrhus was “the first to climb the wall” (Pyrrh. 22.9) also implies the existence of other soldiers, 
but Pyrrhus' own actions nevertheless appear to be solely responsible for his victory at Eryx. 
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Homeric heroes, is clearly Pyrrhus' strength. However, Eryx also demonstrates the 
negligible impact that Pyrrhus' soldiers – and thus his leadership of them – have on his 
victories. This becomes increasingly relevant in Pyrrhus' later campaigns, during which 
he consistently has difficulties in leveraging his own physical abilities during battles. 
 Plutarch reinforces the image of Pyrrhus' individual martial prowess again on the 
Epirote's retreat from Sicily. After crossing back over to Italy Pyrrhus was set upon by a 
host of Mamertines, which threw his army into such confusion that Pyrrhus was forced 
to fight in the rear-guard as his army withdrew. Already wounded by one enemy, he 
responded to the challenge of another, who, although “huge in body and resplendent in 
armor”, Pyrrhus nevertheless cleaved in half with one blow “so that at one instant the 
parts of the sundered body fell to either side” (Pyrrh. 24.1-3). This feat of strength and 
personal heroics goes beyond anything that even Alexander had done, and invites 
comparisons to the Homeric heroes.289 Indeed, Plutarch says that the Mamertines 
checked their advance at this point, thinking that Pyrrhus was “some superior being” 
(Pyrrh. 24.4). This is Pyrrhus at his best: just as he also demonstrated against 
Pantauchus and at Eryx, Pyrrhus is unbeatable in single combat, apparently bordering on 
superhuman.  
 Plutarch, however, is once again quick to put Pyrrhus' military prowess into its 
proper context. Having reached Tarentum unmolested after his heroic bisection of a 
Mamertine, he once again set out against the Romans. Facing two consular armies, 
Pyrrhus likewise split his own force in half, and marched against Manius Curius at 
                                                 
289 See Mossman (1992). 
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Beneventum. Pyrrhus' attempt to surprise the Roman army by means of a night march, 
which itself is a rather uncharacteristic move by the normally straightforward Pyrrhus, 
fails utterly after his lights went out and his soldiers became lost on a long circuit 
through the woods. This left his army disorganized and in full view of the Roman camp 
when dawn broke, and the Roman commander immediately sallied into the field to take 
advantage of the situation. This blunder, tellingly, is the last the reader hears of Pyrrhus 
during Plutarch's narrative of the battle of Beneventum, as the rest of the action is told 
from the point of view of the Romans. After capitalizing on Pyrrhus' mistake and routing 
the vanguard of the Epirote's army, Manius engages the rest of Pyrrhus' force in a 
pitched battle. Despite their initial success, the Romans are almost overwhelmed by 
Pyrrhus' elephants, so that Manius has to commit his camp guards to the battle; these 
fresh troops, however, drive the elephants back into their own ranks, which causes great 
confusion among the Greek soldiers and gives victory to the Romans (Pyrrh. 25.1-5). By 
switching to Manius' viewpoint for the main narrative of the battle immediately after 
Pyrrhus' failed night march, Plutarch not only contrasts the failure of Pyrrhus' 
generalship with the success of Manius' but also shows Pyrrhus to have been a complete 
non-entity during the battle itself. In Plutarch's narrative, Manius does not appear to 
even be aware of Pyrrhus; rather, it is Pyrrhus' elephants that cause the Roman army the 
most difficulty, much as they did at Herculaneum and Asculum. Beneventum, then, 
serves to lessen the significance of Pyrrhus' outstanding personal heroics at Eryx and 
against the Mamertines. As those instances demonstrated, and as was also apparent from 
Herculaneum and Asculum, Pyrrhus' style of generalship was heavily predicated on his 
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own individual skill and prowess on the battlefield. When he was not able to leverage his 
physical strength in individual combat, as was the case at Beneventum, he was 
consequently unable to have a noticeable impact on the course of the battle. This serious 
limitation to Pyrrhus' generalship, although visible in his earlier battles against the 
Romans, was much more apparent at Beneventum, which was his first clear failure on 
the battlefield.  
 Plutarch follows his narrative of Beneventum with a concise explanation of 
Pyrrhus' failures in Italy and Sicily, referring once again to the opinions of Pyrrhus' 
contemporaries. This time, it is not illustrious generals like Antigonus or Hannibal 
whom Plutarch cites, but the general opinion at the time:  
καὶ νομισθεὶς ἐμπειρίᾳ μὲν πολεμικῇ καὶ χειρὶ καὶ τόλμῃ πολὺ πρῶτος εἶναι τῶν καθ' 
αὑτὸν βασιλέων, ἃ δὲ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐκτᾶτο, ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἀπολλύναι, δι' ἔρωτα τῶν 
ἀπόντων οὐδὲν εἰς ὃ δεῖ θέσθαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων φθάσας (Pyrrh. 26.1). 
 
Men believe that in military experience, strength, and daring, he was by far the first of 
the kings of his time, but that what he won by his actions he lost by indulging his hopes, 
since through passionate desire for what he did not have he always failed to establish 
securely what he had. 
 
The second part of this evaluation is consistent with the overall moral message of the 
Pyrrhus-Marius: Pyrrhus failed because he gave in to his excessive hopes and 
ambition.290 The first part of this evaluation is much more relevant to Plutarch's 
understanding of military leadership, and reinforces the conclusions drawn from 
Plutarch's narrative of Beneventum. It is telling, but at this point not surprising, that the 
anonymous “men” in this quotation make no mention of Pyrrhus' rational generalship. 
                                                 
290 Duff (1999), 101-130; Buszard (2002). 
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They do not praise his cleverness or adaptability or foresight, but instead his military 
experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ), his hand (χειρὶ), and his daring (τόλμῃ). One would 
expect that significant military experience would have imparted Pyrrhus with the 
adaptability of Caesar or the foresight of Pericles, but his poor tactical decision-making 
at Herculaneum, Asculum, and Beneventum, and his failure in strategic planning that led 
to his expulsion from Sicily and Italy, show that this is not the case. Instead, Pyrrhus' 
strength as a general comes from both his boldness (as seen in his storming of the walls 
of Eryx), and, taking χειρὶ in a figurative sense, from his ability in close combat (as seen 
particularly at Herculaneum and against the Mamertines).291 This contrast between two 
types of generalship forms the basis of Plutarch's evaluation of Pyrrhus' military 
leadership. Pyrrhus is at his best when he in the thick of the fighting, where his physical 
strength both drives back the enemy line and inspires his own troops. Plutarch does not 
make any explicit criticism of this type of generalship, and indeed refers to it by means 
of the praise of others, but his narrative nevertheless demonstrates its weakness. 
Plutarch's description of Beneventum makes clear that Pyrrhus was unable to control the 
battlefield enough to put himself at the most critical place in the fighting, and so his 
brilliant physical strength proved inconsequential.  
 Plutarch's depiction of Pyrrhus' generalship in the second half of the Epirote's 
career largely mirrors that of the first. Upon returning to mainland Greece, Pyrrhus 
raised a new army and once again ventured into Macedonia, where he came into conflict 
                                                 
291 Of course, it is also possible to take χειρὶ in its literal sense as the strength in his hand cutting the 
Mamertine in half.  
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with its new king, Antigonus Gonatas. Pyrrhus gained an initial victory against 
Antigonus' army after falling upon it in a narrow pass; as a result of this, “consulting his 
good fortune rather than his judgment”, Pyrrhus advanced upon the main phalanx of 
Antigonus' army (Pyrrh. 26.4). Pyrrhus, however, did not suffer for his lack of judgment, 
and actually induced all of Antigonus' demoralized infantry to join his own army without 
even fighting a battle. This is a strong parallel with Pyrrhus' initial success against 
Antigonus' father, when much of Demetrius' army defected to Pyrrhus and proclaimed 
him king of Macedonia early in the Life (Pyrrh. 11.4-6).292 The charisma necessary to 
effectively steal an opponent's army away from him is consistent with Plutarch's 
representation of Pyrrhus' leadership: the adulation and awe that Pyrrhus generated in 
Greek soldiers is something that Plutarch identifies early in the Life as stemming from 
Pyrrhus' resemblance to Alexander's style of generalship (Pyrrh. 8.1). However, the 
limits of this heroic style of generalship are just as apparent in the second half of the 
Pyrrhus as they are in the first. Once again jumping from one opportunity to another, 
Pyrrhus set his sights on Sparta soon after his victory over Antigonus. The Spartan king 
Areus was away with his army on Crete, and although Pyrrhus thus had the opportunity 
to enter the city unopposed on the night he arrived, he decided to wait until daylight 
because he feared he might lose his soldiers to looting in this darkness. Because of the 
absence of the king Pyrrhus did not expect any difficulty in occupying the city the next 
day, but over the course of the night those Spartans who remained in the city, led by 
                                                 
292 The account in the Demetrius, although acknowledging the admiration that the Macedonian troops had 
for Pyrrhus, attributes their defection more to their distaste of Demetrius than to Pyrrhus' military 
brilliance (Dem. 44.5-7). 
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many of the wives of the absent soldiers, managed to fortify their city with both a trench 
and a makeshift wall of wagons. These fortifications, as Plutarch observes, completely 
negated the effect of Pyrrhus' frontal assault when he attacked the next morning (Pyrrh. 
28.1). An attempt by Pyrrhus' son to flank the new trenches was also beaten back, albeit 
with great difficulty, by the bravery of the Spartan king's son Acrotatus, and Pyrrhus was 
forced to call off his assault at nightfall. He attacked again the next morning, despite an 
ominous dream the previous night, but was once again repelled by the combined efforts 
of the Spartans. Before Pyrrhus could launch a third attack, two groups of 
reinforcements arrived, one led by the Spartan king and another by one of Antigonus' 
generals, and Pyrrhus was forced to abandon yet another of his many hopes.  
 At Sparta, as in other battles, Pyrrhus appears unable to adapt to situations that 
do not match his initial expectations. After finding his entry into Sparta opposed, 
Pyrrhus launched himself frontally at the Spartan fortifications for two days despite his 
lack of progress. While Pyrrhus realistically would have been aware of – and likely 
would have ordered – his son's single flanking attempt early on the first day, Plutarch 
narrates the battle in such a way as to divorce Pyrrhus from his son's actions: 
Αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ὁ Πύρρος ἐβιάζετο κατὰ στόμα τοῖς ὁπλίταις πρὸς ἀσπίδας πολλὰς τῶν 
Σπαρτιατῶν ἀντιπαρατεταγμένας καὶ τάφρον οὐ περατὴν οὐδὲ βάσιν ἀσφαλῆ τοῖς 
μαχομένοις παρέχουσαν ὑπὸ χαυνότητος. ὁ δὲ παῖς Πτολεμαῖος ἔχων δισχιλίους 
Γαλάτας καὶ Χαόνων λογάδας ἐξελίξας τὴν τάφρον, ἐπειρᾶτο κατὰ τὰς ἁμάξας 
ὑπερβαίνειν (Pyrrh. 28.1-2). 
 
Pyrrhus himself, then, forced himself against the front with his soldiers towards the 
shields of the Spartans held against him, and over a trench which was not passable and 
which supplied no secure base for the fighters because of its looseness. His son Ptolemy, 
on the other hand, having two thousand Gauls and chosen Chaonians, maneuvered 
around the trench, and made an attempt to pass through the wagons. 
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Through the use of a μὲν...δὲ clause, Plutarch contrasts Pyrrhus' futile head-on assault 
with Ptolemy's attempt to find a weakness in the Spartans' defenses, which would have 
succeeded if not for the bravery of the Spartan Acrotatus. There is no indication of any 
such creative generalship from Pyrrhus, who forced an attack against the most heavily-
defended point. Certainly, Pyrrhus’ actions here do not come as a surprise to the reader 
at this point in the Life; all of Pyrrhus' victories up to this point were as a result of the 
direct application of force, whether his own or his elephants', to a single point in the 
enemy's line. Plutarch gives much credit to the Spartans for resisting Pyrrhus' assault, 
but this further highlights Pyrrhus' inability to come up with an alternate way into the 
city.  
 Pyrrhus' fortunes increasingly decline after his defeat at Sparta. Invited to 
support one of the competing factions at Argos, Pyrrhus withdrew from Sparta, but was 
constantly ambushed and harassed by the Spartan king Areus, and even lost his son 
Ptolemy in a rearguard action. This loss, according to Plutarch, drove Pyrrhus to an even 
greater feat of daring and might than he had yet displayed, and he summarily confronted 
and destroyed the band of Spartans who had killed his son (Pyrrh. 30.5-6). This is a very 
similar situation to the one that sparked Pyrrhus' bisection of a Mamertine: in both cases 
Pyrrhus' army was on the retreat, and in both cases Pyrrhus' superhuman strength was a 
manifestation of his intense anger. While Pyrrhus' great strength and daring did allow 
him to capture the citadel of Eryx on Sicily, such a positive application of his prowess 
now appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Unlike at Eryx, his impressive 
actions against the Mamertines and Spartans did nothing to change the strategic 
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situation: their only tangible benefit in both cases was to allow his army to finish its 
retreat in relative safety. This can be seen as another manifestation of Pyrrhus' reactive 
leadership that was on display at Herculaneum: while his impressive abilities in single 
combat may be able to preserve the existence of his army, they are not enough to have a 
significant impact on the forces of his enemies.293 
 When Pyrrhus finally arrived in Argos, he found Antigonus and his army 
encamped on a hill commanding the surrounding plain and challenged him to come 
down and fight. Antigonus refused, saying that “his own generalship was characterized 
by opportunities rather than arms” (Pyrrh. 31.2). This succinct contrast between two 
types of generalship is at the core of Plutarch's depiction of generalship in the Pyrrhus-
Marius. Pyrrhus' generalship, as Plutarch has shown consistently throughout the Life, 
was indeed characterized by arms. It was Pyrrhus' own physical strength in arms that led 
to his clear victories against Pantauchus and at Eryx, and it was the physical strength of 
his elephants that granted him tactical victories against the Romans at Herculaneum and 
Asculum. At the same time, Pyrrhus consistently proved to be unable to create or 
capitalize upon important opportunities in battles when his strength of arms was 
insufficient: his attempt to make a surprise attack at Beneventum was an abject failure, 
and he failed to improvise when he ran into unexpectedly stiff resistance at Sparta. 
Based on Pyrrhus' generalship throughout the Life, his reaction to Antigonus' challenge 
comes as no surprise. Lacking the initiative to force Antigonus from a strong defensive 
position, Pyrrhus simply ignored him, and entered the city of Argos that night under the 
                                                 
293 See above, pp. 179-182. 
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cover of darkness.294 This proved to be the Epirote's final mistake. In the delay caused 
by trying to fit Pyrrhus' elephants through the narrow gate the Argives within the city 
had the chance to call for reinforcements, and both Antigonus and Areus sent forces to 
confront Pyrrhus within the city. Although at dawn Pyrrhus recognized his dire situation 
and began to retreat, confusion caused by miscommunication with his troops outside the 
city led to Pyrrhus becoming trapped within the narrow streets of Argos. It was in the 
ensuing melee that Pyrrhus met his end, but in a fitting irony the invincible warrior was 
felled by a roof tile thrown by a woman watching the battle from above; this crushed 
Pyrrhus' vertebrae and sent him to the ground, where an enemy soldier delivered the 
final blow (Pyrrh. 34.1-3).   
 By the end of the Pyrrhus, the reader is left with a conflicted view of Pyrrhus' 
military leadership. On the one hand, Pyrrhus was an unquestionably ferocious warrior 
on the battlefield and achieved two victories against the Romans, “Pyrrhic” as they may 
have been. On the other hand, Pyrrhus' victories were arguably as much due to his 
elephants as his own actions, and his frequent tactical mistakes led to a series of defeats 
and his own untimely death. Pyrrhus practiced the same type of daring and physical 
generalship that Alexander did, an observation that Plutarch makes early on in the 
Pyrrhus (Pyrrh. 8.1). Throughout the rest of the Life, however, Pyrrhus achieves neither 
the decisive tactical victories nor the strategic success that Alexander won in his brief 
                                                 
294 Antigonus Gonatas' perceptive understanding of Pyrrhus' generalship in this instance, I would suggest, 
supports the argument that the Antigonus whose praise Plutarch cites at 8.2 was Antigonus Monopthalmos. 
That Gonatas clearly understood the limitations of Pyrrhus' leadership, in particular his lack of creativity 
and initiative, makes it seem unlikely that he would have ever rated Pyrrhus' generalship so highly. 
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life. With that comparison in mind, it is easy to see Pyrrhus' unsuccessful career as a 
result of his failure to live up to Alexander than to a failure of his style of generalship. 
This view, however, becomes far less tenable after reading the Marius. I would argue 
that Plutarch portrays Marius as having practiced a far different style of generalship than 
Pyrrhus, one which focused much more on a general's planning and decision-making 
than his physical prowess. The contrast between these two styles of generalship, first 
made explicit in the final confrontation between Antigonus and Pyrrhus, becomes 
increasingly pronounced throughout the Marius. As we shall see, Marius, who dismisses 
Greek language and literature at the beginning of his Life, consistently appears to be a 
more thoughtful and considerate general than his Greek counterpart in the pair. 
 
Marius' Military Leadership 
 On account of the unique careers of the two men, the Marius reads very 
differently from the Pyrrhus. While Pyrrhus spent much of his adult life as a Hellenistic 
king on military campaign, Marius' military activity made up a much smaller proportion 
of his long career. Nevertheless, Plutarch dedicates significant space to Marius’ 
campaigns in the Life, particularly his war against the German tribes, and there are many 
points of comparison between his generalship and Pyrrhus'.  
 Marius' first opportunity to act as a general came after his praetorship, when 
Metellus invited him to Africa as legate during the war against Jugurtha. During his time 
there, Plutarch says, Marius not only “made a display of every sort of bravery”, but also 
“surpassed officers of his own rank in giving good counsel and foreseeing what was 
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advantageous, and vied with the common soldiers in frugality and endurance” (Mar. 7.2-
3).295 This is the first of many clear differences between Pyrrhus' and Marius' styles of 
leadership. While Pyrrhus' first experience as a general sees him defeating a renowned 
general in single combat, Marius' sees him excelling at planning and foresight; while 
Pyrrhus' actions elevate him above his soldiers and elicit comparisons with the legendary 
Alexander, Marius takes great pains to connect with and endear himself to the soldiers 
under his command. Of course, when considering the relationship of the two generals 
with their soldiers it is vital to be mindful of their very different political circumstances. 
As a Hellenistic king, especially one who so clearly sought to imitate both Alexander 
and his heroic ancestor Achilles, it would have been necessary for Pyrrhus to encourage 
this distance between himself and his men in order to best maintain his legitimacy as a 
king and – especially given his proximity to Macedon – a true successor to Alexander. 
Likewise, because Marius had to rely on popular elections in order to secure both 
political and military power, it was in Marius' best interest to gain popularity with his 
soldiers by sharing in their toils. Indeed, it was the fame that Marius gained in Africa, 
both from his deeds and from letters written by soldiers encouraging those at home to 
support him, that secured his first consulship (Mar. 7.3-9.1). The differences in their 
treatment of their soldiers, then, may have been due to necessity rather than actual 
preference, but it is still a marked difference between their styles of generalship. There 
are others as well, even at this early stage in their careers. Though Marius did not have a 
                                                 
295 ἐπεδείκνυτο πᾶσαν ἀνδραγαθίαν (Mar. 7.2); ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ὁμοτίμους εὐβουλίᾳ καὶ προνοίᾳ τοῦ 
συμφέροντος ὑπερβαλλόμενος (Mar. 7.3). 
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defining heroic moment like Pyrrhus did against Pantauchus, he was brave nevertheless, 
and, more importantly, demonstrated an early aptitude for careful observation and 
planning. It is indicative of Plutarch's understanding of the military careers of these two 
men that Marius' military foresight, which Plutarch introduces so early in the Life's 
narrative, plays just as large a role in his Life as Pyrrhus' physical invincibility plays in 
his.  
 Plutarch has little more to say of Marius' war against Jugurtha after achieving the 
consulship, as the war was effectively over by the time Marius returned from Rome. 
Instead, after identifying the first seeds of enmity between Marius and Sulla resulting 
from the capture of Jugurtha, Plutarch advances the narrative to the invasion of the 
Teutones and Cimbri. The ensuing narrative of Marius' campaigns against the Germanic 
tribes, which occupies a full seventeen chapters, is certainly the apex of the Life, and 
shows the best side of Marius. Early in the narrative, Plutarch makes much of Marius’ 
preparations for the upcoming war, which was fortunately delayed when the German 
tribes advanced into Spain before Italy (Mar. 14.1). Marius spent the resulting reprieve 
training his soldiers through long marches, runs, and other physical activity, which not 
only raised their spirits and courage, but also gave the soldiers an opportunity to become 
accustomed to Marius as their commander (Mar. 13.1-14.3). There is a clear link 
between this initial training and the subsequent success of Marius' soldiers against the 
Germans. Once word had come that the enemy was drawing near, Marius built a 
fortified camp along the Rhone river and excavated a canal to facilitate the delivery of 
vital supplies, as Plutarch says, “so that he might never be forced by lack of provisions 
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to give battle contrary to his better judgment” (Mar. 15.1-3). 296 And indeed, when the 
Germanic tribes turned back toward Italy and the Teutones challenged Marius to battle, 
the Roman refused. Instead, he kept his soldiers waiting inside their fortifications, and 
had them observe the barbarians from the walls so that they might be accustomed to 
their unusual size, battle cries, and equipment. This his soldiers did, and after a short 
time they became both dismissive of their enemies and eager for battle, just as Marius 
had intended (Mar. 15.5-16.5). This focus on Marius' successful preparation and 
foresight is consistent with Plutarch's initial characterization of the Roman's generalship. 
It is also a significant contrast to the depiction of Pyrrhus' generalship in the previous 
Life. Pyrrhus demonstrated little inclination toward planning before his battles, and 
tended to be at mercy of the preparations that his enemies made.297 Even before the 
narrative of the battle begins, then, it is readily apparent to the reader of the Pyrrhus-
Marius that the Roman practiced a very different type of generalship than his Greek 
counterpart.  
 The true extent of Marius' patience became clear as the campaign progressed. 
The Teutones made several attempts to storm Marius' camp, but were driven back each 
time and decided instead to bypass Marius and advance toward the Alps. Marius 
followed the barbarian army as it moved, always making sure to heavily fortify his 
encampment each night. According to Plutarch, when the two armies had nearly reached 
the Alps, at a place called Aquae Sextiae, Marius intentionally chose a campsite with 
                                                 
296 ὡς μηδέποτε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμὸν ἐκβιασθείη δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰς μάχην 
καταστῆναι (Mar. 15.1-2). 
297 Especially against the Spartans and Antigonus (Pyrrh. 28.1-2; 31.1-2). 
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little access to water in order to incite his soldiers to fight (Mar. 18.3). However, while 
his soldiers were beginning to entrench their camp, their idle servants went to gather 
water from the only source in the area, and came into conflict with barbarians who were 
doing the same. The ensuing noise attracted soldiers from both sides, and the initial 
skirmish soon turned into a full battle. While the Romans were able to drive the 
barbarians back to their camp, likely capitalizing on their sluggishness after having just 
finished feasting, Plutarch makes it clear that this battle was not the one that Marius had 
intended to fight (Mar. 19.1-7). Although Plutarch does say that the battle was brought 
on by the gradual escalation of a skirmish rather than at the instigation of the 
commander, I would argue that he does not intend this as a slight against Marius' 
planning and preparation. For one, Marius had indeed intended to fight a battle at Aquae 
Sextiae, and had also expected the battle to be fought over access to drinking water; he 
had apparently just not considered that his camp followers would go off on their own. 
Secondly, it is clear that the effort that he put into training his soldiers and inuring them 
to their fearsome opponents paid off, as his men showed no hesitation before joining the 
battle and fought well even after a day's march. Although this battle shows Plutarch's 
understanding of the potential impact of fortune on any military campaign, it also 
demonstrates his recognition that good preparation can allow one to still achieve victory 
in the face of the unexpected.  
 This initial success, however, did little to weaken the barbarian army, and the 
Teutones remained a serious threat. Consequently, Marius and his soldiers spent a 
sleepless night after the battle erecting the fortifications that were neglected during the 
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fighting (Mar. 20.1-2). The barbarians had spent the intervening time marshalling their 
forces, and so Marius once again began preparing for another battle. Observing that the 
ground between the two armies was uneven, Plutarch says, Marius ordered 3,000 troops 
to lie hidden in ambush and attack the rear of the enemy after the fighting began. He 
then drew up his army on the high ground outside his camp, and the barbarians, who 
“could not wait for the Romans to come down and fight with them on equal terms”, 
charged up the hill at Marius' army (Mar. 20.8). As the barbarians were advancing, 
Marius sent his officers all along his line to relay advice to his soldiers, that after 
throwing their javelins they should methodically push the enemy back with their shields, 
because the barbarians would be on uneven ground and unable to stand up to their 
advance (Mar. 20.9). Plutarch's subsequent comment is brief, but nevertheless significant 
to a complete understanding of generalship in the Pyrrhus-Marius: “This was the advice 
he gave his men, and they saw that he was the first to act accordingly; for he was in 
better training than any of them, and in daring far surpassed them all” (Mar. 20.10).298 In 
the Pyrrhus, the basis of Pyrrhus' generalship was his individual strength and daring, 
which surpassed not only that shown by his own troops, but that shown by his enemies 
as well. According to Plutarch's narrative, Pyrrhus did not prepare extensively before his 
battles, nor did he give tactical advice to his soldiers; victory or defeat for Pyrrhus often 
hinged on whether he was personally at the decisive part of the battle. Just like Pyrrhus, 
Marius surpassed his soldiers in daring and ability. However, Marius' physical 
                                                 
298 ταῦθ' ἅμα παρῄνει καὶ δρῶν ἑωρᾶτο πρῶτος· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἤσκητο χεῖρον τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πάντας πολὺ τῇ 
τόλμῃ παρήλλαττεν (Mar. 20.10). 
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superiority appears here almost as an afterthought, because it has such a small impact on 
the outcome of his battles. Rather, it is Marius' preparation and planning that take up the 
bulk of Plutarch's narrative, because it is these strengths, mental instead of physical, that 
are the hallmark of Marius' generalship.  
 Indeed, Plutarch's narrative of the ensuing battle demonstrates just how effective 
Marius' generalship was. Following Marius' advice, his soldiers stopped the initial 
charge of the barbarians and crowded them back down the hill into the plain. Before the 
barbarians could take advantage of the level ground to reform their lines, the ambush 
that Marius had set in place fell upon their rear. Attacked from both sides, the barbarian 
army soon broke and fled, and in the ensuing rout, according to Plutarch, the Romans 
killed or captured over a hundred thousand of the enemy (Mar. 21.1-4). To a reader of 
the Pyrrhus-Marius, Marius' victory in this battle alone makes Pyrrhus' limited successes 
pale in comparison. Pyrrhus' limited victories against the Romans at Herculaneum and 
Asculum came at a notoriously high cost, and neither of them proved to be remotely 
decisive. Here, however, Marius not only defeated a significantly larger army, but also 
kept his own army intact so that it could be effective for his next campaign. 
 Equally relevant to the evaluation of their respective styles of generalship is the 
way in which Pyrrhus and Marius achieved their victories. Pyrrhus defeated Pantauchus' 
army because of his superiority in single combat, and the Epirote owed his limited 
success against the Romans primarily to the overwhelming power of his elephants. Only 
Pyrrhus' initial victory against Antigonus can legitimately be attributed to his tactical 
skill, since he surprised the Macedonian army in a narrow pass; Plutarch, however, 
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makes little of this tactical victory of Pyrrhus, presumably because it is so out of 
character with the rest of his achievements. In the Marius, on the other hand, as we have 
seen, Plutarch not only identifies Marius' thought process and preparations before his 
battle against the Teutones, he also narrates the battle in such a way as to demonstrate 
the efficacy of Marius' foresight. It is clear that unlike Pyrrhus, Marius does not have to 
be at the decisive point in the battle in order to achieve victory; his careful training and 
preparation of his own soldiers ensured that they would be able to carry out his 
instructions regardless of his own actions during the battle. 
 Marius' victory over the Teutones was by all accounts the high point of his 
military career, but his campaign against the German tribes was not yet over. The Cimbri 
had split from the Teutones before their advance towards Italy, and were causing 
significant problems for Marius' colleague Catulus. Although Catulus had, according to 
Plutarch, shown good sense in retreating to a fortification behind the river Atiso with his 
whole army, rather than dividing his forces to defend the various passes of the Alps, the 
Cimbri showed such impetous and daring in their advance that much of Catulus' army 
left its camp and began to retreat (Mar. 23.2-4). Catulus, who “like a good and 
accomplished commander, placed less regard for his own reputation than for that of his 
countrymen” (Mar. 23.5), seeing that he could not stop his army from fleeing, 
abandoned his fortifications and took his place at the head of the army so that he would 
suffer the disgrace of retreat instead of his soldiers.299 Catulus' selflessness foreshadows 
                                                 
299 ὥσπερ χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἄρχοντα, τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν ἐν ὑστέρῳ τῆς τῶν πολιτῶν τιθέμενον 
(Mar. 23.5). 
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and contrasts with Marius' improper regard for his own reputation during the upcoming 
battle against the Cimbri, the one flaw which Plutarch appears to identify in Marius' 
military leadership.300 It was after this point that Marius was able to join his army with 
Catulus’ and confront the Cimbri, who had not known about the defeat of their allies 
until Marius produced the king of the Teutones in chains. The Romans and the Cimbri 
nevertheless agreed upon a time and a place for the upcoming battle, and Plutarch once 
again identifies specific preparations that Marius made before the fighting. According to 
Plutarch, it was said that at this time Marius introduced an innovation into the Roman 
javelin: he replaced one of the two iron nails that attached the shaft to the head with a 
wooden one, which would break on impact and both impede the enemy's movement and 
prevent the enemy from reusing the javelin (Mar. 25.1). Marius' other preparation for the 
battle was to station Catulus' army in the center of the line and his own soldiers on the 
wings, where he expected the fighting to be heaviest, so that he would gain credit for the 
victory instead of Catulus.301 Unlike Marius' preparations before his battle with the 
Teutones, neither his alteration to the pilum nor his organization of the battle line appear 
to have had any impact on the ensuing battle, and do not factor into Plutarch's narrative 
of the battle itself. Instead, the Battle of Vercellae appears much like the first battle 
                                                 
300 Carney (1960), 28, observes that the figures that Plutarch contrasts Marius with in the Life exemplify 
the good qualities which Plutarch believes Marius lacks.  
301 This is Marius' selfishness that was foreshadowed by Plutarch's earlier praise of Catulus. Plutarch relied 
on the accounts of Sulla and, indirectly, Catulus, for Marius' motivation for his organization of the Roman 
line, and it is true that both of these sources would have been hostile to Marius. However, Plutarch was by 
no means beholden to his sources, and would not have included implied or direct criticism of his subject 
from a source if it conflicted with his own view of the subject. Marius' selfishness here is consistent with 
the excessive ambition that he demonstrates throughout the Life. See Carney (190), 27-8; Buszard (2002), 
9.  
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against the Teutones, in that from the beginning it progressed beyond Marius' direct 
control. Just before the two large armies met, a giant cloud of dust obscured the view of 
both sides and caused Marius and his soldiers to miss the enemy formation in their 
advance. The infantry of the Cimbri thus encountered Catulus' troops, who, because of 
their intense training, their being accustomed to the intense summer heat, and their 
inability to see the true extent of the barbarian army, were able to defeat the Cimbric 
army and drive them back to their camp (Mar. 26.3-27.3). Even though Catulus thus 
claimed credit for the victory against the Cimbri, Plutarch acknowledges that the overall 
success of the campaigns against the Germanic tribes was awarded to Marius on account 
of his higher rank and his victory against the Teutones. 
 The Battle of Vercellae is difficult to compare to any of the battles in the 
Pyrrhus. Although Marius was in nominal command, his ultimate responsibility for the 
victory was disputed because of internal politics that Pyrrhus never had to contend with. 
Plutarch's narrative of the Cimbric campaign certainly does not show Marius in a 
particularly good light, but despite the problems associated with Marius' ambition there 
is nothing in the narrative that discredits his actual ability to lead soldiers. The existence 
of Catulus' army, presumably raised and trained by him, makes it difficult to credit 
Marius with even indirect responsibility for the success of the Roman soldiers as was 
possible for the initial battle at Aquae Sextiae: Marius' own soldiers, according to 
Plutarch, made no appreciable contribution to the fighting. While Plutarch attributes 
some credit for the Roman victory at Vercellae to the effective training of the Romans, 
he focuses more on the inability of the Cimbri to cope with the intense heat of the 
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summer solstice, with which the Romans were well acquainted. For Plutarch, then, 
because the cloud of dust precluded any sort of tactical intervention by either of the 
Roman generals, Vercellae was very much a victory won by the Roman soldiers 
themselves.  
 After successfully repelling the incursions of the Tuetones and the Cimbri, 
Marius returned to the political arena in Rome, where he quickly found himself out of 
his depth. Throughout the last two-thirds of the Life Marius struggled to secure another 
military command, particularly against Mithridates, so that he might regain the power 
and influence that he enjoyed during the Germanic campaigns. His last command, 
however, came during the Social War, before the war with Mithridates began and before 
the worst of the conflict with Sulla. Although Plutarch only dedicates a single chapter to 
Marius' actions during the Social War, this brief account is particularly significant when 
compared to the end of the Pyrrhus. This passage is nevertheless challenging, because it 
initially appears contradictory. Plutarch prefaces his narrative of the Social War by 
saying that Marius' age made him slow to act and prone to hesitation and delay, so that 
the war both decreased his own reputation and increased Sulla's (Mar. 33.1). However, 
Plutarch then goes on to praise Marius for not only winning a great victory during the 
war but also refusing to be drawn into battles when he was in unfavorable positions 
(Mar. 33.3-4). These two conflicting images of Marius are of course two sides of the 
same coin: Marius' refusal to engage the enemy could alternately be called hesitation or 
prudence depending on the attitude of the observer. It would be easy to see this as a 
contradiction stemming from Plutarch's desire to soften the blow of criticism from a 
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hostile source, of which he used several during the composition of the Marius.302 
Plutarch's strong tendency to show his subjects in a positive light is well-documented, 
and it could be argued that this is why he apparently contradicts himself by first 
criticizing and then praising Marius' slowness to act.303 However, such an abrupt shift 
would be uncharacteristically clumsy of Plutarch; moreover, he has already shown 
himself ready to provide an unflattering picture of Marius' military actions when 
appropriate, so there would be nothing stopping him from sticking to the criticism in this 
instance as well. Rather, I would suggest that there is in fact no contradiction here, and 
that this is instead consistent with Plutarch's portrayal of the differences between 
military and political success. The key point here, one which Plutarch has identified in 
earlier parts of the Marius, is that in the Roman Republic appearances could be more 
important than actual military success.304 Marius won a great victory and kept his army 
alive when confronted by superior forces, but because he owed these accomplishments 
to his passivity they diminished rather than enhanced his reputation (and consequently 
his influence). 
 A strong parallel to the unpopularity of the slowness of Marius' generalship at the 
end of his career can be found in the Fabius Maximus. The unpopularity of Fabius' 
delaying tactics against Hannibal, as effective as they were, is a common theme in his 
Life. Fabius' strategy of wearing down Hannibal by shadowing his army without giving 
                                                 
302 Especially the accounts of Sulla and Catulus. See Buszard (2002), 9-11. 
303 Duff (1999), 53-65.  
304 Particularly Mar. 10, with the infighting between Metellus, Marius, and Sulla to gain the honour of 
defeating Jugurtha, and Mar. 25, with similar recriminations between Marius, Sulla, and Catulus over 
credit for victory over the Cimbri. 
   
207 
 
battle made him despised by his countrymen, to such an extent that he even suffered 
abuse in his own camp; only Hannibal recognized and respected Fabius' cunning (Fab. 
5.2-3). Instead, the Roman people much preferred far more reckless generals like 
Minucius and Terentius Varro, who advocated a more aggressive policy against 
Hannibal. It was only after such an aggressive policy led to the disaster at Cannae, 
according to Plutarch, that the Romans had a change of heart: “that which was called 
cowardice and sluggishness in Fabius before the battle, immediately after the battle was 
thought to be no simple human reasoning, but rather, some divine and wonderful 
intelligence” (Fab. 17.5).305 It was the effective destruction of two consular armies, 
rather than any actual success on Fabius' part, that changed the popular opinion of 
Fabius' cautious strategy against Hannibal. For Plutarch, military success in the Rome of 
Fabius’ time, just like Marius’, could easily be overlooked by the Roman people. 
 Plutarch provides few specific details of Marius’ actions during the Social War, 
but that which Plutarch focuses on is particularly important to our understanding of 
military leadership in the Pyrrhus-Marius as a whole. After his initial mention of 
Marius’ unpopularity at the time, Plutarch records an exchange between Marius and 
Pompaedius Silo, whom he erroneously calls Publius Silo, the leader of the Marsi.306 
The confrontation between the two generals is worth quoting in full:  
λέγεται δὲ Ποπαιδίου Σίλωνος, ὃς μέγιστον εἶχε τῶν πολεμίων ἀξίωμα καὶ δύναμιν, 
εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτόν “εἰ μέγας εἶ στρατηγὸς ὦ Μάριε, διαγώνισαι καταβάς”, 
ἀποκρίνασθαι· “σὺ μὲν οὖν, εἰ μέγας εἶ στρατηγός, ἀνάγκασόν με διαγωνίσασθαι μὴ 
βουλόμενον” (Mar. 33.4). 
                                                 
305  ἡ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς μάχης Φαβίου δειλία καὶ ψυχρότης λεγομένη μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθὺς οὐδ' ἀνθρώπινος 
ἐδόκει λογισμός, ἀλλὰ θεῖόν τι χρῆμα διανοίας καὶ δαιμόνιον (Fab. 17.5). 
306 Perrin (1920), 555 n.1; cf. Cato Minor 2.1-4.  




It is said that Publius Silo, who had the greatest authority and power among the enemy, 
once said to him, “if you are a great general, Marius, come down and fight us”; to which 
Marius answered, “No, but you, if you are a great general, force me to fight you against 
my will.”   
 
This anecdote has the immediate purpose of supporting Plutarch's claim just before, that 
Marius demonstrated great patience during the Social War and was not “unduly irritated 
by the insults and challenges” (Mar. 33.3) of his enemies. I would suggest, however, that 
this brief exchange between Silo and Marius also provides significant insight into 
Plutarch's conception of generalship in the Pyrrhus-Marius. Marius' refusal to fight 
against an apparently superior enemy, despite his advanced age and the implications of 
cowardice in this section, is completely in character with his earlier military career. 
Throughout the Life, Marius had been particularly adept at dictating the terms of battle, 
and this skill formed the basis of his strategy against the Germanic tribes.307 While this 
exchange thus provides little new information about Marius' character or leadership, it 
does recall a similar scene from the end of the Pyrrhus. After his retreat from Sparta, 
Pyrrhus confronted Antigonus, who was encamped upon a hill outside Argos with his 
army; Pyrrhus insulted Antigonus and challenged him to come down and fight, but 
Antigonus refused, and Pyrrhus saw no alternative but to march against Argos (Pyrrh. 
31.1-2). It was already clear in the Pyrrhus that the Epirote’s failure to dislodge 
Antigonus represented a significant military mistake, as Antigonus’ army subsequently 
trapped Pyrrhus in the streets of Argos, causing his death. However, that the encounter 
between Pyrrhus and Antigonus could be interpreted as a failed test of Pyrrhus’ 
                                                 
307 Especially at the beginning of his campaign against the Teutones (Mar. 15.1-3).  
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generalship only becomes clear upon reading the Marius. Marius’ retort to Silo not only 
reinforces his status as a good general, but causes the reader to question Pyrrhus’ 
generalship in the same situation. Moreover, I would suggest that it is significant that 
such a parallel comes at the very end of Plutarch’s narrative of Marius’ military career. 
By this point in the Life, the reader has seen multiple proofs of Marius’ military ability, 
and has no reason to believe that Marius is anything but a great general. Not only, then, 
does the reader see Silo’s taunt as patently false – Marius has no need to prove his 
ability as a general – but he is also much more willing to accept what Marius says as an 
accurate assessment of the situation because it is coming from a successful general. By 
prompting the reader to trust in Marius’ military analysis throughout his Life, Plutarch 
lays the groundwork for the reader to understand Marius’ criticism of Silo’s generalship 
as a criticism of Pyrrhus’ as well. Indeed, that Marius and Pyrrhus were on opposite 
sides of their respective engagements (Marius the defender; Pyrrhus the attacker), makes 
the parallels of this scene even stronger. Their opposing roles in such similar situations 
make it easy for the reader to conflate the two episodes in his mind, thus imagining 
Pyrrhus unable to dislodge Marius from an advantageous position and suffering Marius’ 
stinging criticism of his generalship as a result. Marius’ demonstrated superiority to Silo 
and implied superiority to Pyrrhus is an appropriate way for Plutarch to finish his 
discussion of Marius’ military achievements, as it shows Marius to be as successful at 
the end of his military career as he was at the start. 
 Plutarch's brief account of Marius' actions during the Social War is the last 
military narrative in the Life. Unlike in the Pyrrhus, of course, there is substantially 
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more narrative in the Marius after the end of his military career, and so Marius' 
successful military career is removed from his own ignoble end. Despite the uncertainty 
that remains over Marius' actual responsibility for the final defeat of Jugurtha and the 
victory over the Cimbri at Vercellae, Plutarch portrays him as a skilled and successful 
commander. Marius' strengths lay in his planning, his patience, and the thorough training 
of his soldiers, which Plutarch consistently highlights in each of his major military 
campaigns.  
 
Comparison of Generalship in the Pyrrhus-Marius 
 As addressed at the beginning of this chapter, there is no concluding synkrisis to 
the Pyrrhus-Marius, and so there is consequently no direct comparison by Plutarch 
regarding their military careers. The consistency and detail with which Plutarch treats 
their generalship throughout the pair, however, does allow readers to draw their own 
conclusions. Many of the extant synkriseis that address the military careers of their 
subjects focus on relatively simplistic criteria. Plutarch frequently compares numbers of 
victories earned or losses sustained, degree of bravery, available resources, quality of 
opponents, and scale of achievements.308 It is certainly possible to compare the 
generalship of Pyrrhus and Marius in these ways as well. To start with perhaps the 
crudest method of comparison, Pyrrhus decisively lost battles at Beneventum (Pyrrh. 
25.1-5), Sparta (Pyrrh. 27.1-30.1), and Argos (Pyrrh. 31.1-34.6), whereas Marius 
                                                 
308 Number of victories: Cim.-Luc. 2.1; Per.-Fab. 2.1-2; Pel.-Mar. 2.1; bravery: The.-Rom. 1.3-4; Age.-
Pomp. 3.3-5; Phil.-Flam. 2.3; resources:  Phil.-Fla. 2.1-2; quality of opponents: Cim.-Luc. 3.5; scale of 
victories: Lys.-Sulla 4.4;  Age.-Pomp. 3.1-2; Ari.-Cato 5.1-2. 
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remained undefeated throughout his entire career. In terms of quantity, Marius crushed a 
barbarian force of more than 100,000 men (Mar. 21.2), far more than Pyrrhus ever faced. 
On the other hand, Pyrrhus fought and won against Romans and Greeks, while Marius 
primarily fought against uncivilized barbarians except for a few small battles during the 
Social War (Mar. 33.1-3).309 Both men were excellent and brave soldiers before they 
became generals, as seen by Pyrrhus' actions at Ipsus (Pyrrh. 4.3) and Marius' against 
the Celtiberians (Mar. 3.2-3) and Numidians (Mar. 8.1-2). However, while Plutarch 
describes Pyrrhus' bravery and prowess in battle at every occasion (Pyrrh. 7.4-5; 16.7-8; 
22.6; 24.2-4; 30.5-6), he only speaks of Marius taking part in combat once after 
becoming general, saying simply that he was in better shape than his soldiers and that he 
surpassed them all in bravery (Mar. 20.6).  
 According to just these criteria, while Marius may appear to have an edge in the 
number and scale of his victories, it would be difficult to argue outright that Marius was 
the superior general. However, as we have seen, Plutarch's treatment of their generalship 
throughout the pair is far more detailed and nuanced than such a limited comparison. 
Throughout the Pyrrhus, Plutarch consistently identifies Pyrrhus' generalship as based 
almost entirely on his own individual abilities in combat. Although his martial prowess 
did indeed grant him victory against Pantauchus and at Eryx, this proved to be the 
exception rather than the rule. When he was out-maneuvered by his opponents, as he 
was at Beneventum, Sparta, and Argos, Pyrrhus proved unable to deal with the 
                                                 
309 Although Marius's most significant victories were against barbarians, Plutarch dedicates an entire 
chapter to building up the threat that the Teutones and Cimbri posed to Rome (Mar. 9.1-9). 
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unexpected situation. Only at Asculum did Pyrrhus demonstrate some of the sound 
generalship that one would expect from him, making sure to choose a battlefield 
appropriate for his cavalry after an inconclusive first day of fighting, but even there, as 
at Herculaneum, it was only the blunt force of Pyrrhus' elephants that granted him some 
semblance of victory. This is a clear and consistent theme throughout the Life, yet it is 
also one that is not only surprising, but often difficult for a reader to accept. At Pyrrh. 8, 
as we have seen, Plutarch focuses on Pyrrhus' sterling reputation among his 
contemporaries. Both Macedonian soldiers and famous generals compared Pyrrhus with 
Alexander and considered him one of the foremost generals of history; moreover, 
Pyrrhus had written and read extensively on military affairs, considering it the only 
kingly branch of study (Pyrrh. 8.1-3). Similarly, Plutarch’s effusive praise of Pyrrhus’ 
actions at the beginning of the Battle of Asculum (Pyrrh. 16.11) leads the reader to 
expect the Epirote to show similar skill and dynamism in battles throughout the rest of 
the Life. It is indeed surprising, then, that someone as highly-regarded and well-versed 
in military affairs as Pyrrhus would so often appear to be as reactive and unimaginative 
on the battlefield as he proves to be.  
 The Marius’ portrayal of its subject’s generalship is equally surprising. While 
Plutarch does mention Marius’ military education at the beginning of the Life, his lack 
of detail on the subject (referring to it simply as στρατιωτικῆς παιδείας, Mar. 2.1), 
particularly compared to the detail with which he treats Pyrrhus’ academic interest in 
military science, does not suggest that Marius will be a particularly thoughtful or 
considered general. This is compounded by the reference to his warlike nature (Mar. 
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2.1) and his total disregard for Greek learning (Mar. 2.2-4). Nevertheless, it is Marius, 
far more than Pyrrhus, who appears to have mastered the art of generalship. He trained 
and prepared his soldiers effectively before the Germanic campaigns, adapted to 
changing circumstances at Aquae Sextiae when the battle began accidentally, and kept 
his army largely intact by demonstrating eminent patience against both German and 
Italian opponents. Such qualitative differences in the generalship of Pyrrhus and Marius 
are difficult to bring out through the comparison of simple statistics that Plutarch often 
makes in concluding synkriseis, as seen above, but they are nevertheless visible in the 
military narratives that Plutarch constructs in the pair. 
 Another important point of comparison that Plutarch brings out within the 
military narratives of the Pyrrhus-Marius is the contrast between each man’s reputation 
and actual military success. The importance and impact of reputation is most clearly 
seen in the Pyrrhus. Plutarch twice relates detailed praise of his military ability: first the 
praise of specific generals such as Antigonus and Hannibal (Pyrrh. 8.5), then the praise 
of anonymous commentators (Pyrrh. 26.1). I have already discussed the difficulties of 
taking such praise for his reputation at face value, above, but however Plutarch expects a 
reader of the Life to interpret these passages he makes it clear that Pyrrhus did indeed 
possess a sterling reputation among men at the time. As mentioned above, the common 
Macedonian soldiers clearly looked up to Pyrrhus, and saw him as exhibiting several of 
the characteristics of Alexander (Pyrrh. 8.1). This admiration, unlike the praise of 
contemporary or later generals, actually had a practical benefit for Pyrrhus during his 
career. After Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia at the behest of the other diadochoi, he was 
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confronted by Demeterius, who thought that he could more easily defeat him than 
Lysimachus. However, when Demetrius had encamped near Pyrrhus’ army, both local 
Beroreans and some of Pyrrhus’ own men infiltrated Demetrius’ camp, and by 
describing Pyrrhus’ irresistibility in battle, vigor, and love of his soldiers, convinced so 
many of Demetrius’ soldiers to defect to Pyrrhus that Demetrius was forced to withdraw 
(Pyrrh. 11). An even more impressive display of the strength of Pyrrhus’ reputation 
comes after the Epirote was forced to retreat from Italy, when he induced Antigonus’ 
phalanx to come over to his army by stretching out his hand and calling out the 
infantry’s officers (Pyrrh. 26.8). Even though he had no lasting achievements to show 
for his years in Italy and Sicily, Pyrrhus’ reputation was still such that the common 
Macedonian soldiers flocked to his banner. The strength of Pyrrhus’ reputation, 
however, only highlights the reality that his military achievements routinely fail to live 
up to the reader’s expectations throughout the Life. As discussed above, while Pyrrhus’ 
heroic style of individual leadership, reminiscent as it was of Achilles and Alexander, 
inspired admiration across the Greek world, it translated into neither lasting military 
success nor even significant individual victories.   
 Military reputation is less of a theme in Marius’ Life than it is in the Pyrrhus, but 
it becomes apparent in a comparison between the two. On the one hand, Marius saw 
even more practical benefit from his reputation for military skill than Pyrrhus did. 
Unlike Pyrrhus, Marius needed popular support in order to maintain his political and 
military command, and he was able to translate the fame from his achievements in the 
Jugurtine War and the impending threat of Germanic invasion into his first four 
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consulships (Mar. 9.1, 11.1, 12.1, 14.6-14). His resounding victory over the Teutones 
similarly brought about his fifth (Mar. 22.4). On the other hand, while Pyrrhus kept his 
reputation for military skill even after being forced to retreat in failure from Sicily and 
Italy, Marius began to lose his reputation while still achieving military successes. 
Plutarch attributes much of Marius’ subsequent fall from public grace to his fear of 
losing the favor of the multitude and his poor choices of political allies (Mar. 28-31).310 
His loss of reputation for his military ability during the Social War, however, as 
discussed above, comes despite yet another impressive victory and more examples of his 
considered patience (Mar. 33.2). Moreover, the criticism of Marius’ generalship that 
Plutarch relates, that he was slow in making attacks and given to hesitation (βραδὺς γὰρ 
ἐφάνη ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ὄκνου τε περὶ πάντα καὶ μελλήσεως ὑπόπλεως, Mar. 33.1), is 
even more jarring because it is simply a negative way of viewing his patience, which 
was responsible for so much of his success. This is admittedly a small point within the 
entire Life, and when read on its own appears to have little significance. When taken 
with Plutarch’s portrayal of military reputation in the Pyrrhus, however, I would suggest 
that it can be seen as part of a warning by Plutarch about putting too much faith in a 
general’s military δόξα. Just as the effusive praise of Pyrrhus’ generalship 
overshadowed his actual accomplishments, so did later criticism of Marius’ leadership 
fault him for one of his greatest assets. Neither is completely wrong: Pyrrhus was a 
tremendous fighter in single combat, and Marius often delayed significantly before he 
made an attack. As the parallel treatments of reputation in the Pyrrhus-Marius suggest, 
                                                 
310 Duff (1999), 118-121. 
   
216 
 
however, and as is borne out by the Parallel Lives themselves, it is necessary to observe 
a man’s actions and not rely solely on his reputation. 
 A comparative reading of leadership in the Pyrrhus-Marius, then, allows for a 
significantly more nuanced understanding of their military abilities than can be seen 
from either Life on its own. Important themes concerning generalship, the value of 
military education, and reputation run across both Lives, and provide avenues for a 
direct comparison of two generals’ successes and skills. Pyrrhus’ reputation for 
generalship is significant, but despite his physical similarities to Alexander the Great and 
his single-minded focus on military education, he achieved neither the immediate nor 
lasting successes that Marius achieved. Upon finishing the Pyrrhus-Marius, the reader is 
left to conclude that Plutarch considered Marius' style of generalship to be clearly 
superior to Pyrrhus'. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Pyrrhus-Marius provides an excellent opportunity to apply many of the 
lessons in the previous chapters. In the first chapter I examined how Plutarch uses 
extended military narrative in order to highlight key aspects of his subjects’ unique 
styles of generalship, and this pair is one of the best examples of that. Throughout the 
Pyrrhus, Plutarch spends a significant portion of the Life describing Pyrrhus’ military 
campaigns across Greece, Italy, and Sicily. As we have seen, each part of the narrative 
contributes to Plutarch’s portrayal of Pyrrhus as a general in the style of Alexander who 
can never quite match the success of his predecessor. Plutarch’s praise of Pyrrhus’ 
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battlefield control at Herculaneum (Pyrrh. 16.11), discussed in detail above, stands out 
in large part because it contrasts with this picture of Pyrrhus’ individualized leadership 
that characterizes his actions in the rest of the Life. Plutarch uses military narrative in 
the Marius to similar effect, consistently characterizing his generalship during both the 
Germanic invasions and the Social War as being marked by foresight and prudence. He 
is shown to anticipate the actions of both his own soldiers (Mar. 16.1-17.1) and those of 
the enemy (Mar. 20.5-21.1), and to be unperturbed by the intimidation (Mar. 15.5-16.2) 
or taunts (Mar. 33.2) of others while on the battlefield.311 The contrast between these 
two styles of leadership is a clear stimulus for the reader to judge between the 
generalship of Pyrrhus and Marius, an exercise which Plutarch is shown to have valued 
and which is even more important in the absence of a concluding synkrisis. 
 In addition to the judgment on their military leadership, Plutarch also invites the 
reader of the Pyrrhus-Marius to consider the effectiveness of military education in the 
pair. In Chapter 2, I examined the importance of military education to the ability of 
many statesmen in the Parallel Lives to benefit their cities despite their moral failings. 
Interestingly, however, while Marius is one of those whose military education has a clear 
impact on his service to Rome, Pyrrhus’ military education appears to have benefited 
neither him nor his kingdom of Epirus. Indeed, as we have seen throughout this chapter, 
there is clear irony in the relationship between military education and military success in 
this pair. Pyrrhus, whose academic interest in the art of war was such that he wrote on 
                                                 
311 As Plutarch observes, Marius’ steadfast bravery completely abandoned him on the political stage (Mar. 
28.3). 
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the subject, is consistently unable to translate his knowledge into practical success on the 
battlefield; Marius, on whose military education Plutarch provides no real detail, proves 
himself to be a thoughtful and considered commander who wins battle after battle. That 
Plutarch provides more detail about Pyrrhus’ military education than Marius is mostly 
due to the availability of sources, as Plutarch tended to possess considerably more 
information on the education of his Greek subjects than his Roman ones.312 
Nevertheless, it remains striking that whatever Marius’ στρατιωτικῆς παιδείας (Mar. 2.1) 
actually entailed, it was certainly more effective than Pyrrhus’ academic interest in 
military affairs. That both Pyrrhus and Marius suffered heavily throughout their careers 
because of their sole focus on military education and lack of Greek παιδεία is well-
established.313 At the same time, as we can see by comparing the military narratives 
from both Lives, only Marius appears to have gained any practical benefit from the 
military education that they both valued so highly. It is possible to see the 
ineffectiveness of Pyrrhus’ military education as a further warning against the dangers of 
ignoring Greek παιδεία, but I do not believe that to be the case. Plutarch makes that 
point clearly enough in the Pyrrhus-Marius as it is, and, as seen in Chapter 2, it is a 
common theme in many other Lives.314 Instead, I would suggest Plutarch is warning 
against a purely literary study of military science, advocating instead a more practical, 
hands-on approach to it, and possibly to education in general. Plutarch’s portrayal of 
                                                 
312 Pelling (2002), 306. Cf. Buszard, (2002), 7-11, on Plutarch’s sources for the Pyrrhus-Marius. 
Although, as Swain (1990), 132, has argued, Plutarch’s lack of sources on a subject’s education do not 
stop him from making education a relevant theme in the Life.  
313 The importance of παιδεία – more significantly the consequences of its absence – to the pair has 
received considerable comment from Duff (1999), 101-130; (2008), 16-18; Buszard (2002), 156-161. 
314 Particularly the Coriolanus, Pelopidas, and Marcellus. See above, pp. 70-73.  
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military education in the Philopoemen supports this well. In his Life, Philopoemen 
appears just as focused on military education as Pyrrhus, eschewing even those physical 
aspects of παιδεία such as athletics and wrestling that conflicted with his military 
training (Phil. 3.3-4). Like Pyrrhus, Philopoemen read treatises on military tactics and 
leadership, but, apparently unlike Pyrrhus, he preferred to “get his proof and make his 
practice on the grounds themselves” (Phil. 4.9).315 Plutarch specifically reinforces 
Philopoemen’s military practicality later in the Life, noting that Philopoemen physically 
observed the terrain before a successful battle (Phil. 14.8). Philopoemen was 
unequivocally successful throughout his military career, and even made significant 
modifications to the equipment and tactics of the Achaean phalanx (Phil. 9.1-14), which 
similarly suggests a practical and familiar understanding of the art of warfare. 
Philopoemen’s work to change the way his army fought brings the discussion back to 
Marius, who similarly made his soldiers more effective by changing both how his army 
marched (Mar. 13) and the structure of the pilum (Mar. 25.1). Marius’ use of the terrain 
to create an ambush against the Teutones (Mar. 20.5) also suggests parallels to 
Philopoemen’s tendency to plan ahead and inspect the terrain of a possible battlefield. 
Obviously, Plutarch does not provide enough information about Marius’ military 
education to draw any conclusions about what it entailed, even with these parallels to 
Philopoemen’s military habits. Nevertheless, I do believe that these parallels between 
the military contributions and habits of Marius and Philopoemen, when seen against the 
                                                 
315 ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων αὐτῶν ἐλάμβανεν ἔλεγχον καὶ μελέτην ἐποιεῖτο (Phil. 4.9). 
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failure of Pyrrhus’ own military education, advocate the need for statesmen to apply 
their study to the real world. Pyrrhus may have fought plenty of battles, but was 
consistently unable to employ his tactical or strategic knowledge on the battlefield.  
Not all pairs of Lives have such clear parallels between their military narratives; 
the military narrative in the Alexander-Caesar, for instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, is 
so grossly imbalanced towards the Caesar that there are few comparisons to make 
between their military careers. Such can also be said for other pairs, such as the 
Aristides-Cato Major or Fabius Maximus-Pericles, where Plutarch puts considerably 
more emphasis on one of his subject’s military careers than the other, and it is more 
fruitful to look at military narrative in a single Life than to compare it across the pair as I 
have done in the Pyrrhus-Marius. However, the Pyrrhus-Marius is not the only pair that 
that is amenable to an in-depth comparison of military narrative. The Sertorius-
Eumenes, as discussed in Chapter 2, also contains strong parallels between military 
narrative, particularly in terms of the use and effectiveness of military deception.316 
Similarly, the Philopoemen-Flamininus provides a good contrast between the respective 
military abilities and achievements of its subjects, many of which Plutarch points out in 
the concluding synkrisis of the pair.317 Nevertheless, the Pyrrhus-Marius stands out 
amongst the Parallel Lives for the significance of the military narrative to a thematic 
reading of the pair and the importance of military achievement to the lives of its 
                                                 
316 See above, pp. 111-119. 
317 Indeed, Plutarch’s comparison of Philopoemen and Flamininus’ military successes in the synkrisis is 
one of the most nuanced there is, and considers far more than just their number of victories. See Duff 
(1999), 267-269. 
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subjects. As flawed as they were in other aspects of their lives, both Pyrrhus and Marius 
achieved their greatest ἀρετή on the battlefield. Pyrrhus’ generalship might not have 
lived up to its high reputation, but the Epirote was nevertheless an irresistible individual 
on the battlefield; Marius, for his part, showed the patience and foresight of a great 
general while on campaign, even though those traits failed him completely in the 
political arena of Rome. 
  





 Plutarch’s Parallel Lives are an invaluable source of information about some of 
the most important Greek and Roman figures in history, the majority of whom earned 
their fame on the battlefields of the ancient world. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
Plutarch dedicates a significant portion of many Lives to the generalship and military 
accomplishments of his subjects. As we have seen, his consistent inclusion of military 
narrative in the Parallel Lives goes beyond mere interest in the topic: Plutarch integrates 
discussion of military leadership into the portrayal of his subjects’ characters so that his 
readers might improve themselves, a theme which lies at the very heart of the Parallel 
Lives.  
 Plutarch’s military narrative, as seen in Chapter 1, forms a significant part of the 
structure and characterization of many Lives. His descriptions of battles and campaigns 
throughout the Parallel Lives, particularly those seen in the Caesar and Lucullus, 
demonstrate a clear understanding of the military accomplishments of his subjects. 
Moreover, Plutarch frequently arranges these narratives in such a way as to highlight 
specific examples of good generalship that he considered worthy of imitation, a practice 
consistent with his broader goal of improving the character of his readership by 
providing illustrations of virtue from the political and military careers of his subjects. 
These examples of good generalship embedded throughout the Parallel Lives do tend to 
be specific to the particular circumstances in the Lives in which they are found, but it is 
nevertheless possible to see a clear pattern in what Plutarch considered to be generalship 
worthy of imitation. For Plutarch, a general’s ability to plan, issue orders, and act 
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rationally is consistently the most important factor in his success on the battlefield. In his 
narrative of the Battle of Pydna in the Aemilius Paulus, Plutarch not only highlights 
Aemilius’ observation of the deterioration of the Macedonian phalanx during the battle, 
but also the chain of orders from Aemilius to subordinate officers to soldiers that enabled 
the Romans to exploit the gaps in the phalanx and achieve victory (Aem. 20.7-10). In 
Plutarch’s eyes, then, Aemilius owes his success not only to his ability to analyze and 
react to an unexpected situation, but also to his ability to relay his plan effectively to 
those who most needed to implement it. Many other generals in the Parallel Lives 
demonstrate the same rationality and thoughtfulness that Aemilius does: Plutarch 
similarly highlights the successful considered generalship of Caesar, Fabius Maximus, 
Philopoemen, and Marius, among others, throughout each of their individual Lives. 
Despite the frequency of this theme in many Lives, however, Plutarch was quick to 
identify its absence as well. He explicitly criticizes the rashness of Pelopidas and 
Marcellus that led the two generals to throw away their own lives in ill-considered 
battles; indeed, this similarity between the two men appears to have been the primary 
reason for their pairing.318 I would argue that Plutarch’s greatest disapproval of 
unthinking generalship, however, appears in the Pyrrhus-Marius. Plutarch never  
condemns Pyrrhus’ generalship in the Life outright, but as we have seen, the implicit 
comparisons between the contrasting generalship of Pyrrhus and Marius throughout the 
                                                 
318 Plutarch frames the Pelopidas-Marcellus with the theme of their wasteful deaths. His proem to the pair 
begins with a series of apophthegms on the importance of a general’s survival (Pel. 1-2), and concludes 
the final synkrisis with a criticism of their wasteful deaths (Pel.-Marc. 3). See Ingenkamp (2008) for a 
close discussion of this theme in the pair. 
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pair emphasize the ultimate ineffectiveness of Pyrrhus’ style of leadership. No aspiring 
or established general, after reading the Pyrrhus-Marius, would chose to imitate Pyrrhus 
over Marius; despite a few close-fought tactical victories, Pyrrhus’ impetuous and blunt 
leadership lead to one strategic defeat after another, while Marius’ patient and 
considered generalship bring him a string of brilliant military successes. The Pyrrhus-
Marius thus confirms Plutarch’s preference for rational generalship that is seen 
throughout the Parallel Lives, while also providing a counter-example of what style of 
generalship should be avoided. 
 It is Plutarch’s evident disapproval of brash generalship that might help explain 
the relative lack of military narrative in the Alexander, perhaps the one Life in which 
descriptions of battles and campaigns are most conspicuously lacking. It is of course 
important to take Plutarch’s own words at face value here, as he does say specifically 
that he “is leaving for others the magnitudes and battles” of Alexander’s career (Alex. 
1.3).319 Plutarch is clearly content to let other authors take on the admittedly numerous 
details of Alexander’s military accomplishments so that he can focus, as he says, on 
other aspects of the man’s life that illustrate his character (Alex. 1.1-3). There is a clear 
parallel here with the proem of the Nicias, where Plutarch explains that while he will be 
describing some of the same events that Thucydides and Philistus have, he will do so 
only “briefly and by necessity”, so that he does “not appear to be altogether negligent 
and lazy”.320 Instead, he intends to focus on revealing details about Nicias that he has 
                                                 
319 ἐάσαντας ἑτέροις τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας (Alex. 1.3).  
320 ἐπιδραμὼν βραχέως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελὴς δοκῶ καὶ ἀργὸς εἶναι (Nic. 
1.5). 
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found from a variety of different sources and that have not been suitably discussed by 
other authors (Nic. 1.5). It is likely that much of Plutarch’s cursory treatment of 
Alexander’s famous battles of the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela stems from a similar 
desire to avoid re-treading familiar narratives while still doing his due diligence as an 
author. Nevertheless, I would suggest that Plutarch’s relative quiet about Alexander’s 
generalship throughout the Life may also be in part due to his disapproval of the 
Macedonian’s style of generalship. It is clear from what military narrative Plutarch 
includes in the Alexander that he considered his subject’s generalship prone to rashness. 
Indeed, Plutarch lays this charge against him twice just during his description of the 
Battle of the Granicus, saying that in his attack across the river “appeared to be frenzied 
and leading according to madness rather than judgement”, and that his rush against the 
Greek mercenaries at the end of the battle was “influenced by anger more than reason” 
and led to his horse being killed from underneath him (Alex. 16.4-16.14).321 Plutarch is 
less critical of Alexander’s generalship elsewhere in the Life, and even praises it in his 
brief accounts of Issus and Gaugamela; nevertheless, Plutarch also frequently mentions 
other instances in which Alexander’s penchant for fighting at the front leads to his injury 
or near-death.322 It is significant that Plutarch, who tends to avoid overtly criticizing the 
subjects of his Parallel Lives, is as disparaging as he is about Alexander’s generalship, 
                                                 
321 ἔδοξε μανικῶς καὶ πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ στρατηγεῖν (Alex. 16.4); ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ 
λογισμῷ πρῶτος ἐμβαλών (Alex. 16.14). 
322 Plutarch acknowledges the importance of Alexander’s generalship to his victory at Issus (20.7-8), and 
praises his confidence and calculation in the midst of the fighting at Gaugamela (32.4). Nevertheless, he 
appears to be more interested in highlighting Alexander’s injuries in battle at Issus (Alex. 20.8-9) and 
against the Malli (Alex. 63.1-14); Plutarch also comments on Alexander’s propensity to court danger more 
generally on two other occasions (Alex. 41.1, 58.1). 
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especially considering the Macedonian’s fame and unquestioned success in battle. 
Alexander’s impetuousness in battle is just one manifestation of his excessive θυμός, 
which forms an important theme throughout the Life.323 It also, however, clearly 
parallels the rashness exhibited in battle by Pyrrhus, a rashness which brought the 
Epirote no lasting success and which we have seen Plutarch discourage in the Pyrrhus-
Marius. Indeed, the pattern of military leadership that Plutarch discusses in the Pyrrhus-
Marius is largely similar to that in the Alexander-Caesar. While it is certainly true that 
Alexander’s individualistic style of generalship led to considerably more military 
success than Pyrrhus achieved, I would suggest that Plutarch’s mixed portrayal of 
Alexander’s generalship within the Life leads the reader to see Caesar as the superior 
general of the pair. Caesar may have had a slower start to his military career, as Plutarch 
highlights with the story of the Roman weeping at the thought of how much more 
Alexander had achieved at the same age (Caes. 11.5-6). However, as we examined in 
depth in Chapter 1, shortly after this anecdote Plutarch begins the first of several in-
depth analyses of Caesar’s military campaigns, throughout which he portrays Caesar’s 
generalship in an unequivocally positive manner.324 Plutarch’s relative disregard of 
Alexander’s military accomplishments, especially in comparison to his detailed 
narratives of Caesar’s, has the effect of magnifying the Roman’s own generalship. 
Plutarch certainly had other reasons for not focusing more heavily on Alexander’s 
generalship in his Life, as discussed above, and he still portrays the Macedonian king 
                                                 
323 Cf. Mossman (1988), 85; Duff (1999), 85-6. 
324 See above, pp. 34-40, for details. 
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positively. Nevertheless, in the Alexander-Caesar, just as in the Pyrrhus-Marius and 
across the rest of the Parallel Lives, Plutarch’s treatment of his subjects’ military 
leadership demonstrates a clear preference for rational and considered generalship. 
 These parallels reinforce the importance of synkrsis to the deeper understanding 
of generalship in the Parallel Lives. Even though both the Pyrrhus-Marius and 
Alexander-Caesar are missing their customary concluding synkriseis, we have seen that 
the internal comparisons both within and between pairs make it possible to infer 
Plutarch’s judgments about his subjects’ military careers. For the majority of pairs which 
do have extant formal synkriseis, however, these internal comparisons serve to reinforce 
the emphasis that Plutarch often places on the generalship of his subjects. The frequent 
discussion of military leadership in the concluding synkriseis demonstrates Plutarch’s 
consistent interest in the military accomplishments and careers of his subjects, and the 
criteria by which he judges military success in the synkriseis show how thoroughly he 
analyzes his subjects’ generalship. He is interested not just in the scale of battles or the 
number of victories a general may have accumulated, but also in the influence of fortune 
on a general’s career, the impact of his military innovations, and his ability to make 
productive use of his victories. Moreover, the judgments that Plutarch makes between 
the military careers of his subjects in these final synkriseis incentivize the reader to re-
consider the individual Lives themselves; this, in turn, serves to reinforce the lessons of 
generalship that Plutarch integrated into the military narratives of the Lives. 
Plutarch wrote the Parallel Lives, he says, so that his readers could better 
themselves through observing and emulating the virtuous deeds of great past statesmen 
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(Per. 1-2; Aem. 1). Due to Plutarch’s expressed interest in demonstrating the character of 
his subjects, the Parallel Lives are frequently read today for their insight on the moral 
virtues of their featured statesmen; virtuous actions are observed not so that they can be 
imitated, but so that they provide insight into good character and correct behaviour. 
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with this trend: modern readers are in no 
position to imitate the political or military deeds of classical statesmen, but many of the 
moral lessons contained within the Parallel Lives have a timelessness that encourages 
self-reflection even today.  
 This current focus is, however, limited, and does not do justice to the breadth of 
Plutarch’s interest and knowledge that is represented in the Parallel Lives. The majority 
of statesmen who are subjects of a Life either began their careers as generals or were 
known for little else, and with few exceptions individual Lives reflect the significance 
that the art of generalship played in their subjects’ careers. Plutarch was not merely 
concerned with the morality of military success, but also with the specific methods and 
resources employed by generals to achieve their victories on the battlefield. Moreover, in 
keeping with his stated purpose of the Parallel Lives, Plutarch expected that at least 
some of his readers would be able to improve their generalship through reading the 
Lives of great military leaders in the same way that others would be able to improve 
their character. This thesis has demonstrated that Plutarch’s portrayal of military 
leadership is more considered, consistent, and integral to the Parallel Lives than has 
been traditionally recognized, and that it is worthy of further study in its own right.  
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